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ABSTRACT 
This is an empirical study of leaders and how they affect organizational 
performance. Its context is the research university as a knowledge- 
intensive organization. It appears to be the first of its kind. 
The thesis explores whether the characteristics of a leader in position 
today can tell us about the future success of their institution. It asks the 
question: Should research universities be led by top scholars? One 
reason why universities are an interesting case is that, unusually for 
knowledge-intensive organizations, their leaders' technical expertise can 
arguably be measured reasonably objectively. 
Using cross-sectional analysis, the first approach adopted in this thesis is 
to identify whether accomplished scholars are currently leading the 
world's top universities and business schools. It demonstrates -- using a 
variety of data sets, and in a variety of settings, including a check on the 
role of outliers -- that better universities and business schools are led by 
presidents and deans with systematically higher numbers of life-time 
scholarly citations. 
Next the dissertation attempts to go beyond simple cross-sectional 
patterns to address the question of causality. It does so in a longitudinal 
study that follows the performance of a panel of 55 universities over a 
nine-year period from 1992 to 2001. Using regression analysis, this 
thesis uncovers some evidence that is consistent with the existence of a 
causal relationship between the research ability of a leader and the future 
achievement of their institution. The results suggest that a university 
tends to improve in the UK Research Assessment Exercise if its leader 
has been a successful scholar. 
Qualitative evidence in the form of interviews with university leaders then 
motivates a theory of strategic leadership that might explain the statistical 
patterns. It is argued in the thesis that scholars may make effective 
leaders for reasons that are both internal and external to the individual. A 
scholar-leader, it is suggested, influences performance because of an 
inherent knowledge of the core business of a research university, and 
also through the extension of powers acquired by being viewed as 
credible by followers. Finally, the thesis concludes by asking whether 
university governing bodies appoint the right people. 
The central argument being made in this thesis is that where expert 
knowledge is the key factor that characterises an organization it is expert 
knowledge that should also be key in the selection of its leader. 
vii 
Introduction 
Introduction 
This thesis is an interdisciplinary study of leadership and performance. It 
argues that in knowledge-intensive organizations, where the majority of 
employees are expert workers, having a leader who is also an expert may 
be beneficial to the institution's long-term performance. The thesis 
chooses, as its example, universities. It appears to be some of the first 
empirical work of its kind. Although there is a large academic literature 
on leadership, there has been little empirical analysis about leaders of 
knowledge-intensive organizations and in particular in universities. 
This study explores whether the characteristics of a leader in position 
today can tell us about the future success of their institution - more 
specifically, it asks the question, is there a relationship between university 
performance and leadership by an accomplished scholar? A natural 
alternative argument takes the form: what the leader in the knowledge- 
based sector needs is primarily high managerial ability allied merely to 
some acceptable minimum level of technical ability. By contrast, what the 
later data suggest is a fairly smooth relationship between the level of 
scholarship and university quality. 
The focus here is on strategic leadership in context (Fiedler 1967, Bass 
1985, Pettigrew 1985,1990, Leavy & Wilson 1994, Bryman 1996, 
Carpenter 2002). In addressing the research question, this thesis 
attempts to combine quantitative and qualitative data. It relies mostly on 
statistical analysis but also includes interviews with leaders. 
Four separate data sets have been created by the author. Before the 
empirical evidence is presented, the thesis sketches a theory of strategic 
leadership. 
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Why is this research important? 
First, around the world, interest in university leadership and governance 
has grown as the sector has become increasingly competitive and global. 
Major changes have taken place in institutions of higher education, and 
subsequently in the role and responsibilities of their leaders (see for 
example Bargh, Bocock, Scott, & Smith 2000, Bok 2003, Tierney 2004, 
among others). Therefore, it seems valuable to try to understand 
successful leadership in these times. 
Second, and more importantly, as we live in a world where competitive 
advantage arguably depends on intellectual innovation -- not primarily on 
the manufacturing of physical items -- we need to know more about 
leaders in the knowledge-intensive sector, especially in universities. The 
world's top institutions are located in the US. Evidence for this is 
presented in Chapter 3, where, in an international league table of 
universities, the top ranking institutions are overwhelmingly American. It 
may be important, therefore, to try to uncover what differentiates these 
institutions from their rivals. This seems especially important if 
universities in the rest of the world are to attain levels of excellence and 
compete for resources, and, crucially, the best faculty. 
On leadership, a comment from a UK vice chancellor (VC), head of the 
only private university in England, seems relevant. 
¢ `... The best universities in the world are those of the American Ivy 
League, and they are run by academics. The connection is not hard 
to make. ' Terence Kealey, VC, Buckingham University quote (in the 
Times Higher Education Supplement 25 August 2006). 
Data presented later show that leaders of the top universities are not only 
academics they are notable scholars. Interestingly, the most successful 
US institutions are predominantly private, with some famous exceptions, 
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for example the University of California. This raises questions about the 
role of governments. 
In the UK in the last two decades there have been moves towards 
introducing a business culture into the public sector, often called `new 
managerialism' (Clarke & Newman, 1994,1997), or its less ideological 
counterpart, `new public management' (Hood 2000). The dissertation is 
not the place to review the history of managerialism, but in the UK it is 
sometimes seen as having been initiated under Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and embedded under Prime Minister Tony Blair (Andrews 
1998). 
Kogan describes leadership in British universities as being disposed 
towards `managerialism' as early as 1984, and he explains that it started 
because of the intense financial pressures on universities at that time 
(Kogan 1984). A milestone in this change of attitude came from the UK 
government commissioned Jarratt Report (1985). Jarratt both predicted 
and advocated that university leaders should be appointed because of 
their managerial qualities as opposed to their `collegial or charismatic 
authority' (1985). The assertion that VCs in the 1980's were becoming 
more akin to CEO's, as suggested by Jarratt, was the theme of a study by 
Bargh, Bocock, Scott & Smith (2000). But they found little evidence that 
UK vice chancellors were acquiring the powers of chief executives. Yet 
this may be changing. In the qualitative interviews reported in Chapter 6 
there is some evidence that UK vice chancellors believe they are 
becoming more powerful as leaders. With regards to any change in 
culture, Barge and colleagues noted an increase in the use of 
management practices, and in managerial jargon being used in 
documents, for example, university reports (2000). Interestingly, they 
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suggested that it was the older research universities, as opposed to the 
newer institutions', that adopted a more corporate style. 
Universities in the UK have increasingly been seen as part of the public 
sector (Neave 1988, Jenkins 1995, Greatrix 2005) which might also 
explain the adoption of a more managerial approach. Since the late 
1980's, controls over the affairs of universities have shifted towards 
central government (Neave 1988, Jenkins 1995, Greatrix 2005). This is 
again attributed by some authors to Margaret Thatcher (Barnett 1988, 
Neave 1988, Jenkins 1995, Stevens 2004), who, it is argued, reduced the 
autonomy of universities and concomitantly the power of faculty. 
There is some evidence to suggest that universities in the UK have 
become more managerial (see Deem 1998, Deem & Brehony 2005). In 
addition, their remit has broadened beyond solely the generation and 
dissemination of knowledge. For example, New Labour has emphasized 
ideas about universities contributing directly to national wealth-creation 
(Middlehurst & Elton 1992, Pollitt 1993, Greatrix 2005), and they have 
encouraged links with business (see the Lambert Review of Business- 
University Collaboration 20032). The reason that successive governments 
have sought to become more involved in the running of universities is 
largely believed to be because of a desire to reduce public funding 
(Barnett 1988, Neave 1988, Shattock 1994, Jenkins 1995, Stevens 
2004). Yet, it could be argued that UK research universities are merely 
publicly assisted, as they receive only marginal amounts of direct funding 
from government. 
The views of one long-standing UK vice chancellor interviewed for this 
research are interesting: 
' In 1992 the UK higher education sector expanded substantially as polytechnics were 
granted university status. At this time the numbers doubled from approximately 50 to 
over 100. 
2 Available from www. hm-treasury. gov. uk 
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"Since the Thatcher years, and then into Blair's period, universities 
have been condemned for being badly managed places. As if they 
are run by amateurs. / completely disagree and in fact I see it as 
insulting. I believe that the corporate sector has many more 
failures and also corruption and cover-ups. Don't get me wrong, I 
think the corporate sector has many things to teach us, particularly 
in the area of finance and project management, for example. But 
these can be brought in. They don't need to reside in senior 
positions. 
"If we have not been efficient then I would like to see some 
evidence in terms of outputs. We have successfully educated a 
huge number of graduates, and for very little money. UK 
universities are the second most-cited after the US, we have a 
massive share of the overseas market, and indeed many 
European countries are trying to emulate our system. " 
This thesis rests on a central tenet: that research universities are 
knowledge-intensive organizations (Mintzberg 1979). Their core 
business is generating knowledge, through research, and disseminating it 
through publishing and teaching. It is not, fundamentally, service 
provision. Without question, service is important, but it should arguably 
be viewed as supporting the core functions. In professional service 
firms, which are somewhat akin to universities, professional staff are 
treated as `autonomous competent individuals' (Handy 1984, in 
Middlehurst & Elton 1992, pp. 225) who, on the whole, manage 
themselves. This does not mean that administrative and management 
support is unnecessary, only that management functions should not 
impinge too directly on professionals (Handy 1984, Maister 1993). 
In some ways this view has its roots in the early literature about the 
differences between management and leadership. Management is about 
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maintaining systems and instituting controls, and managers are seen as 
accepting the status quo. Leaders, on the other hand, are perceived as 
taking the longer perspective; they are more directly involved with 
strategy and also organizational change (Bennis & Nanus 1985, Bennis 
1989, Kotter 1988,1990, Middlehurst & Elton 1992). This thesis will 
argue that the distinction between managers and leaders may be even 
more important in knowledge-based organizations because of the 
technical ability required by those who lead experts. 
Figure A presents the dissertation's argument in a schematic model that 
links the appointment of a scholar with the performance of a university. It 
suggests that if a governing body has decided upon a strategy of raising 
or maintaining the research performance of their university, then 
appointing a leader who is a scholar may be the right choice. The model 
over-simplifies a complicated process but serves to illustrate the point 
and to introduce the key conceptual arguments presented in this thesis. 
The education and career history of university presidents3 has attracted 
interest in previous research, (Szreter 1968, Halsey and Trow 1971, 
Cohen and March 1974, Taylor 1986, Middlehurst 1993, Bargh at al 
2000, Dolton and Ma 2001), but little specific attention has been given to 
the research background of academic leaders. Yet many university 
websites make a great deal of the eminence of their president. Also, 
given the centrality of research performance in many institutional mission 
statements -- expressed through the quality of research produced and the 
scholarly reputation of staff -- it is logical to turn to the academic ability of 
their leaders. 
3 The term 'president' is generally used to denote head of university, vice chancellor, 
principal, director, rector, among other titles unless otherwise specified. When referring 
specifically to UK leaders the term vice chancellor (VC) is used. 
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Figure A. 
Model Linking Appointment of a Scholar on a Continuum 
Between Extreme Researcher and Extreme Manager with 
Later University Performance 
------ GOVERNING BODY 
LONG TERM STRATEGY 
To improve performance of core business 
Research & teaching 
CHOICE OF ! LEADER ON CONTINUUM 
I Extreme researcher Extreme manager 
CHANGE IN RESEARCH 
----- 
PERFORMANCE 
OF UNIVERSITY 
Two further points should be raised in this introduction. First, the core 
business of research universities is research and teaching. Although 
teaching is a central activity of universities, it is research quality that top 
universities prioritize. This is evident in the fact that promotion within the 
faculty is typically through a peer-review process that focuses almost 
entirely on candidates' research productivity. That is not to say that 
brilliant teaching is unimportant but that it alone will not usually lead to 
promotion in most research universities. This situation may differ in 
colleges and universities that prioritize teaching over research. 
Second, in this thesis, scholarship is not viewed as a proxy for either 
management experience or leadership skills. An `expert' leader must 
have expertise in areas other than scholarship. Most academics in senior 
leadership positions within universities have first gained management 
experience by running research centers or labs, or heading up academic 
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programs. For example, the overwhelming majority of leaders 
interviewed in this study were either deputy-heads, deans or they led 
major laboratories before their step to the top position. Scholarship, 
therefore, is already a prerequisite of leadership in universities. To head 
up an academic department or school, one must first be a senior member 
of the faculty, usually a full tenured professor. 
How do we define a research university? 
The term `research university' has been used for a number of years in the 
United States (US) where there are 3,500 higher education institutions 
that require classification (Brodie & Banner 2005). In the United Kingdom 
(UK), `research intensive universities' (Shattock 2003) have been 
identified since the introduction of the Research Assessment Exercise in 
1986, and also the expansion of the higher education sector in the early 
1990's. 
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching produces a 
regular report entitled `A Classification of Institutions of Higher Education'. 
The report4 states that research universities are those that `offer a full 
range of baccalaureate (under-graduate) programs, are committed to 
graduate education through the doctorate, and give high priority to 
research'. Research universities have a `commitment to create new 
knowledge', and therefore `they consider research capability as a primary 
qualification for appointment, promotion, and tenure of faculty members, 
and they pride themselves on having world-class scholars among their 
ranks (1994). ' This thesis uses the Carnegie definition of a research 
university. 
4A Classification of Institutions of Higher Education (1994). 
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Structure of Thesis 
The research presented in this thesis draws upon four different data sets 
that have been compiled by the author for this study. Three chapters are 
quantitative and the fourth offers qualitative data from interviews with 
leaders in universities in the UK and US. 
The hypothesis explored in the dissertation is underpinned by theories 
which argue that knowledge-intensive organizations perform better if led 
by experts. Therefore, in Chapter 1 the proposition is offered with 
supporting arguments and theoretical models. It is suggested that 
scholar-leaders, those with high technical ability, are at an advantage 
because they have a greater understanding of the organization's core 
business and, also, they appear more credible to those being led. 
Chapter 2 opens the empirical section with an outline of the method and 
sample. It also focuses on the thesis' key variable or characteristic, 
namely the lifetime citations of presidents. Citations are used here as a 
measure of how research-active and successful a president has been in 
his or her academic career. Each academic discipline has very different 
citation conventions. To be able to compare the lifetime citations of a 
biologist with an economist or historian requires a process of 
normalization. Information about the collection of citations and their 
standardization is outlined in Chapter 2. Also included is a review of the 
ethical procedures followed in this study. 
A first step to reaching the dissertation's hypothesis is to ask: `Are top 
scholars currently running research universities? ' If they are not then it is 
unlikely that the leader characteristic of scholarship is important. In 
Chapter 3 this question is explored empirically by examining what the 
world's top universities actually do. If the best institutions -- who arguably 
have the widest choice of candidates -- systematically appoint top 
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scholars as their presidents, this could be one form of evidence that, on 
average, better researchers may make better presidents. Economists 
would call this a revealed preference argument. Chapter 3 then reports a 
positive correlation between the lifetime citations of a university's 
president and the position of that university in a global ranking. Statistical 
tests calculating Pearson's correlation coefficient and Spearman's rho are 
applied to cross-sectional data. The higher the university is in the global 
league table, the higher the lifetime citations of its leaders. 
Chapter 4 looks for a similar relationship between the citations of deans 
of business schools and the position of a school in the FT Global MBA 
ranking. Because business schools have the complicated task of 
reaching out to two communities - researchers and practitioners - it 
might be expected that a significant relationship will not exist. Yet, again, 
using cross-sectional analysis, a positive correlation is found between the 
position of a business school in the ranking and the prior research 
achievement of its dean. 
Chapter 5 attempts to go beyond cross-section patterns to address the 
question of causality by drawing upon longitudinal information. It does so 
by using an established measure of performance that has existed in the 
UK since 1986 - the so-called Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). 
The data come from 55 UK research universities, namely, those 
institutions that competed in the RAE in 1992 and also 1996 and 2001. 
Using regression analysis, the study uncovers evidence that seems 
consistent with the existence of a causal relationship between the 
research ability of a leader and the future performance of their university. 
The focus turns to qualitative evidence in Chapter 6. Data from 
interviews with 23 leaders in US and UK research universities are 
presented, together with statements from UK vice chancellors reported in 
5 This chapter was published in the Journal of Documentation (2006) 62(3): 388-411. 
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the Times Higher Educational Supplement. Finally, a number of 
interviews have been conducted with members of a committee to appoint 
a UK vice chancellor. Data from these are also included. 
In Chapter 7 the empirical findings are used to further discuss the theory 
of strategic leadership presented in Chapter 1. This chapter concludes 
by raising questions about the process of selecting leaders that may 
sometimes be adopted by university governing bodies. Possible 
limitations of the thesis and suggestions for future work are in the closing 
chapter. 
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Chapter One 
Why Better Scholars May 
Make Better Leaders 
Theory Propositions 
Introduction 
The empirical work in this thesis is motivated by a theory suggesting that 
experts and professionals are better led by individuals who are also 
specialists. In this respect, it is suggested that professionalism rather 
than managerialism is a more robust basis for leadership in a knowledge- 
intensive organization, which is likely to be reflected in organizational 
performance. In the context of research universities, it is argued that 
accomplished scholars (i. e. those with professional expertise) may be the 
more appropriate and successful leaders. 
The basic premise, advocated below, is that leaders with high technical 
and professional ability have inherent knowledge of the organization's 
core business, and that this influences a leader's inherent preferences. 
So, for example, a scholar-leader may prioritize activities, decisions and 
resources related to research. A second requisite factor lies with the 
followers of leaders, in that they must view their organizational head as 
being credible. It is suggested that credible leadership extends a leader's 
influence and authority. Inherent preferences and credible leadership are 
viewed as being different sides of the same coin. Central to the theory is 
the context in which leadership is being examined. The arguments laid 
out are not necessarily generic to all leaders, only those in organizations 
that are knowledge-intensive or professional, although the latter group 
are not included in this study. 
The Context 
Research universities are examples of knowledge-intensive organizations 
(Mintzberg 1979). The longitudinal evidence in this thesis suggests that a 
scholar-leader may improve the future performance of a university. As 
will be argued in this chapter, this is perhaps partially explained because 
a leader who is a scholar, with technical and professional ability as 
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opposed to merely managerial skills, has a greater understanding of the 
organization's core business. 
Figure 1.1 
CORE BUSINESS 
" Recruitment of top faculty 
" Raising funds for research 
" Teaching UG and PG 
The Research University 
A 
Core Busines 
Research & 
Teaching 
C 
TP 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
SERVICING AND SUPPORTING 
CORE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
" Administration 
" Personnel 
" Student services 
" Communications & 
Marketing 
" IT, etc. 
I PERIPHERAL BUSINESS 
PERIPHERAL BUSINESS 
" Technology transfer 
" Non-core associated 
businesses (i. e. conferences) 
Figure 1.1 presents a model of a typical research university. The core 
business is research and teaching, as identified in most university 
mission statements. It is supported by the administration that ensures the 
smooth running of the institutional infrastructure and also the services 
provided. A third tier is common, particularly since the 1980's, which 
includes various forms of peripheral business, such as technology 
transfer. 
Universities can be described as pluralistic organizations (Denis, 
Lamothe & Langley 2001) because they are made up of groups with 
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divergent interests. For example, one group consists of faculty who are 
the knowledge-workers most closely aligned to the core business, and, 
arguably, the income generators. The second dominant group in a 
university is made up of administrators and professional managers, 
without whom the organization could not function. Tensions can exist 
between these two groups. It could be argued that conflict between 
knowledge workers and managers is partially a symptom of the recent 
culture of managerialism, raised earlier, that is particularly prevalent in 
the UK. 
Cohen & March (1974) describe the position of university presidents as 
leading in an 'organized anarchy'. In a similar vein Alvesson & 
Sveningsson (2003) refer to the often ambiguous nature of leadership in 
knowledge-intensive firms. This arises in organizations commonly 
described as collegiate where a leader is the `first among equals' 
(Lowendahl 1997, McKenna & Maister 2002). Thus, they argue, without 
a hierarchical structure, leadership is at least ambiguous, at worst an 
illusion (Cohen & March 1974). 
But these views of university leadership can be challenged. Four 
arguments are presented here. 
Middlehurst & Elton (1992) suggest that Cohen and March's description 
of a university as an `organized anarchy' is `a phrase that is both 
unfortunate in its connotations and contradictory in its form' (pp. 253). 
Hammond (2004) questions the idea that universities are non- 
hierarchical. Indeed, he argues that `like most large institutions they 
retain significant hierarchical features' (pp. 93). This also applies to 
professional service firms (PSFs) where again a similar misconception 
about hierarchy is often propagated. While PSFs may have somewhat 
flatter organizational structures than in most manufacturing firms they are 
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still run along traditional bureaucratic lines with promotion through a 
hierarchy (Maister 1993). 
Second, it is unlikely and may be somewhat contradictory to suggest that 
a culture of organized anarchy, or even ambiguity, reigns when the 
central business and structure of an organization has changed so little 
over the hundreds of years it has existed which, arguably, is the case with 
research universities. Indeed, unlike many other types of organizations 
they have demonstrated unusual stability (Birnbaum 1989). This fact 
seems at odds with the notion of anarchy. Arguably, there have been 
changes in the position of university presidents, reflecting on the one 
hand a globalized world, and on the other, expanding or shrinking 
markets, changes in funding mechanisms, enhanced competition and so 
on. But the core business of a research university does not seem to 
change a great deal from year to year, or from decade to decade. 
This is consistent with a comment made by one of the non-academic UK 
vice chancellors interviewed for this thesis: "... there is less freedom in a 
university. The strategic degrees of freedom are restricted in a university. 
lt is more difficult to change the course - the outputs are always going to 
be about the same. " 
Third, leadership in universities is not an irrelevant concept; it could be 
argued that leadership is as necessary in knowledge-intensive 
organizations as any other form of organization. Hammond (2004) 
claims that leaders in US research universities -- for example presidents, 
provosts and deans -- have substantial authority that is usually displayed 
in traditional organizational charts, akin to most private enterprises 
(Hammond 2004). 
Finally, that leaders `negotiate' their way through decision-making, as 
opposed to adopting what is perceived to be a more direct method within 
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a less collegiate structure, does not necessarily mean that they do not 
get their own way, nor that they have less power (Trow 1999). On the 
issue of power, one head-hunter who is used to recruit vice chancellors in 
the UK believes they are not lacking: "There is no doubt that leaders have 
an enormous amount of power in universities; more than in many other 
organisations where the long-term strategy is firmly laid out. For 
example, in the civil service, or at the other extreme in Asda/Walmart 
where the leader is a motivator for the `troops' but has very little say 
about the strategy of the business. That is all mapped out long before in 
somewhere like Ohio. " 
Interestingly, some scholars have argued that university leaders with 
possibly the most direct powers reside in some of the best institutions in 
the world, for example, Berkeley, Stanford, Caltech, Ivy League 
institutions, among others (Rosovsky 1991, Trow 1999). 
Leadership in Context 
As mentioned above, leaders are discussed within a specified context not 
as a generic form (Pettigrew 1990, Leavy & Wilson 1994). This study 
attempts to present a theory of leadership in knowledge-intensive 
organizations. One reason why universities are an interesting case is 
that, unusually for knowledge-intensive bodies, their leaders' technical 
expertise can be measured reasonably objectively. 
Of relevance here is the work on managing experts (Quinn, Anderson & 
Finkelstein, 1996) and professionals (Alvesson 1992, Maister 1993, 
Mintzberg, Quinn & Ghoshal 1995, Lowendahl 1997, Robertson & Swan 
2003, McKenna & Maister 2002, Fenton & Pettigtrew 2006) and project 
leaders in research and development (R&D) (Narayanan 2001). 
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There have also been a number of influential empirical studies that focus 
on leadership in higher education (for example, Cohen & March 1974, 
Birnbaum 1988, Middlehurst 1993, Bargh et al. 2000, Ehrenberg 2004, 
among others). But, there appears to have been little statistical thinking 
about how leaders in knowledge-intensive organizations might influence 
performance; and in the context of research universities, the question of 
whether the level of scholarship may have some bearing on the 
appropriate choice of a leader has also received minimal attention. 
Alvesson writes that knowledge workers can be loosely defined as 
`having an interest in the use of judgement backed up to a high degree by 
theoretical, intellectual knowledge' (2004, pp. 1). Knowledge workers can 
be found in R&D, law and accounting firms, IT and management 
consultancies, and among engineers and scientists (Starbuck 1992, 
Maister 1993, Alvesson 2004). Experts and professionals are often 
described as being self-motivated, preferring to work autonomously and 
requiring minimal individual managing (Handy 1984, Starbuck 1992, 
Maister 1993, Mintzberg, Quinn & Ghoshal 1995, Lowendahl 1997). 
Lowendahl (1997) suggests that good professionals (i. e. those who have 
excelled in consulting, accounting and so on) are required as firm 
managers. The key reason is that those with an excellent professional 
reputation (pp. 56) will be more readily accepted by their peers. 
This thesis proposes that in knowledge-intensive organizations there are 
role-specific characteristics that may enhance a leader's ability to 
perform. This draws from upper echelons (UE) theory of strategic 
leadership (Hambrick & Mason 1984). UE theory argues that top 
managers make strategic choices (Child 1972,1997) that are reflections 
of their own values and cognitions (Hambrick & Mason 1984), and that 
members of the top management team (TMT) will be influenced in their 
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decision-making by individual and group demographic factors (such as 
age, education, functional track, TMT heterogeneity among others). 
Strategic Leadership 
Most recent research on strategic leadership has focused on the top 
management team (TMT) (Hambrick & Mason 1984, D'Aveni 1990, 
Haleblian & Finkelstein 1993, Finkelstein & Hambrick 1996, Geletkanycz 
& Hambrick 1997, Goll & Rasheed 2005, among others). Increasingly, 
however, the TMT is being analytically dismantled, and research is 
turning to various constituent parts (for example, Lewin & Stephens 1994, 
Hayward & Hambrick 1997, Bigley & Wiersema 2002, Carpenter & 
Sanders 2002, Papadakis & Barwise 2002, Bertrand & Schoar 2003, 
Jensen & Zajac 2004, Arendt et al. 2005). 
It is generally argued that universities are governed through processes of 
collegiality and negotiation (Cohen & March 1974, Birnbaum 1988). 
However, this does not mean that leaders have no influence, albeit there 
may be differences in levels of executive power between presidents in US 
privates and those in European universities (Rosovsky 1991). This is not 
the place to compare in the detail US presidential leadership with 
European rectors or British vice chancellors. Briefly, however, the 
American system is unitary with the president at the head of the 
hierarchy. Though the president reports to a powerful board of trustees, 
he or she is ultimately in charge, with a role similar to that of a chief 
executive officer. 
Senior academic administrators in the US (deans, provosts, chairs of 
departments) are normally appointed by the leader, not voted into 
position by faculty, which is still the case in many continental European 
countries. The interview material with leaders that is reported in Chapter 
6 would suggest that the UK seems to be moving slowly towards the US 
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model. But the US presidential system is still recognised as giving 
greater authority and powers to university leaders when compared to 
other systems of higher education (Rosovsky 1991, Trow 1999, Bargh et 
al. 2000). This is particularly true of US private universities. US ntihlirs 
on the other hand are more exposed to State government intervention 
(Trow 1999, Hammond 2005, Bloom, Hartley, & Rosovsky 2006). 
The decision in this thesis to turn attention away from the TMT and on to 
individual leaders can perhaps be justified. In a university, apart from the 
president or vice chancellor at the top of the institution, there are other 
heads of key strategic units, for example, deans of schools or faculties. 
These second-tier leaders are also decision-makers. It is conventional 
for deans, and also presidents, to each have their own top teams. But, as 
suggested above, it is normally they who decide which academic 
administrators are to be included among them (Trow 1999). 
Most heads of research universities in the US and UK make their own 
appointments to business school dean although endorsement from 
faculty may be taken into consideration (Rosovsky 1991). Similarly, it 
seems likely that most business school deans appoint their own deputy 
deans. This was confirmed in the interviews with leaders. All those 
interviewed in this thesis report that they selected their own top team, 
even though many of the UK vice chancellors complained that they had to 
first change or adapt the process. Thus power may be shifting towards 
leaders. 
Adopting this position is not to deny the importance of TMT members, 
but, as argued, it is suggested here that the CEO, or president and dean 
is, in principle, more than a central member of the TMT (Jackson, 1992). 
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What about management and leadership ability? 
As was mentioned earlier in the introduction, scholarship is not a proxy 
for either management experience or leadership skills but in addition to. 
Most academics in senior leadership positions within universities have 
first gained management experience as provosts and pro-vice 
chancellors or deans. However, a priori, if what really matters in a leader 
is managerial ability, it would not be expected that universities would be 
led by successful researchers. 
Why Better Scholars May Make Better Leaders 
Figure A, in the introductory chapter (pp. 8), presents a simple schematic 
model that links the appointment of a scholar with the quality of a 
university. It suggests that if a governing body has decided upon a 
strategy of raising or maintaining the research status of their university 
then appointing a leader who is a scholar may be the right choice. 
There has been discussion in universities, and especially business 
schools, about the effectiveness of non-academic leaders. This thesis 
not only argues that research universities, and other important constituent 
parts such as business schools and academic departments, should 
normally -- there will always be exceptions -- be led by academics, but 
also that leaders of research universities should be distinguished 
scholars. 
A theory of strategic leadership in knowledge-intensive organizations is 
offered in this thesis to try to explain why a scholar-leader might improve 
an institution's performance. The theoretical proposition has two 
interrelated parts. The first is behavioural, in that it is internal to leaders. 
The second factor refers more to those who follow. Therefore, it is 
external to leaders. These two accounts are presented in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2 
Theoretical Framework of Inherent 
Preferences and Credible Leadership 
Research University 
CORE BUSINESS 
Academic research & teaching 
Leader with strong research history 
Institutional head (e. g. president) or head of 
strategic unit (e. g. dean of business school) 
Inherent Knowledge Generic 
Research expertise creates Competencies 
Inherent Preferences Leadership 
Priorities and time 
skills and 
managerial 
allocation e. g. experience 
" Recruitment and retention 
of faculty 
" Research funding & RAE Management 
" Intellectual direction-setting expertise will 
mostly lie with 
Credible Leadership professional 
" Status amongst peers managers and 
Legitimates authority administrators 
" Symbolic nature - signals 
priorities 
Included in Figure 1.2 are the generic competencies of management and 
leadership skills. As has been suggested a number of times, presidents 
and vice chancellors will usually have demonstrated substantial 
leadership skills to succeed to the top position. In addition, they will have 
managerial experience, although many of a university's managerial 
functions will reside with professional administrators, for example 
registrars, directors' of HR, finance and IT. As will be evident in Chapter 
6, in the interviews with leaders, all but one emphasized leadership over 
management when describing the most important elements of their job. 
Many also stated that a leader can buy in administrative expertise where 
he or she feels lacking. 
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Inherent Preferences and Credible Leadership 
Why might scholarship matter to leadership? The first part of the 
theoretical account argues that having been a top scholar may influence 
leader-behaviour. Inherent knowledge about academic research has 
been learned throughout a scholar's life. It is suggested here that 
inherent knowledge, which is a kind of deep understanding of research 
and scholarship, may shape the way he or she sees the world. Indeed, it 
may affect the way a leader runs an organization, by informing decision- 
making and influencing strategic choice (Child 1972,1997). 
Strategic choice may be directed through a process of inherent 
preferences. It is likely that a top scholar has prioritized scholarship in his 
or her own life and, furthermore, that they may continue to emphasize 
activities related to scholarship once becoming a leader. For example, in 
allocating time a scholar-leader may be more likely to stress academic 
and research activities above other demands on managerial time. 
Scholars may place greater emphasis on the selection of top faculty, and 
may be more likely to trade off other activities, so that they can perform a 
central role in faculty appointments and tenure decisions. Moreover, a 
leader who is also a top scholar may help to attract other top scholars to 
their institution. 
It is suggested in Chapter 5 that universities led by successful 
researchers go on to perform better in the UK Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE). This might happen because a scholar-leader prioritizes 
RAE related activities over others. It has been shown empirically that 
strategic choices which have been prioritized are more likely to yield 
successful outcomes (Hickson, Miller & Wilson, 2003). 
This chapter's conceptual approach draws from Hambrick and Mason's 
(1984) theory of strategic leadership In a similar vein, upper echelon 
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theory argues that the behaviour and strategic choices of members of top 
management teams will be influenced by demographic characteristics like 
education, socio-economic factors, TMT heterogeneity among others 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). In this thesis, the externally observable 
characteristics are the lifetime citations of leaders, which are measurable 
and taken to be representative of the level of scholarship attained. 
Deeper psychological factors may also be at play here. For example, 
when making faculty appointments -- even in a system that is genuinely 
meritocratic as opposed to one that is prone to nepotism6 -- humans may 
favour some individuals over others for reasons that are not entirely 
logical. This may be related to confidence. As was said by one university 
leader interviewed for this research: "Being a good scholar means that 
can look a Nobel or Pulitzer Prize winner in the eye. " This will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
The second part of the thesis's theoretical explanation is about the role of 
credible leadership. The idea of 'legitimacy in the academic presidency' 
is taken up by Bornstein (2003) who outlines 5 key areas of legitimacy. 
First on her list and of relevance here, is individual legitimacy. She cites 
Birnbaum and Umbach (2001) who claim that presidential candidates with 
a traditional academic career path confer the greatest legitimacy. This is 
particularly true for those being selected into the most prestigious 
institutions which, they argue, are far less likely to appoint individuals 
from business, politics or the military (Birnbaum and Umbach 2001). 
Bornstein (2003) goes on to suggest that individual legitimacy is further 
enhanced if candidates have a proven track record in administration, as 
dean or provost for example. 
6 E. g. A culture of favouring inside promotions has been shown to be prevalent in the 
Italian system of higher education, and has lead to inefficiencies (see Perotti 2002). 
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Similarly, it is proposed here that when leading a knowledge-intensive 
organization -- like a university -- credible leadership may afford greater 
power. This idea is consistent with the literature on the social interactions 
between leaders and their followers (e. g. House 1977, Bass 1985,1990, 
Bennis and Nanus 1985, Sashkin & Fulmer 1988, among others). It 
suggests that a scholar-leader will have greater credibility among his or 
her colleagues, and concomitantly that this might extend a leader's 
authority. 
Thus, in concluding this section, this thesis argues that a scholar-leader 
with extensive technical expertise has `inherent knowledge' of the 
organization's core business. It is suggested that inherent knowledge 
may inform decision-making and influence strategic choice. This 
happens in part through a process of `inherent preferences' that directs 
leaders to prioritize research-focused activities. The second key factor 
when leading a university is `credible leadership'. It is argued that a 
scholar-leader will have greater credibility among colleagues, and, 
concomitantly, that this will give him or her greater powers of influence. 
These theoretical ideas are revisited in Chapter 7 after the empirical 
evidence has been presented. 
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Chapter Two 
Method and Sample 
Introduction 
Each of the empirical chapters in this thesis includes a tailored 
methodological section which gives a description of the data collection 
process, and the respective statistical tests that have been applied. 
Because of this there is no single methods section covering the whole 
thesis. But an overall explanation and description of research design and 
data collection methods is offered here. 
This chapter will also convey information about the bibliographic data 
used in Chapters 3 to 5 inclusive. It outlines the strengths and 
weaknesses of using citations and looks at alternative measures. A 
detailed break-down of the normalization process used to assign life-time 
citation scores to leaders is also included. 
Finally, the chapter outlines the ethical procedures that are being followed 
in this study. In the qualitative interviews careful attention has been taken 
to ensure confidentiality. The Research Code of Conduct at the 
University of Warwick has been followed. 
Methodology 
Attempting to address questions about how leaders impact upon 
organizational performance is challenging. This is because there is much 
other noise in the data which makes isolating the actions of one 
individual, albeit a notable individual, difficult. To then include 
performance variables and attempt to attribute institutional success to a 
leader adds yet another dimension. 
The research question in this thesis -- to what extent are successful 
knowledge-based organizations led by experts rather than managers -- 
has been addressed empirically in three ways: statistically using 
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regression analysis, in a cross-sectional design and also longitudinally, 
and thirdly, in qualitative interviews. Universities were selected by the 
author as a type of knowledge-intensive organization partly because, 
unusually, a leaders' technical expertise can be measured reasonably 
objectively. It might be more difficult to measure the professional ability 
of a lawyer or accountant. 
A possible weakness of the methodological approach arises when 
assigning explanations to the statistical patterns. The interview data are 
helpful in fleshing out and adding weight to the analytical arguments, but 
do not provide evidence of the transfer mechanisms (i. e. the processes 
through which a scholar-leader might influence an organization). An 
appropriate design to understand the processes more fully might be in- 
depth case-studies in a number of research universities that are led by 
scholars and non-scholars. This may be work for the future. 
Nevertheless, the author believes that the method used in this thesis 
generates evidence that is robust, especially as a first step to 
understanding this important and often-asked question. 
Citations 
This thesis focuses on one set of measures, namely the lifetime scholarly 
citations of presidents. Citations are references to authors in other 
academic papers as acknowledgement of their contribution to a specific 
research area. Citation information used in this study comes from the 
Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Science, the on-line 
database comprising the Science Citation Index, Social Science Citation 
Index and the Arts and Humanities Citation Index. 
Bibliographic data are used as the key independent variable in this thesis 
in three of the empirical chapters. This information has been gathered by 
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hand-counting the lifetime citations of each leader. Data have been 
generated for 403 individuals. These include: 
1.100 global university presidents (Chapter 3) - collected 
between October and December 2004. 
2.100 deans of business schools in the Financial Times MBA 
ranking and also 38 deans of UK business schools (Chapter 4) 
- collected between June and July 2005. 
3.165 UK vice chancellors (Chapter 5) - collected in October and 
November 2005. 
Citations are used here as a measure of how research-active and 
successful a president has been in his or her academic career. 
Bibliometric information is generally viewed as a reliable indicator of 
research achievement over time (van Raan 2003). Most academics who 
go into administrative positions reduce their research output. This 
depends, somewhat, on their discipline. The data generated for the 
purposes of this study make it clear that university presidents accumulate 
the overwhelming majority (approximately 90-95%) of their citations 
before they become institutional leaders. 
Most important when using citations as any kind of measure is 
recognition of the huge differences between disciplines. For example, a 
highly-cited social scientist might have a lifetime citation score of around 
2,000 whereas a molecular biologist could have a score over 15,000. 
Bibliometric indicators have been used more consistently across the 
sciences, particularly in the natural and life sciences, though less so in 
engineering and the behavioural sciences (van Raan 2003). These 
disciplines publish more journal articles and have a higher prevalence of 
co-authorship. 
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The social sciences are patchier. For example, economics relies heavily 
on journal articles although, unlike the science publications that tend to 
publish quickly, in economics it can be over two years from submission to 
publication (Hamermesh 1994). Writing articles for journals is much less 
common in the arts and humanities. These disciplines tend more towards 
publishing monographs. Cronin et at. (1997) found that in the discipline 
of sociology two distinct groups of highly cited academics co-existed - 
those highly cited through journal articles and those through monographs. 
This should present less of a problem here because citations from both 
books and journals that are recorded in ISI have been counted. 
Van Raan (1998,2003,2005) has raised areas for concern when using 
citations as measures of quality. He suggests that citation indices have 
become easy tools for policy makers and university administrators keen 
to make quick assessments of individual research output and quality (van 
Raan 2005). Wouters (1999) points out that the ISI system was designed 
to retrieve information not evaluate it. 
Self-citing is a potential problem that can take two forms: first, over-citing 
one's own work in academic papers and, second, self-citation in journals 
to try to raise the journal impact factor. An example of this is given by 
Fassoulaki et al. (2000), where authors report a significant correlation 
between self-citation levels and journal impact scores in the 1995 and 
1996 issues of six anaesthesia journals. 
Other possible difficulties with citations include inconsistencies in 
methods of referencing, and inaccuracies in citation statistics (Moed 
2002, King 2004). Finally, monopoly concerns have been raised about 
over-reliance on the Web of Science (Weingart 2003,2005). 
Language biases have been shown to exist within ISI (van Leeuwen et al. 
2001) though it is now considered to be less of a problem because most 
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journals publish in English (King 2004). King suggests that preferential 
referencing may take place in the US (i. e. that Americans are more likely 
to reference Americans), partially a feature of the size of that nation's 
output. To try to circumvent this, separate analyses of US data are 
offered in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Although van Raan (2005) notes the weaknesses of bibliometric 
measures, he also argues that citations are a good indicator of scholarly 
influence over long periods of time. His preference for evaluating science 
is to couple peer review with bibliometric analysis. King (2004) suggests 
that citations are the most reliable measure of research quality and 
output. In a feature in the journal `Nature', King uses the ISI citation index 
to measure the quantity and quality of science across different nations 
(2004). 
There have been a number of studies comparing the UK's Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE) results with bibliometric measures. 
Oppenheim (1997) uses ISI data to compare 1992 RAE results with 
citation indicators in three subject areas: anatomy, genetics and 
archaeology. He finds a strong correlation between the two methods of 
assessment and notes that in archaeology there is a greater reliance on 
monographic literature. Norris and Oppenheim (2003) replicate this 
study with approximately the same results following the 2001 RAE. 
Smith and Eysenck (2002) discover a similar correlation across all UK 
psychology departments in the 2001 RAE. 
Substantial effort has been made to try to accurately assign citation 
numbers to people's names. Though some measurement error must be 
presumed, two studies that adopt different counting methods -- Seng and 
Willett (1995) who use a very precise method on the one hand, and 
Oppenheim (1995) who assigned citations more approximately on the 
other -- both report similar correlations. 
32 
Why use citations instead of journal articles? 
There is a growing body of work that uses citations to assess intellectual 
output and productivity (see King 2004; Bayers, 2005). Moreover, citation 
counts are a good predictor of professorial salaries (Hamermesh, 
Johnson & Weisbrod 1982) and Nobel Prizes (Garfield & Welljams-Dorof 
1992). An alternative approach is to count an author's published articles 
and weight by journal impact factors. However, this presents three 
problems. First, monographs would be excluded from the data. Second, 
the quality of a journal is a noisy measure of the future impact of 
individual articles (Oswald 2006). For example, many highly cited articles 
are not published in `Grade A' journals and vice versa. Finally, assigning 
weight to journal quality through, for example, ISI Journal Impact Factors 
might not be reliable -- even if they were available -- for papers published 
10-20 years ago. 
Normalizing Citations to P-scores 
The discrepancies in citation levels across disciplines are demonstrated 
in the number of new cited references that appear in ISI every week. The 
sciences generate approximately 350,000 new cited references weekly, 
the social sciences 50,000 and the humanities 15,0007. 
ISI has created a `Highly Cited' (ISI HiCi) category that identifies 
approximately the top 250 academic researchers (depending on 
discipline) across 21 broad subject areas. They are dominated by science 
subjects, totalling 19. The social sciences are also covered, but there are 
only two social science subject areas, namely `Economics and Business' 
and `Social Sciences - General'. Currently no `Highly Cited' category 
exists for authors in the arts or humanities8. 
These figures date to October 2004. 
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Using citation thresholds created by ISI HiCi a normalised citation score 
has been produced in this thesis for 23 subject areas. These include a 
score for the humanities that has been generated for the purposes of this 
study. It is necessary to note that the discipline of law is classified in ISI 
as being in the social sciences not the humanities. It is included here in 
the `Social Sciences - General' category. 
Each university president is assigned a normalised citation score, which 
reflects both the differences across disciplines and their personal citation 
levels. This score is referred to as the `P-score' = president's individual 
lifetime citation score normalised for discipline. The P-score is used here 
as an exchange rate normalising the different citation conventions across 
disciplines. A president's lifetime citation score has then been divided by 
his or her subject score. The normalised P-score produced through this 
process makes it possible to do like-for-like comparisons between 
individuals from different disciplines. 
The humanities score has been created by the author using the `new 
cited references' generated by ISI each week. (As mentioned above the 
sciences approximated at 350,000 new cited references weekly, the 
social sciences 50,000 and the humanities 15,000. ) If we divide the 
social science weekly score of 50,000 by the humanities 15,000 we get a 
figure of 3.33. The author has then divided the `Social Sciences, General' 
score of 117 (see Table 1.1) by 3.33 which creates a score of 35.13. The 
number 35 has been used here as the `Humanities, General' score. 
The normalization method used in this thesis was created by the author in 
2004. Another comparable method of normalizing citations is used by 
Podlubny (see Podlubny 2005 and Podlubny & Kassayova 2006). 
8 This was the case at the end of 2006. 
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Does the age of a leader matter? 
The issue of whether age biases an individual's citation levels is 
addressed in each of the chapters that draw from bibliometric data, so it 
is not necessary to go into detail here. But a summary is perhaps helpful. 
This issue can be looked at from two perspectives. The first posits that 
older leaders have an advantage because they may have had longer to 
accrue citations. The second argument suggests that bibliometics are 
more a feature of modern academia, and, therefore, younger leaders are 
likely to have played the game and built up higher numbers of citations. 
These two will thus work in opposite directions. In fact, as will be shown 
later, there is no evidence that age skews the citations levels of university 
leaders. 
Data Collection and Ethics 
Four data-sets have been created for this thesis. They include 
quantitative and qualitative data. In the quantitative chapters, information 
has come from public sources. Qualitative data have been acquired 
through semi-structured interviews with a number of university leaders. 
Quantitative data 
Four hundred and three (403) individuals are included in data presented 
in Chapters 3 through 5. The data used in Chapters 3 and 4 comprise of 
100 university presidents and 138 business school deans. The names of 
presidents and deans have come through institutional websites. In 
Chapter 5, information on 165 vice chancellors has been gathered 
through `Who's Who', and the Association of Commonwealth Universities. 
As previously mentioned, the bibliographic data used in this study come 
from the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) Web of Science. For 
reasons of confidentiality and sensitivity, given the high status of 
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university leaders, the quantitative data consisting of leaders' citations 
information have been included in the thesis copies available to the 
doctoral examiners only (see Appendix 4), but they are of course 
available on request. 
Kaleidagraph was used to analyse and present data in Chapters 2 and 3. 
SPSS was used in Chapter 4. 
Qualitative data 
Qualitative data are discussed in Chapter 6. They consist of 23 
interviews with leaders in universities in the US and UK and also 10 
interviews with members of a panel to appoint to the position of vice 
chancellor in a UK university. Finally, secondary data in the form of 
statements from 11 UK vice chancellors in the Times Higher Education 
Supplement are included. Because these are not primary data, their 
quality and accuracy cannot be validated by the author. They are 
reported here because of their relevance to the dissertation's research 
question. 
Interviews were documented by transcribing what was heard by hand into 
a notebook. They were not recorded because of the status of the 
interviewees. The author believed that university leaders would be both 
more candid and more at ease if a voice recorder was not used. 
Interview transcriptions are reported in Chapter 6. Responses were 
colour coded and grouped into two-clusters. The first level clusters 
interviewees' responses around interview questions. The second level 
clusters interview material around the key themes that emerged from the 
data. A qualitative data analysis package, for example NVivo, was not 
used in this thesis. The author felt that as the interviews were transcribed 
by hand instead of voice recorder NVivo would not be appropriate. This 
is because the exact words given by those interviewed could not be 
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guaranteed as might be expected when interviews are recorded digitally 
or on tape word-for-word. 
In all interviews between the author and university leaders, there has 
been agreement that no names will be attributed to statements in any 
materials or publications unless approval from participants has first been 
sought. This has been adhered to in all journal articles and working 
papers in the public domain (published or on websites). In this thesis, 
except for the Times Higher Education Supplement material and in places 
where prior authority has been sought (for example in Chapter 4), no 
interview statements are assigned to names. Only general information, 
for example `former vice chancellor' or `dean', accompanies the 
statements. 
In the case-study featuring members of a vice chancellor's appointment 
committee, total anonymity is given both to the institution and all panel 
members - as per prior agreement with participants. All interviewees 
who have kindly participated in this research have been kept up to date 
with new papers and they have been promised a copy of the final thesis. 
The author is committed to ensuring that a high standard of integrity is 
applied to this study. Ethical practices are congruent with the University 
of Warwick, Research Code of Conduct. 
Finally, the author wishes to thank all participants who agreed to be 
interviewed. 
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Tahlp 2.1 
Citation Thresholds for Scientists 
Across Different Disciplines 
Subject area Scientist 
Agricultural Sciences 154 
Biology & Biochemistry 780 
Chemistry 648 
Clinical Medicine 1095 
Computer Science 84 
Economics & Business 169 
Engineering 182 
Environment/Ecology 248 
Geosciences 433 
Humanities, General* 35 
Immunology 763 
Materials Science 219 
Mathematics 130 
Microbiology 534 
Molecular Biology & Genetics 1234 
Multidisciplinary 123 
Neuroscience & Behaviour 908 
Pharmacology & Toxicology 312 
Physics 1832 
Plant & Animal Science 292 
Psych iatPsychiatry/Psychology 393 
Social Sciences, General 117 
Space Science 1301 
Thomson ISI Highly cited, available from 
http: //in-cites. com/thresholds-citation. html 
* Humanities score created by Amanda H. Goodall as 
explained in Chapter 2. 
Note to Table: The above citation thresholds represent 
approximately the top 3250 authors in each disciplinary field 
between 1994 - 2004. 
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Chapter Three 
What is the Relationship 
(if any) Between Top 
Universities and Leaders 
Who are Top Scholars? 
Introduction 
When looking at the individuals who lead the world's top 100 universities 
it is possible to find both a handful of Nobel Prize winners and a handful 
of leaders with few or no research citations. It might be thought from this 
fact that there is no systematic link between research output and 
university leadership. Yet there is a pattern. There is a significant 
correlation between the research background of a leader and the position 
of their university in a world league table. 
The first question, addressed in this chapter through statistical tests using 
Pearson's correlation coefficient and Spearman's rho, is to ask whether 
the world's top universities currently appoint top researchers to the 
position of president. The emphasis here is on the world's leading 
research universities. This group has been chosen because it is 
important to understand the actions of successful organisations. 
The Collection of Citations Data on Presidents 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the dissertation focuses on one set of 
variables or characteristics, namely the lifetime citations of presidents. 
This score is used here as a measure of how research-active and 
successful a president has been in his or her academic career. The 
lifetime citation score of presidents is normalised to adjust for different 
disciplinary conventions. 
Data on the presidents of the world's top 100 universities, identified as 
shown below, were collected between mid-October and early-December 
2004. Only those presidents in post during this period are included, and 
to the author's knowledge, no presidents changed during the time data 
was collected. Biographical information came from university web sites, 
though direct requests for CVs were made on occasion. Each president's 
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lifetime citations were counted by hand and assigned a normalised 
citation score, or P-score, which reflects both the differences across 
disciplines and their personal citation levels. 
League Tables 
As higher education has become global, in the recruitment of international 
students and staff, so have league tables. International tables have 
existed for a number of years in areas such as business education 
through the Financial Times. In 2003 the first global league table of 
universities was produced by the Institute of Education in Shanghai at 
Jiao Tong University (SJTU). SJTU used a process of inviting comment 
through their website to make adjustments to their methodology for the 
2004 table. It is their `Academic Ranking of World Universities' (2004) 
that is used in this chapter. (See Appendix 1 for the full list of 100 
universities). 
The UK based Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) produced a 
global ranking in November 2004 (www. thes. co. uk) which has not been 
used in this study. There are three main problems with the league table9. 
First, 50% weight is assigned to a subjective `peer-review' process where 
1300 academics across 88 countries are invited to name the top 
institutions in their geographic area and their academic field. This is the 
largest component in the ranking yet there is no information available on 
the background of these global academics. That is a concern. For 
example, how might an individual's choice have been influenced by their 
own place of education, sabbatical leave or co-authorship, and so on? 
Second, 10% weight is given for the international nature of an institution's 
student body and staff. However, there is little explanation about why 
`international' is a proxy for high quality. Finally, because the THES is a 
9 Changes were made to the methodology in the 2005 version of the THES international 
league table. 
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commercial organisation it is not possible to access the data or check the 
calculations. 
An advantage of the SJTU table is that it is not produced by a newspaper 
or magazine. Media-generated league tables are ubiquitous and 
controversial. Tables, such as those in The Times, and US News and 
World Report in the US, offer information to potential students across a 
range of criteria. Media-driven league tables may be useful heuristic 
devices for students but as objective tools of assessment of university 
quality they are unreliable. Perhaps the main criticism is that they are 
produced by commercial organisations designed to make money by 
selling their publications. Therefore a headline is required. To generate a 
story, the methodology is changed, often annually, which ensures that 
institutions at the top rotate (Lombardi, Craig, Capaldi & Gater 2002). 
Lombardi and colleagues suggest instead that, in the US, university 
positions actually change very little each year if a fixed method of 
analysis is used (2002). 
The Center for Studies in the Humanities and Social Sciences 
(www. thecenter. ufl. edu) was created as a non-profit organisation in 1998 
in the United States. Its mission is to develop methods for measuring and 
improving university performance. For a number of years TheCenter has 
produced an alternative ranking, `The Top American Research 
Universities' (Lombardi et al. 2003). 
This ranking differs from media equivalents because actual numbered 
positions are not assigned. Instead universities are assessed on nine 
separate measures. Those that score highly in at least one of the nine 
measures are put into a 1-25 top research university category'o 
10 The measures include: total research, federal research, endowment assets, annual 
giving, national academy members, faculty awards, doctorates granted, postdoctoral 
appointees and SAT scores. Some degree of ranking does exist because they are 
ordered depending on the number of points they score across the nine categories. So 
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The measures of university quality used in both TheCenter and the SJTU 
world league tables do not exactly correspond. However, it is interesting 
to compare the number of US universities at the top in both tables. 
TheCenter's top-25 category has 52 universities included. Of these, 44 
also feature in the SJTU global table. Positions 1-27 are exactly 
correlated in both rankings. In other words, these two rankings of top US 
universities are very similar. 
The `Academic Ranking of World Universities' (2004) league table uses 6 
different criteria to assess universities. The Table 3.1 comes from the 
SJTU web site" 
There are, arguably, some weaknesses in the SJTU methodology. First, 
younger universities stand to lose out; particularly in the first category that 
assigns weight (10%) to alumni awards. Second, the humanities and the 
social sciences are weakly represented here -- though SJTU have done 
some adjustment for this. There are no ISI HiCi's in the arts and 
humanities and far fewer in the social sciences. The Awards category is 
also limited. Nobel Prizes are only given for achievement in physics, 
chemistry, medicine/physiology, economics, literature and peace, and 
Fields Medals only for mathematics. 
Data on the 100 University Presidents 
It is important to note that the world league table ranks institutions by 
assigning points (as per criteria above). This can result in two or more 
institutions being given the same position (see the full list in Appendix 1). 
The universities in the top-100 table are dominated by the United States, 
where 51 of the institutions are located. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, US 
the top three universities score 9 out of 9, the next six universities score 8 out of 9, and 
so on. 
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institutions are unevenly spread across the world's top 100, dominating 
the top 20 with 17 universities, and with 30 in the top 40. Of the 100 total, 
only 4 in the bottom 20 are US-based. If we treat American states as 
individual nations, California, with a population of 36 million, has the 
highest number of leading universities. Ten Californian institutions are 
within the top 55; 6 of these are in the top 20, and 7 of the 10 are public 
or state universities. 
Thirty-seven institutions out of 100 are located in European countries. Of 
these, 11 are in the United Kingdom, 7 in Germany, 4 in both France and 
Sweden, 3 in Switzerland, 2 in the Netherlands, and 1 each in Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Italy and Russia. 
Finally, among the top 100 there are 12 universities in the rest of the 
world -- 5 in Japan, 4 in Canada, 2 in Australia, and 1 in Israel. 
The nation location of an institution is not always reflected in the 
nationality of its president. For example, the top 10 universities are found 
in two countries -- US (8) and UK (2), whereas the leaders come from 
four -- Canada, New Zealand, UK, and the US. 
There are 15 female presidents in the sample. Six are in the top 20 
universities and 10 are within the top 50. North America dominates with 9 
US female presidents and 2 in Canada. The remaining four are in 
Denmark, France, Sweden and the UK. 
Every president in the group of 100 universities has a PhD. The majority 
have been academics though two presidents spent most of their careers 
in non-research positions in industry or government, and a small group 
went almost directly into academic administration. 
" SJTU have also slightly altered their methodology in recent league tables. 
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The age of a president potentially affects his or her lifetime citation levels. 
The older they are, the greater the opportunity to accrue citations. It is 
therefore necessary to check whether presidents with the highest levels 
of lifetime citations are in fact older than those with fewer citations. Some 
European universities still publish date of birth information, though they 
are in the minority. Birth dates can be loosely calculated by using 
individuals' age at graduation from first degree. Using this method it is 
possible to compare the ages of presidents at the top and bottom of the 
top-100 global league table. If it is shown that the top presidents are 
markedly older than those in the bottom 20, then adjustment of citation 
scores would be necessary. 
The ages of only 80% of presidents in the top 20 universities and 80% of 
presidents in the bottom 20 could be obtained. The mean age of 
presidents in the top 20 universities is 58 years. In the bottom 20 
category the mean age of president is 60. Because of the closeness in 
age between these two groups, and in particular the slightly older 
average age of the lowest quintile, citation scores have not been 
adjusted. 
Figure 3.2 displays the disciplinary background of the presidents. What is 
noticeable is the evenness of disciplinary spread across each quintile. Of 
the 100 presidents, 52 have a scientific background. The scientists are 
dominated by the life sciences at 50%, but there are also 11 engineers, 6 
physicists, 5 chemists and 4 computer scientists. 
Thirty-seven of the 100 presidents are social scientists. The largest 
disciplinary group among the social scientists is that of lawyers, who 
number 15. Within a second group of 16 there is an even spread of 
educationalists, political scientists, sociologists and those from public and 
social policy. Finally, there are 6 economists. 
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Eleven presidents are from the arts and humanities. This group is 
noticeably smaller. Taylor (1986) documents the disciplinary distribution 
amongst vice chancellors and principals in the UK in 1986. He also cites 
earlier work by Collison and Millen (1969) who showed that in the UK 
between 1935 and 1967 the proportion of presidents from the arts 
declined from 68% to 48% while scientists rose from 19% to 41 %. Taylor 
then reports his own findings, that by 1981 67% of vice chancellors and 
principals were scientists, 13% from the social sciences and less than 
20% were from the arts. Cohen and March (1974) showed a similar 
pattern -- in the number of presidents from the arts - for the US between 
1924 and 1969. 
In a study by Dolton and Ma (2001) on CEO Pay, the disciplinary 
backgrounds of UK vice chancellors are reported. Drawn from a wide 
cross-section of British universities (including Oxbridge, civic universities, 
former colleges of advanced technology, among others), they note that 
VCs in position in 1999 included 3% lawyers, 13% engineers, scientists 
made up 25%, social sciences including business 36% and finally VCs 
from the arts and humanities made up 13%. 10% were reported as being 
non-academics. 
Of the 100 presidents in this sample, 12 are ISI Highly Cited (HiCi) 
academics. These individuals are more common in the top universities. 
Of the 12 presidents in HiCi, 6 are in the top 20 group of universities, 3 in 
the next 20,2 in the next and 1 in the fourth quartile. Finally, there are 3 
Nobel Prize winners among the presidents (all in medicine) -- two in the 
top 20 and one in the 20-40 category. 
The distribution of citations across the 100 presidents fits Lotka's Law, an 
application that is often used in bibliometric research. Lotka (1926) 
describes the frequency of publication by authors in a given field. As can 
be observed in Figure 3.3 using presidents' P-scores, a version of this 
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law applies here. Lotka's power law predicts that of all the authors in a 
specific field, approximately 60 percent will publish just one article, 15 
percent will have two publications, 7 percent of authors will publish three 
pieces, and so on (Potter 1988). According to Lotka's Law of scientific 
productivity, only 6 percent of the authors in a field will produce more than 
10 articles (the number making n contributions is about 1/n2 of those 
making one). This law is most accurate when applied over long periods of 
time and to large bodies of work -- for example individuals' lifetime 
citations. 
The Results 
As outlined in Chapter 2, the 100 presidents' lifetime citations are 
represented by a normalised P-score. 
The individual citation scores of the 100 presidents, before adjustment, 
range from 0 to 28,718. The mean citation score is 2731 and the median 
is 371. After adjusting for discipline, the highest P-score is 37 points and 
the lowest is 0. The mean P-score is 6.03 and the median is 2.27. When 
the group of 100 is split into two, the top leaders of the 50 universities 
have a mean P-score of 8.76 and a median of 4.57, and those in the 
bottom half of universities have a mean P-score of 3.30 and a median of 
0.93. Of the total group of 100 presidents, 4 have a citation score of zero. 
The results are presented here in scatter plots and cross tabulations - 
that are grouped into quintiles (the `1-20' group always refers to the top of 
the SJTU table and 1 equals Harvard). 
The most highly ranked universities have leaders who are more highly 
cited. Figure 3.4 shows this. It gives a cross-sectional breakdown of P- 
score by university rank in quintiles. This shows a monotonic decline in 
citation levels as the universities go down in world rank. 
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The next step is to try to establish statistical significance. The chapter 
does this in two ways. 
A natural first approach is to test whether the rank ordering of one 
variable is correlated with the rank order of the second variable. 
Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is an appropriate measure12. The 
highest P-score is ranked 1 and the lowest P-score is ranked 100. The 
actual rank of presidents' P-scores is then tested for a correlation against 
university rank. 
Using these data, Spearman's rho is calculated at 0.378. With 100 
observations the associated 5% critical value for a two-tailed test is 
0.195, and at 1% it is 0.254, which establishes that the correlation is 
statistially significant at conventional confidence levels. 
A second approach can be seen in Figure 3.5 which gives the distribution 
of the 100 individual P-scores by world university rank. Using Pearson's 
coefficient (r), the degree of linear relationship between the `rank of 
university' and `president's P-score' can be examined. For the data in 
Figure 3.5, Pearson's r is 0.345. The 1% critical value on a two-tailed test 
is 0.254, which means again, that the relationship is statistically 
significant13. There continues to be a statistically significant relationship if 
the natural logarithm of P-score is used; this can be seen in Figure 3.5a 
This correlation, between cites and university quality, can also be seen 
amongst the sub-sample of female presidents, though at 15 the group is 
small (Figure 3.6). It is also statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
12 Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is the test used to measure the relationship 
between two sets of ranked or ordinal data. Alternatively Pearson's correlation 
coefficient is used to measure the relationship between normal distributions. 
13 It should be noted that there is evidence that the residuals are skewed. 
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disciplinary breakdown of the 15 female presidents is 7 scientists, 7 social 
scientists and 1 from the humanities. One president is Highly Cited. 
US universities make up 51 out of the 100. The mean P-score for this US 
group is 8.07 with a median score of 4.86, which is higher than the world 
group mean of 6.03 and median of 2.27. There are 25 scientists, 21 
social scientists and 5 in the humanities. Of the 12 Highly Cited 
presidents in total, 9 are based in US universities, though two of these 
are non-Americans -- 1 is from Canada and 1 from the UK, who is also a 
Nobel Prize winner. 
Figure 3.7 presents a scatter plot for the sample of US presidents. Again 
there is a correlation between citation levels and (world) university 
position. The correlation is significant at the 1% level. 
It is useful to note that university rank explains only 12% of the variance 
in leaders' citations. In other words, there are many other explanatory 
factors that are not being measured here. However, these correlations 
are significant enough to warrant further investigation and discussion. 
Is the citation-rank correlation true for universities outside the US? 
So far we have identified a strong positive relationship between the 
citation levels of university presidents and the position of their institution 
within a ranking of 100 universities. This association exists amongst the 
100 presidents in total, the female group, and the 51 US presidents. 
The mean citation P-score for presidents in the 49 countries in the rest of 
the world is 3.91 with a median score of 1.07. This is below the 100- 
group mean P-score of 6 and it is half the US mean P-score of 8. 
Therefore US presidents are twice as cited as those in the rest of the 
world. 
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In the rest of the world the presidents include 27 scientists, 16 social 
scientists and 6 in the humanities. There are 3 Highly Cited researchers 
in the group. Two are from the Netherlands and one in Germany. 
Figure 3.8 shows there is no statistically significant correlation between 
citation levels and position of president across the 49 countries in the rest 
of the world. 
As can be seen in the data, one of the differences between the top 
American universities and non-American universities is that the former 
choose leaders who are more highly cited. 
Outliers 
It is important to ensure that the results from this study have not been 
unduly influenced by a small number of presidents with extremely high P- 
scores. To do this, two tests are available. First, we can return to 
Spearman's rho, which puts an equal weight on each observation instead 
of assigning continuous values. As has been pointed out above, a 
statistically significant rank correlation has been established, with a 
significance level better than 1 %. 
The second check on outliers is simply to delete the data used from the 
highest P-scores for the Pearson's test. To do this the top 5% of P- 
scores, all located within ranges 30 and 40, were withdrawn and the 
correlation re-tested, with a result of 0.297. With 95 observations the 5% 
critical value for a two-tailed test is 0.200 and at 1% it is 0.260, so the 
correlation remains. 
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Discussion 
Data on world university rankings have only recently become available. 
That universities with strongly research-intensive missions appoint as 
their presidents men and women with strong citation records does not 
appear to have been previously documented. The data in this chapter do 
not enable judgements to be made about the weight assigned by 
selection committees to the research records of presidential candidates 
as distinct, for example, from other criteria such as managerial expertise 
or entrepreneurship. But the data do suggest that research universities 
look for candidates who fit institutional missions. 
These findings show that in at least one area the top universities are 
making different choices from those lower in the global ranking. On 
average, the higher the university is in the global league table, the more 
highly cited is that institution's president. There are, of course, 
exceptions. Two universities from the Netherlands -- in positions 39 and 
63 -- both have presidents who are Highly Cited. (It is interesting to note 
that these are the only two universities in the top 100 from that country). 
And there are top universities led by presidents with few or no citations. 
However, these cases are in a minority. 
It is possible that the correlation can be explained through unobservable 
heterogeneity. This would mean that research talent is merely a proxy for 
leadership ability. The positive relationship between presidents' P-scores 
and university rank may actually be picking up a correlation between 
other variables. For instance, presidents who are good at research may 
just be good at everything. This is the alternative to a cause-and-effect 
relationship. All correlations are potentially susceptible to this kind of 
criticism. It seems implausible however that candidate's research records 
do not play a part in their selection for headship of institutions with 
prominent research missions. 
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Concluding Comments 
This chapter finds a correlation between the citations of presidents and 
the positions of their universities in a world league table. Better 
universities are led by more highly cited researchers. 
The statistical relationship is strong for the group of 100 universities as a 
whole, and for the sub-samples of female presidents and US presidents. 
On average, one extra point on a president's adjusted citation score, 
where scores run from zero for the least-cited president to a score of up 
to 40 for Highly Cited and Nobel-prize winning presidents, is associated 
with ten extra places in the world's top-100 ranking of universities. No 
statistically significant correlation is found, however, for the sub-sample of 
universities from the rest of the world. 
Simple quantitative research of this kind may offer insights into university 
leadership - insights that are particularly relevant to universities that want 
to compete for a position amongst the world's top research institutions. 
The best universities, which can choose from the widest pool, are 
systematically selecting top researchers to lead them. 
Causality cannot be established through these correlations. The 
performance of a university has not been shown here to be linked to the 
actions of a president or vice chancellor, whether highly cited or not. 
However, this type of research starts the process of understanding 
whether there may be benefits from appointing a researcher as president. 
An interesting next step might be to find out whether a similar pattern 
exists in a substantial unit within a university, for example a school. This 
thesis argues that all heads of major strategic units in research 
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universities should possibly be headed by scholar-leaders; units where 
the core business is research and teaching. 
In the next chapter the focus moves onto deans of business schools. 
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Table 3.1 
Methodology used in SJTU ranking 2004 
Criteria Indicator Code Weight 
Alumni of an 
Quality of institution winning Alumni 10% Education Nobel Prizes and 
Fields Medals 
Staff of an institution 
winning Nobel Prizes Award 20% 
Quality of 
and Fields Medals 
Faculty Highly cited 
researchers in 21 HiCi 20% broad subject 
categories 
Articles published in 
Nature and Science* 
N&S 20% 
Research Articles in Science 
Output Citation Index- SCI 20% 
expanded and Social 
Science Citation Index 
Academic 
Size of performance with Size 10% 
Institution respect to the size of 
an institution 
Total 100% 
Copyright © 2004 Institute of Higher Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University 
* For institutions specialized in humanities and social sciences such as London School of 
Economics, N&S is not considered, and the weight of N&S is relocated to other indicators. 
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Figure 3.1 
The Cross-Country Distribution of 
the World's Top 100 Universities 
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Figure 3.2 
The Disciplines of the Presidents 
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Figure 3.3 
The Distribution of Presidents' Lifetime 
Citations Follows Lotka's Power Law 
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Figure 3.4 
A Cross-Tabulation of Presidents' Lifetime 
Citation P-scores by World University Rank 
(in quintiles) 
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Figure 3.5 
Presidents' P-scores by Rank among 
the World's Top 100 Universities 
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Loaarithm of Presidents' P-scores by University Rank 
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Figure 3.6 
Female Presidents' P-scoresby University Rank 
(P<0.01) 
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Figure 3.7 
US Presidents' P-scores by University Rank 
(P<0.01) 
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Chapter Four 
Are Top Business Schools 
Led by Top Scholars? 
Introduction 
This chapter presents a second empirical contribution, again a 
correlation. It shows that business schools that stand higher in the 
Financial Times Global MBA ranking have deans with systematically 
higher levels of life-time citations. The robustness of this finding is 
reinforced since the same significant correlation is found, using a different 
performance measure in another data set, among UK business and 
management schools. 
The question of whether it matters if a leader has been a scholar has also 
circulated around business schools for a number of years. In principle, 
every Dean Search Committee grapples with this issue. Yet to the 
author's knowledge there appears to have been no previous empirical 
research on business schools. 
One of the major challenges for business and management disciplines is 
trying to straddle two communities - research and practice. Publishing 
output is expected to be both scholarly and relevant (Augier & Teece 
2005). The potential conflict has generated considerable debate (see for 
example Hodgkinson et al. 2001, Starkey & Madan 2001, Pettigrew 2001, 
Dossabhoy & Berger 2002, Aram & Salipante 2003, March 2003, Gosling 
& Mintzberg 2004, Stiles 2004, Bennis, & O'Toole 2005, Zell 2005). 
A statement from one of the leaders interviewed for this thesis describes 
this: 
¢ "The primary business of a business school is the same as a 
university - teaching and research, and administration. But with a 
business school there are another two objectives - to have credibility 
with the profession and have a high external profile amongst the 
business world, and second, to facilitate a twin-track of publishing - 
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Academic journals and also applied publications. " George Bain, 
former VC Queens University, Belfast and also former dean of 
Warwick Business School and London Business School. 
Because of the somewhat more complex brief of business schools in 
comparison to universities, it might perhaps be expected that there would 
be no relationship between a dean's life-time citations and the position of 
their school in an international ranking. Yet once again a correlation 
exists. 
Financial Times Global MBA Ranking 
As suggested in the previous chapter, media-generated university league 
tables may be useful heuristic devices for students, but as objective tools 
of quality assessment they can be unreliable. Rankings also exclude 
factors such as an institution's history, reputation and wealth. However, 
it could be argued that because business schools are relatively new 
additions to the academy, and they are small in comparison with 
universities, there is a greater possibility of movement within league 
tables or other performance measures. 
The Financial Times produces one of the more consistent league tables. 
It has the advantage that the methodology used for assessment remains 
largely unchanged each year. The FT league table is also chosen here 
because it is internationally recognised 14 
The FT ranking began as a European survey of 49 business schools in 
1998 and developed into a worldwide league table of 75 schools in 2000. 
This number was extended to 100 in 2001. 
14 Available from: www. rankings. ft. com 
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To construct its ranking, the FT assigns 55% of weight to alumni survey 
returns, relying on criteria such as salary and career progress. Twenty- 
five percent is put on business school characteristics -- for example, 
measuring diversity of staff and students, and the extent to which a 
school is internationally recognized. A final 20% is allocated for research 
quality; 5% for faculty with PhDs; 5% on the number of doctoral grads 
taking a faculty position at one of the top 50 schools; and 10% for the 
number of faculty who publish articles in 40 named academic journals. 
The FT ranks institutions by assigning points; therefore, this can result in 
two or more institutions being given the same position. 
Data on the 100 Business School Deans 
The sample in this chapter includes 100 business school deans, two of 
whom are acting-deans. Their scholarly backgrounds are almost 
exclusively in the social sciences. Because of the disciplinary 
homogeneity across deans, there is no need to normalise citations. Data 
on the 100 deans were collected between June and July 2005. Only 
those deans in post during this period are included15. Each dean's 
lifetime citations were counted by hand. These cover citations to both 
journal articles and monographs. 
Of the 100 business schools in the FT MBA (2005) ranking, sixty-five are 
located in North America. Fifty-eight of these are in the US and 7 in 
Canada. Twenty-six schools are based in European countries. Of these 
14 are in the United Kingdom (UK), 3 each in France and Spain, 2 in 
Ireland and 1 each in Switzerland, Netherlands, Italy and Belgium. 
Finally, 9 of the 100 schools are spread across the rest of the world. 
15 With the exception of one dean who was appointed two months after this period. 
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There are 2 schools each in Australia, Hong Kong and Mexico, with one 
each in Brazil, China, and South Africa. 
Only 11 deans in the FT Top-100 are women. Six of these are located in 
US schools, 3 in the UK, and one each in Canada and Brazil. 
With regards to deans' backgrounds, 9 of the 100 have come from the 
business sector and not from academia, though 2 of the 9 have PhDs. 
Most of the deans in the sample have had traditional academic careers. 
Over a quarter of the deans define themselves as professors of 
management, business administration, strategy or entrepreneurship. In 
addition, there are 18 economists, 13 are from finance and 6 from 
accounting. Marketing professors account for 7, organizational behaviour 
and industrial relations 6, and finally 7 in operations and information 
management, operational research and risk management. 
The age of deans may potentially affect their life-time citation score, 
because those who are older have had the greatest opportunity to accrue 
citations. So, for example, if the deans with low numbers of citations can 
be shown to be significantly younger than those deans with high life-time 
scores, age could be influential. However, inspection of the age profile of 
deans in the data of this study finds that there are no major age 
differences between those with the highest and lowest citation scores. 
Results 
The individual life-time citation scores of the 100 deans in this study are 
in the range 0- 3378. The mean citation score is 355 and the median 
score is 103. There are three deans with scores over 2500 cites. 
Twenty deans have a citation score of zero. 
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It is useful to begin by splitting the group of deans in half. Among those 
who run the world's top-fifty business schools, the mean citation score of 
the deans is 447 and the median 183. The mean citation score of the 
next 50 deans is 263 and the median is 52. These data are presented in 
averages in Figure 4.1. The bar chart shows that the first 50 deans in the 
FT Top-100 collectively have just under double the citations of those in 
the second group. 
To test for statistical significance, two checks are applied. The first is a 
calculation of Spearman's rho. It tests whether the ordering of one 
variable (the position of a business school) is correlated with the ordering 
of the second variable (a dean's life-time citations). The highest citation 
score is ranked 1 and the lowest is ranked 100. As an alternative, this is 
followed by a calculation of Pearson's correlation coefficient (r). Each 
dean's citation score is regressed against the position of their business 
school to try to establish whether there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the position of a school in the FT table and the 
citation score of a dean. For clarity, full scatter plots are presented. 
Using these data, Spearman's rho is 0.274. With 100 observations, the 
associated 5 per cent critical value for a two-tailed test is 0.195, and at 1 
per cent it is 0.254. Hence the correlation between leader's rank and 
school's rank is statistically significant at p<0.01. 
Using Pearson's coefficient (r), the degree of linear relationship can be 
examined between the position of a business school and the citation 
score of a dean. Figure 4.2 presents a scatter plot showing 100 deans' 
citation scores plotted against the FT global ranking of business schools. 
Pearson's r is 0.288. The 1 per cent critical value on a two-tailed test is 
0.254, which means, again, that the relationship is statistically significant 
at p<0.01. 
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Could the results be driven by outliers? 
Conspicuous in Figure 4.2 are three distinct outliers -- those individuals 
above 2500 citations. When the same test is applied but this time to the 
logarithm of a dean's citations, Pearson's r is 0.275 which is significant at 
p<0.01. When the three outliers are removed from the data, as in Figure 
4.3, Pearson's r increases to 0.351, which is now significant at p<0.001. 
This suggests that the results are not driven by these outliers. 
Does the correlation exist in US business schools? 
The US dominates the FT league table with 58 business schools. Of the 
top 20 schools, 15 are located there. Fifty-eight US deans are in the sub- 
sample. The mean life-time citation score of the US deans is 449 and the 
median 210. As can be seen in Figure 4.4 when Pearson's r is applied 
to the US group once again the relationship is found. The one per cent 
critical value for 60 observations is 0.408, and Pearson's r for the US 
deans is 0.419 which is significant at p<0.001. 
These tests show that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the position of a business school in the FT ranking and the life- 
time citations of its dean. The higher the school is in the league table, the 
higher the dean's citations. On average, six extra citations gained by the 
dean equate to one move up the FT ranking for a business school. 
Equivalently, 600 extra citations will, at the mean values, move a school 
from the bottom of the FT Top-100 to close to the top. The correlation 
holds for the full group of 100 deans and also for the sub-sample of 58 
US deans. 
Interestingly, when this test is applied to the group of 43 non-American 
institutions only, there is no statistically significant correlation between the 
rank position of a school and a dean's citation score. This non-US result 
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raises a number of questions. Could it be a reflection of bias of English 
language or US journal publishing? Or do the top US business schools 
perhaps favour research more than the non US institutions? It is not 
feasible to answer these questions here. But it is possible to isolate a 
single country from the 100 sample and run the same test to identify 
whether a similar pattern exists 16 
Does the same correlation hold in different data on a sub-sample of 
UK business schools? 
After the United States, the UK, at 14, has the second-highest number of 
business schools in the 2005 FT Top-100 table. The UK seems an 
appropriate nation to focus on because language parity means that 
publishing and citations biases may be somewhat minimised. Also, the 
UK has a potentially useful objective measure of quality, namely the so- 
called Research Assessment Exercise. The Research Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) was set up by the UK Government in 1986 to assess, 
with the aid of expert peer review, the quality and quantity of research 
being generated in UK universities. 
The RAE Unit of Assessment (UoA) for business school submissions is 
`Business and Management Studies'". The year used is 2001, which 
was the last time the RAE assessment panels reported. Each 
submission is of a whole university department. 
Only those units of assessment that achieved a score above 4D in the 
2001 RAE are included here. RAE UoA scores range from `5A Star' at 
the very top end with the `A' signifying that all staff in the field of business 
16 For an alternative research ranking of European business schools see Baden-Fuller, 
Ravazzolo & Schweizer (2000) and for Canada see Erkut (2002). 
17 RAE results available at www. hero. ac. uk/rae/Results/. For a review of UK 
management submissions to RAE 2001 see Bessant et al. (2003), and for a review of 
the journals cited in the business and management submissions in RAE see Bence & 
Oppenheim (2004) and Geary, Marriott & Rowlinson (2004). 
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in a given university have been submitted for assessment. The scores 
go down to 1 D, at the very lowest level, where D signifies that only a 
small minority of staff have been submitted. The reason in the present 
study for drawing a line at RAE grade 4 is because a quality-threshold 
allows comparison with schools in the FT Top-100 (2005). Of the UK 
business schools that made it into the FT ranking in the equivalent RAE 
year of 2001, the lowest RAE grade of a UK school included was 4D. 
In 2001 there were 38 units of assessment in Business and Management 
Studies in UK universities rated 4D and above. Sixteen submissions 
scored in the 5s, and 22 scored in the 4s. Thirty-six of the 38 business 
schools are located within comprehensive universities. Only two are 
stand-alone business schools. 
The next step is to test whether a similar correlation exists between the 
38 UK business schools (or units of assessment) and the research history 
of those deans in place in 2001. Again the life-time citations of the 38 
deans were hand counted. RAE scores are used here to rank the 
position of a school or UoA. The top UK school, London Business School 
with `5A Star', is ranked 1; the second two schools, Lancaster Business 
School and Warwick Business School with `5B Star' are ranked 2; and so 
on down to those schools rated 4D in the RAE, who for this study, have 
been assigned a ranking position of 9. 
The maximum recorded number of life-time citations of a dean in the 38 
British schools is 1600 and the minimum is zero. The mean leader- 
citation score among departments rated in the 5s is 379, and the mean 
citation score of those in the 4s is 150. This implies that deans running 
departments in the former group are two-and-a-half times more cited than 
those in the second column of departments that scored in the 4s. 
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Figure 4.5 presents a scatter plot of the 38 UK deans' citation scores 
plotted against the RAE ranked position of business schools. Pearson's r 
is 0.452. The 1 per cent critical value on a two-tailed test for 40 
observations is 0.393, which means that this negatively-sloped 
relationship is statistically significant at p<0.01. An increase of 65 
citations obtained by a dean is equal to one move up in the RAE for a unit 
of assessment. 
It is perhaps useful to note that business school rank explains 
approximately 10% of the variance in leaders' citations. As would be 
expected, there are other explanatory factors that are not being 
measured here. 
Summary 
Again in this chapter a correlation is reported. It offers simple evidence 
that the higher a business school is in the FT Top-100 ranking the higher 
are the lifetime citations of its dean. The correlation is found for the 
international group of 100 business schools, for 58 US schools, and, in a 
different data set, for 38 UK university business schools in the 2001 
Research Assessment Exercise. For the sake of clarity, full scatter plots 
are reported. The correlation is robust to the exclusion of outliers and a 
logarithmic transformation of the variables. 
This finding is consistent with that of the previous chapter except that the 
relationship between presidents and the position of their universities is 
marginally stronger than that between deans and business schools. 
Given the above-mentioned debate in business schools, about reaching a 
balance between academic and applied research, this seems interesting. 
The study's contribution is that it provides the first formal evidence that 
top business schools systematically appoint researchers as their leaders. 
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Its limitation is that the data are, again cross-sectional, and, therefore, 
causality cannot be established. This issue is addressed in the next 
chapter. 
Interpretation of Findings in Chapters 3&4 
These findings suggest that those universities and business schools at 
the top of the global rankings are behaving differently from institutions 
lower down. Better scholars are leading better universities and business 
schools. Cross-sectional analyses can be indicative of causality but, of 
course, they are not sufficient to establish a causal relationship. 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 4 
seems interesting and apparently robust. 
Why are universities and business schools that are higher in league 
tables led by leaders with stronger publication records? 
Four interrelated explanations are: 
A. Top institutions are more likely to seek out top scholars as 
presidents and deans. 
B. The best institutions are more attractive to the best scholars. 
C. The correlations might be a statistical coincidence of this time 
period. 
D. The relationships are explained through unobservable 
heterogeneity. 
E. Presidents and deans who have been successful scholars are 
more likely to improve the performance of a university or business 
school. 
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Possibility A -- Top institutions are more likely to seek out top 
scholars as presidents and deans. 
It is possible that an Ivy League university will always appoint a president 
or dean who has either worked at an Ivy institution or studied at one. In 
UK universities, there is little movement in vice chancellors between 
those leading older research universities and those in former polytechnics 
or newly established universities (Bargh et al., 2000). Who gets 
appointed may be a factor of the universities that house business 
schools. For example, business schools within universities that have a 
strong research focus may be more likely to conform to this culture 
(Bennis & O'Toole, 2005). Similarly, it could be argued that if a leader of 
a university, who appoints deans, is themselves a top scholar, he or she 
may appoint other scholars into key leadership positions. In short, like 
may appoint like. 
Top universities and business schools are also better placed to attract top 
candidates because they have access to greater resources, and therefore 
can provide better facilities and salaries. 
Alternatively, university and business school governors or board 
members may wish to use the appointment of a scholar to signal a 
change in institutional strategy. Signalling may be of symbolic 
importance both to internal and external stakeholders. Some illustrative 
statements from the interviews in Chapter 6 express these ideas. 
"Appointment of a top researcher sends an internal signal to 
colleagues that research success in the institution is 
important", Amy Gutmann, President, University of 
Pennsylvania (interview April 28,2005). 
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"An appointing board can signal a sound understanding of 
the culture of a research university by appointing a 
recognized scholar with administrative ability to a top 
leadership position", John Heilbron, former Vice-Chancellor 
of Berkeley (personal correspondence July 2004). 
"By having an academic at the helm, the university is stating 
clearly what it values most highly, " Shirley Tilghman, 
President, Princeton (The Daily Princetonian, October 24, 
2005). 
"A top scholar is more likely to be of interest to the media. 
And a high media profile can be very useful with brand 
growth, fundraising and alumni relations", Mary Blair, 
Director of Fundraising at the London School of Economics, 
(personal correspondence 2005). 
Possibility B -- The best schools are more attractive to the best 
scholars 
This is the idea that candidates who have been successful scholars will 
be more attracted to higher-status business schools. It offers an 
explanation that is the mirror image of A in that there is a match between 
the selector and the selected and that this represents a better investment 
return. Economists might describe this as a form of rational assortative 
matching (Becker, 1973). 
Possibility C- The correlation is a statistical coincidence of this 
time period. 
It is unlikely that the results in Chapter 3, replicated in chapter 4, have 
occurred through statistical coincidence. This is confirmed in Chapter 5. 
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Possibility D- The relationship is explained through unobservable 
heterogeneity. 
This would mean that research talent is merely a proxy for leadership 
ability. The positive relationship between leader's citations and institution 
rank may actually be picking up a correlation between other variables. 
For instance, presidents who are good at research may just be good at 
everything. This is the alternative to a cause-and-effect relationship. 
All correlations are potentially susceptible to this kind of criticism. It 
seems implausible, however, that candidates' research records do not 
play a part in their selection for headship of institutions with prominent 
research missions. 
Possibility E- Leaders who have been scholars improve the 
performance of universities and business schools 
Option E proposes that there may be a link with organizational 
performance in that those deans with strong publishing records contribute 
something extra to the role of leader. This hypothesis suggests that 
universities and business schools perform better if led by a scholar. 
Evidence contributing to this argument is presented in the next chapter, 
and theoretical explanations are further developed in Chapter 7. 
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Figure 4.1 
The Relationship between Deans' Mean 
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Figure 4.2 
The Relationship between Deans' Life-Time Citations 
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The Relationship After Excluding Outliers 
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The Relationship in a Different Data Set: Deans of UK 
Business and Management Schools in 2001 
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Chapter Five 
Experts Leading Experts: 
A Longitudinal Study of 
Leadership and University 
Performance 
Introduction 
This chapter adopts a longitudinal method to develop further the 
hypothesis that better scholars may make better university presidents. It 
uses multiple regression analysis, with university performance as the 
dependent variable, and the lifetime citations of presidents as the key 
independent variable. Control variables for university income, 
presidential age and discipline are also included. These are incorporated 
to check the robustness of the correlations between university 
performance and a leader's cites. Data from the UK are used because 
of the unique method of assessment that has been available in that 
country for a number of years - the Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) - which is outlined below. 
This study uses panel data comprising 55 UK research universities 
observed three times - 1992,1996 and 2001. The lifetime citations of 
165 UK university presidents have been hand-counted and normalized for 
discipline. 
The Sample of Institutions 
There are 55 UK universities in the data set18 -- the full list is in Table 5.8. 
The institutions selected make up the oldest and most established 
research universities in the UK. They are often referred to as the `old' 
universities, those that existed before 1992, a period that marked major 
expansion in the number of UK higher education institutions. This group 
have consistently generated the majority of academic research and they 
continue to receive the bulk of UK research income (Higher Education 
Statistics Agency 2006). 
18 Aston is not included in this sample because of the small number of departments it 
submitted to the three RAEs over the period 1992-2001. 
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It was decided, on balance, that inclusion of new universities (those 
established in 1992 from polytechnics) would not be appropriate. This is 
because in 1992, the start date in this study, polytechnics had only just 
become new universities; also, even today despite enlargement of the 
sector, old universities still continue to dominate the RAE. 
Each university in the 55 sample differs in its total revenue, age and 
geographic location. Using 2001 figures, the revenue of the sample 
institutions ranges from £65 million ($120 million) at the lowest end, up to 
£450 million ($840 million) for Oxford and Cambridge. The mean 
revenue, however, is £160 million ($300 million) and the median is £120 
million ($220). There are three loose categories of university in this 
group. The first are the universities that were established before the 19th 
Century including Cambridge, Oxford and St Andrews, among others. 
The second category are the `red brick' or civic universities that were 
established in the 19th and 20th centuries and are all located in cities, for 
example Bristol, Liverpool and Manchester. Finally, there are a recent 
group of so called `plate glass' universities, that were established in the 
1960's and these include Essex, Warwick and York. 
Age, size, wealth and reputation are all major contributing factors to the 
long term success of any university. But it is important to mention that 
success over the last 40 years among UK research universities has not 
been confined to one particular group. There has been movement up 
and down in RAE performance and also in various league tables (see for 
example league tables in The Guardian newspaper, Times Higher 
Education Supplement, The Independent, among others). In this study, 
that spans nine years, the data show that improvement in performance is 
not confined to the largest or the oldest institutions. Using a measure 
that identifies universities that have increased the number of top-ranked 
departments over three RAE's (outlined below), the top 10% of movers 
up include one 1960's university and four red brick or civic universities. 
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One is located in Wales, two in the north of England, one in the west of 
England and one in the south. 
The Leaders 
The sample includes 165 British university presidents19 . They have led 
the 55 universities over, approximately, a twenty year period. It is the 
presidents in place in 1992 and 1996 that appear most in the statistical 
analysis. Biographical information has come from 'Who's Who', the 
Association of Commonwealth Universities, and from individuals' 
biographies. Bibliometric data on the presidents was collected in 
October and November 2005. 
The focus in this chapter is on presidents' lifetime citations that are 
normalized for discipline into a P-score and used as a proxy measure of 
each individual leader's past research productivity (as outlined in Chapter 
2). Even though it is not directly relevant to the analysis, a description of 
the presidential data is still interesting, especially if we separate the 
sample into three loosely consecutive time periods. This allows for a 
comparison between those leading the 55 research universities in the 
1980's, 1990's and early 2000s approximately (see Table 5.1). 
Immediately noticeable in Table 5.1 is the small number of women 
presidents. Of the total 165 UK leaders, over the three time periods, only 
7 are female. They include one woman each in the 1980's and 1990's 
and 5 among the most recent cohort. This implies that women are 
increasing in numbers as leaders of the UK's top universities, albeit it 
explains only 9% of the current 55 presidents. As outlined in Chapter 3, 
in 2004 18% of the top 50 research universities in the US were led by 
women. 
19 President is used here to denote the executive leader of a university. The term is used 
to include vice chancellor, principal, and director, among others. 
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Apart from sex differences, the most striking feature of the three cohorts 
represented in Table 5.1 is in their relative similarity. For example, the 
mean age of accession to president in the first two decades -- 1980's and 
1990's -- is 52 years. This age rises by a year for the 2000 cohort. In the 
1960s the average age of president was also 52 (Bargh et al. 2000). 
Average age of accession to university leader has been rising since the 
turn of the century. In the 1900s, early 40s was a common age of 
president. By the 1950s the average age of a starting president rose to 
48 years, and it appears to be continuing to rise slowly (Cohen & March 
1974, Bargh et al. 2000). This, no doubt, partially reflects extended life 
expectancy. Length of tenure, on the other hand, is marginally 
shortening. The average tenure of US university presidents in the first 
seventy years of the nineteenth century was 10 years (Cohen & March 
1974). For presidents in this UK cohort the mean length of tenure in the 
1980's was also 10 years. By the 1990's, the average time in office 
started to drop to 8 years. With many contracts now renewable after 5 
years, it is possible that the tenure of incumbent presidents might decline 
further. 
Where there have been changes over the three decades is in the 
disciplinary background of UK presidents. The 1980's were dominated by 
scientists who made up 75% of the cohort. Of the scientists the largest 
group at 64% was, overwhelmingly, engineers. In the 1980's those with 
a social science back-ground numbered only 7 of the 55 with even fewer, 
5, from the humanities. In the 1990's scientists started to marginally 
reduce in numbers to 50% of all presidents, and, of the most recent 
cohort 43% are scientists. Social scientists as a disciplinary group have 
increased their presence at the top of universities, and to a lesser extent 
so have those from the humanities. 
Relevant to this study is the number of non-academics who run research 
universities. Of the 165 presidents, only 8 are non-academics. Of these, 
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6 are civil servants; one came from a research and development 
background in industry and the other from a professional service firm. 
Glasgow University is the only institution to have appointed two civil 
servants out of its last three leaders. 
Finally, 8 presidents appear twice in this data set. In other words, they 
have run two universities in the sample between the 1980's and 2005. 
This group could be described as `career' presidents who may have 
dropped out of research at an earlier stage in their academic career to 
pursue administration. This is confirmed when we look at the mean 
citation score of the `career' presidents when compared to the overall 
citation norm of the group. The former have half the average lifetime 
citations of the sample as a whole. The P-score mean for career 
presidents is 2.4, and the median is 1.7, whereas the group mean is 5.8 
and the median 5.1. Also, the average age that a `career' president 
becomes leader is 48, four years earlier than the group mean. 
Dependent Variable: University Performance 
There are several ways to measure the long-term performance of a 
university. One of the most common, although possibly the least 
scientific, is to use league tables, which have become ubiquitous. The 
main problem with rankings is their lack of consistency in assessment 
methodologies. They also exclude factors such as an institution's history, 
reputation and wealth. Most league tables are media generated, 
produced by commercial organisations designed to make money by 
selling their publications. To create a story, the methodology is changed, 
often annually, which ensures that institutions at the top rotate (Lombardi 
et al. 2002). 
The UK has had a system for appraising research universities since 
1986, one that takes place every four to five years. The Research 
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Assessment Exercise (RAE) was designed to help inform funding bodies' 
decisions about how to distribute public money for research. Selectivity is 
focused on quality in that institutions that conduct the best research 
receive a larger proportion of the available grant. Based on a system of 
peer review, the RAE provides quality ratings for research across all 
disciplines. Panels use a standard scale to award a rating for each 
submission. The ratings have changed over the different assessment 
exercises, but generally they range from 1 to 5*. Scores are assigned to 
units of assessment (equivalent to academic departments broadly 
speaking) depending on how much of the work is judged to reach national 
or international levels of excellence20. Submissions are then allocated a 
letter A-E that signifies the number of faculty in a given unit that have 
been submitted for review. 
The RAE is the measure of university performance used in this chapter. 
It was felt to be particularly appropriate because of the emphasis it places 
on the output of academic research, which is a core business function of 
research universities, the other being teaching. It is important here to 
mention this second core function and how it might relate to the thesis. 
The quality of teaching is not being measured; however, it can be argued 
that there is a relationship between a university's RAE success and the 
standard of its instruction. In the UK a separate measure was 
established by government to assess teaching in all universities - 
Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA). In this assessment process, scores 
are assigned to each university department based on the strength of their 
teaching. TQA scores have been shown to correlate highly with RAE 
scores (Shattock 2003). In other words, those institutions that perform 
best in RAE tend to obtain the highest TQA scores also. 
20 Information about RAE available from www. hero. ac. uk 
84 
Measure of Performance 
University improvement is measured here across three Research 
Assessment Exercises -- 1992,1996 and 2001 - and is used to assess 
how much each university has improved or declined in the number of top 
departments across these periods. The focus here is on improvement in 
those departments that achieved the highest three scores in the RAE of 
5A*, 5B* and 5A21. These grades are synonymous with research 
considered, by peer-review, to be of international excellence. These 
scores have been selected as measures of success in this study because 
obtaining a top grade is a reflection of overall departmental quality when 
compared to, say, a score of 5C which means that a number of faculty 
have been omitted from assessment. Thus, it is only a part-measure of a 
department's quality. 
Understanding the spread of grades across the RAE is helpful. In 1992 
the 55 universities in this sample submitted a total of 1799 departments. 
Of these 322, or 18%, obtained a top score in the fives. In the 1996 RAE 
the same group of universities submitted 1761 units of assessment. In 
this year, of the 1761 submissions, 525, or 30%, scored somewhere in 
the fives between grades 5*A and 5E. Of the 525 grade fives awarded in 
1996,320 received scores in the three top five grades. Thus top fives 
accounted for 18% of the total departments submitted in 1996, whereas a 
third of all submissions received a grade somewhere in the fives. In 
2001, the number of fives awarded rose even higher. In this period the 
sample institutions submitted only 1676 units of assessment to the RAE. 
Of these 921, or 55% of the total submissions, scored in the fives, and 
528, or 32% of the total received a top five grade. Therefore, with so 
many submissions scoring a five grade in 1996 and 2001, it was felt 
necessary to lift the threshold of performance to the top three grades 
awarded. 
21 In RAE 1992 the three top scores were 5A, 5B and 5C. 
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This decision can be justified because departments that achieve a top 
five grade are submitting all or most of their faculty for assessment rather 
than merely a portion of them. Also attainment of the top scores 
demonstrates that academics are deemed to be of international 
excellence. 
University performance is, then, measured by comparing the growth in 
the number of excellent departments -- those that received a score 
among the top three grades in RAEs. These figures are generated both 
for growth in the level of units and also as growth in the changes over 
time for each of the sample institutions. For further information, results 
for the 55 sample universities on the growth in all grade five submissions, 
over the three RAEs, is also supplied. The findings are in Table 5.9 (A, B 
& C). 
The question that the research is trying to answer is: have the mover 
universities moved in part because their leaders were better scholars? 
To understand whether university performance in the RAE can be 
explained partially by the leader-characteristic of scholarship, the study 
correlates a president's lifetime citations, or P-score, with the later 
movement, up or down, of the number of excellent departments in his or 
her institution. It also controls for institutional revenue, age and the 
scholarly discipline of presidents. 
Independent Variable: Presidents' Lifetime Citations 
As discussed in Chapter 2, citations are references to authors in other 
academic papers as acknowledgement of their contribution to a specific 
research area. They are used in this chapter to signify the scholarly 
success of each president. Bibliometric information has come from ISI 
Web of Science. 
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In this chapter, each university president is assigned a normalized citation 
score, which reflects both the differences across disciplines and their 
personal citation levels. The process used to establish the `P-score' -- 
president's individual lifetime citation score normalized for discipline - 
uses the same methodology outlined in Chapter 2. 
Control Variables: Organizational Revenue, Age and Discipline of 
President 
Three control variables have been included in the regression analysis: 
organizational income, the president's age, and the academic discipline 
of each president. All are measured across different time periods. 
University revenue has been included for years 1992/3 and 1996/7 
(figures supplied by the Higher Education Statistics Agency in the UK). It 
is important to note that the income variable existed only for 47 of the 55 
universities. This is because no data were available to the author for the 
8 University of London colleges22 in 1992 when the revenue figures for 
individual colleges were aggregated into one `University of London' sum. 
The income figures include government funded grants, tuition fees and 
education grants and contracts, research grants & contracts, endowment 
& investment income, miscellaneous income and income from services 
rendered. 
The age variable has been included by calculating the age of an 
incumbent president in 1992 and 1996. The academic discipline of a 
president is defined by creating two fields, the `sciences' that are coded 0, 
and the 'social sciences and humanities' that are coded 1. 
22 The 8 colleges of the University of London include Imperial, London School of 
Economics, University College, Birkbeck, Goldsmiths, Kings, Queen Mary and Westfield 
College and Royal Holloway. 
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Results 
Table 5.2 gives means and standard deviations for P-scores and the 
performance variable -- the number of departments that scored a top-five 
grade in Research Assessment Exercises 1992,1996 and 2001. 
In looking at the presidents' P-scores, as mentioned earlier, what is again 
noticeable is the rise in mean P-score to 7.13 in the year 2001. This is 
due to an outlier effect in that one leader (Anthony Giddens, Director of 
London School of Economics from 1997 to 2004) has a large number of 
lifetime citations. As noted in the table, if the outlier is removed there is 
consistency in P-scores among presidents across the three time periods. 
The highly cited LSE president in 2001 does not influence the chapter's 
results. The key correlations are not affected by this outlier because the 
calculations in the study allow for lags. Hence, only leaders' P-scores in 
1992 and 1996 are used. The mean P-score of leaders in 1992 is 5.15 
and the mean P-score of leaders in 1996 is 4.62. 
Turning to the performance variables, as reported above, there is a rise in 
the number of submissions receiving top scores between RAE 1992 and 
2001. The rise is particularly noticeable in the last time-period of 1996 to 
2001 where the mean increases approximately a half from 6.13 to 9.6. 
Initial results can be found in the simple cross-sectional bar diagram in 
Figure 5.1. The focus here is on the leaders of those universities that 
made the greatest gains, and the least gains, in the number of top-five 
departments between RAE 1992 and 2001. The president's P-score 
figures represent the means in P-score between 1992 and 1996 allowing 
for a lag. 
As can be seen, the universities that advanced the most during this 
period -- increasing their number of excellent departments -- were 
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disproportionately led by presidents with higher lifetime citations. The 
mean P-score of leaders running the top five mover-universities is 13.6 
and the mean P-score of those heading the top 10 mover-universities is 
9.6. However, of the universities that accumulated the least top-fives 
across the nine year period -- indeed some actually reduced their number 
-- the P-score of leaders for both the lowest 5 and 10 universities is 3.1. 
Therefore, presidents leading the top 10 mover-institutions have three 
times the P-scores, and those leading the top 5 mover-institutions have 
over four times the lifetime citations of those who led the universities that 
performed least well. These preliminary findings suggest that the 
research history of a president may affect the future performance of a 
university in the RAE. 
Table's 5.3 through 5.7 report regression equations. These attempt to 
establish more carefully whether a statistically significant relationship 
exists between organizational performance, the dependent variable, and 
president's P-score, among other independent variables. In the following 
tables, the effect of the independent variables is measured by the 
coefficients, and the level of significance is given by the t-statistic. 
Results are presented for three time periods. The first is 1992 to 1996, 
followed by 1996 to 2001 and finally the full 9 years, 1992 to 2001. Given 
the importance of lags, the results incorporating two research exercises 
that span just under a decade, would seem to be the most robust. 
Table 5.3 gives results for the level of excellent departments, or top-fives, 
gained in 1996 in the RAE, and then reports the effects of the 
independent variables in 1992. 
As can be seen, the P-score of a president in 1992 is statistically 
significantly related to the number of top-five departments 
in 1996. The 
coefficient is 0.30 (t-statistic = 2.29) which is significantly 
different from 
zero at the 5% level. Table 5.3 also shows that organizational 
income is 
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statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is 0.10 (t-statistic = 
6.27). But age and discipline of president are not here statistically 
significant. 
Table 5.4 gives results for the number of top-five departments in the 2001 
RAE and reports the effects of the independent variables in 1996, again 
allowing for a lag of five years. In 2001 the P-score coefficient is 0.53 (t- 
statistic = 3.04) which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Again, the 
finance variable correlates with organizational performance. The 
coefficient is 0.09 (t-statistic = 7.25). However, there is no statistically 
significant relationship with either age of leader or their academic 
discipline. The size of the coefficient on P-score is somewhat mediated 
by adding the extra variables (comparing column 1 to column 4 in Table 
5.4). 
The equation in Table 5.3 illustrates that one extra point on a presidential 
P-score raises the number of top-five or excellent departments by 0.3. 
Table 5.4 shows that in 2001 the number of top-five departments is 
increased by 0.53; in other words, a hypothetical 10 point move on a 
presidential P-score in 1996 is estimated to generate five excellent 
departments in 2001. These are, of course, associations rather than 
clear cause and effect. 
Although they use lags, the results so far are fundamentally cross- 
sectional. Now we turn to longitudinal analysis. 
Table 5.5 gives regression equations in which the dependent variable is 
the change in the number of top-five, or excellent, departments, in the 
Research Assessment Exercise between 1992 and 1996. As can be 
seen, the association between P-score in 1992 and the later performance 
in 1996 is statistically significant at the 1% level. The coefficient is 0.13 
(t-statistic = 3.43). University income does not now, in columns 2-4 of 
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Table 5.5, have a significant effect on the changes over time in the 
number of top-five departments, and again there is no well-determined 
effect from the age or discipline of a leader. 
Table 5.6 shows a slightly different pattern. In 2001 the number of top- 
fives is statistically unaffected by presidential P-score five years earlier in 
1996. Although the coefficients on P-score across the four columns are 
not significantly different from zero, they remain positive. Again, there is 
no significant effect from income nor the age or discipline of a leader. 
A statistically significant relationship between performance and leaders' 
lifetime citations is reinstated again in Table 5.7 when a longer 
perspective is adopted. The presidential P-scores in 1992 are correlated 
with the number of excellent departments obtained nine years later in the 
2001 RAE. The coefficient is 0.21 (t-statistic 3.13). Statistical 
significance is established at the 1% level. Finance, age and discipline 
are not correlated with university performance. In columns 2-4 of Table 
5.7, their inclusion in the regression equation leaves the coefficient on P- 
score approximately unaffected. 
A factor that may affect the ease with which an institution can change is 
the initial strength or weakness of that university. For example, these 
regression equations may, in a sense, favour an institution that has 
further to move, because it has very few top departments, when 
compared to one that has already demonstrated success by achieving 
many top grades. Could this be a problem? 
A test for this is to include a variable controlling for an institution's original 
position23. This check was done by entering the number of top-five 
grades that an institution had in 1992 into a regression equation where 
the dependent variable is the change in top departments from 1992 to 
23 Thanks to Ronald Ehrenberg for this suggestion. 
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2001. When this is done, the results reveal that there is no difference in 
the statistical significance of presidential P-scores, or in the other 
independent variables of income, age and discipline (table not reported). 
Therefore, institutions that improve the most are not doing so merely 
because they had the furthest scope to change. 
The results presented in Tables 5.3 through 5.7 appear to show that a 
president's lifetime citations, or past success as a scholar, are 
significantly correlated with the future number of top-five grades that a 
university attains in the RAE. Conversely, university revenue does not 
affect performance. Using a measure that follows the growth in 
departments rated excellent may be a particularly appropriate gauge of 
RAE performance. Achieving the very top grades is a challenging task 
because excellence must be reached across all faculty in a given unit of 
assessment. It is the proportion of people entered that is important24. 
The results presented in this chapter illustrate the apparent relevance of 
presidents' P-scores when explaining universities' performance in the UK 
Research Assessment Exercise. In other words, there seems to be 
some evidence consistent with a statistical, and perhaps even causal, 
relationship between the past level of scholarship attained by a president 
and the future performance of their university. 
A Further Check for Reverse Causality 
Care has to be taken to try to check for reverse causality. This is done 
earlier in the chapter by introducing a series of lags. But another test 
can be applied. In the style of Granger causality (Granger & Newbold 
1974), when the leaders' P-scores in 2001 are regressed on universities' 
24 Nevertheless, it is still interesting to look at how a university performs in the RAE in 
the next tier -- across all five grades 
from A5* through 5E. These results plus analysis 
are in Table 4.9 (A, B& C). 
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RAE performance in 1992, there is no statistically significant relationship. 
In an equation of this type where the independent variable is the number 
of top-five, or excellent, departments the coefficient is 0.035 (t = 0.80). 
Concluding Comments 
Using longitudinal data, this chapter explores whether the characteristics 
of a leader in position today can tell us about the likely future 
performance of their organization. The findings seem to offer some of the 
first evidence that there may be a relationship between the research 
quality of a leader and later organizational outcomes. 
The study's hypothesis is tested by using multiple regression analysis 
where university performance in the UK's Research Assessment Exercise 
(RAE) is the dependent variable and the lifetime citations of presidents -- 
normalized for discipline -- is the key independent variable. Control 
variables for university income, presidential age and discipline are also 
used. The focus is on changes in university performance over a nine- 
year period and three assessment exercises. The data set covers a 
panel of 55 universities and 165 university presidents. Statistical 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis is provided. 
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Table 5.1 
Description of the Data 
Means 
1980's 1990's 2000-2005 
Number of male 54 54 50 
leaders 
Number of 1 1 5 
female leaders 
Age of accession 52 years 52 years 53 years 
to leader 
Leader's lifetime 4.59 7.80* 5.12 
citations 
normalized into a 
P-score 
Length of 10 8 N/A 
leader's tenure 
Leaders who 41 28 24 
were scientists 
Leaders - social 7 15 17 
scientists 
Leaders - 5 10 10 
humanities 
Leaders - non- 2 2 4 
academics 
# Universities n= 55 n= 55 n= 55 
*One leader has exceptionally high citations. When we exclude this observation the P- 
score mean is 5.06 
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Table 5.2 
Descriptive Statistics: Data over Three Research 
Assessment Exercises 
Means 
& standard deviations 
Variables 1992 1996 2001 
Leader's lifetime 5.15 4.62 7.13* 
citations normalized (7.47) (5.94) (21.56) 
into a P-score 
Number of top-five 5.82 6.13 9.6 
departments (6.82) (7.43) (8.13) 
# Universities n= 55 n= 55 n= 55 
*One leader has exceptionally high citations. When we exclude this observation the P- 
score norm is 4.38, standard deviation is 6.92. 
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FIGURE 5.1 
Universities with the Greatest and Smallest 
Improvement in the Number of Top-Five 
Departments Between RAE 1992-2001 
10 Least- 
Improved 
Universities 
10 Most - 
Improved 
Universities 
5 Least- 
Improved 
Universities 
5 Most - 
Improved 
Universities 
The Mean P-scores of Leaders Between 1992-1996 
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Table 5.3 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is 
the Number of Top Departments in the UK Research 
Assessment Exercise in 1996 
The Number of To -Five Departments in 1996 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of leader in 1992 0.30* 0.21* 0.20* 0.20* 
(2.29) (2.05) (1.98) (1.96) 
University income in 1992/93 0.10** 0.11 0.11** 
(6.27) (6.56) (6.28) 
Age of leader in 1992 0.25 0.26 
(1.58) (1.53) 
Discipline of leader in 19921 0.30 
(0.16) 
R2 0.09 0.54 0.57 0.57 
Constant 4.58 -4.55 -19.05 -19.57 
(3.87**) (-. 71**) -2.05* 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, 1= Social Sciences & Humanities **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
Table 5.4 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is 
the Number of Top Departments in the UK Research 
Assessment Exercise in 2001 
The Number of Top-Five Departments in 2001 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of leader in 1996 0.53** 0.33** 0.33** 0.33** 
(3.04) (2.58) (2.54) (2.49) 
University income in 1996/97 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
(7.28) (7.06) (6.87) 
Age of leader in 1996 0.04 0.04 
(0.21) 0.21 
Discipline of leader in 19961 0.11 
(0.07) 
R2 0.15 0.63 0.62 0.62 
Constant 7.17 -3.08 -5.38 -5.61 
5.53** (-1.84) (-0.49) (0.48) 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, 1= Social Sciences & Humanities **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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Table 5.5 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is the 
Change in the Number of Top-Five Departments Between 1992 
and 1996 in the UK Research Assessment Exercises 
The Change in Top-Five Departments 1992-1996 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of leader in 1992 0.13** 0.13** 0.12** 0.12** 
3.43 (3.07) (2.93) 2.90 
University income in 1992/93 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.55) (0.64) (0.65) 
Age of leader in 1992 0.02 0.02 
0.36 (0.29) 
Discipline of leader in 19921 -0.11 
(-0.15) 
R2 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Constant -0.37 -0.61 -2.01 -1.81 
(-1.09) (-0.90) (-0.52) (-0.43) 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, 1= Social Sciences & Humanities **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
Table 5.6 
Repression Equations where the Dependent Variable is the 
Change in the Number of Top-Five Departments Between 1996 
and 2001 in the UK Research Assessment Exercises 
The Change in Top-Five Departments 1996-2001 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of leader in 1996 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.04 
(1.03) (0.64) (0.53) (0.40) 
University income in 1996/97 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.97) (0.86) (0.59) 
Age of leader in 1996 -0.00 0.06 
(-0.02) (0.43) 
Discipline of leader in 19961 1.97 
(1.64) 
R2 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.09 
Constant 3.08 2.18 2.53 -1.44 
(5.07**) (1.80) (0.32) 0.18 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, 1= Social Sciences & Humanities **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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Table 5.7 
Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is the 
Change in the Number of Top-Five Departments Between 1992 
and 2001 in the UK Research Assessment Exercises 
The Change in To -Five Departments 1992-2001 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of leader in 1992 0.21 ** 0.19*'' 0.20** 0.20** 
3.13 (2.59) (2.64) 2.63 
University income in 1992/93 0.02 0.02 0.02 
(1.48) (1.27) (1.35) 
Age of leader in 1992 -0.00 -0.03 
(-0.07) (-0.24) 
Discipline of leader in 19921 -0.78 
(-0.58) 
R2 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.21 
Constant 2.70 1.33 1.85 3.22 
(4.46**) (1.10) (0.27) 0.43 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, 1= Social Sciences & Humanities **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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Table 5.8 
Universities in the sample* 
1. Birkbeck College, London 
2. Brunel University 
3. City University 
4. Goldsmiths' College, London 
5. Herriot-Watt University 
6. Imperial College, London 
7. King's College, London 
8. London School of Economics 
9. Open University 
10. Queen Mary and Westfield College, London 
11. Queen's University, Belfast 
12. Royal Holloway, London 
13. MIST 
14. University College London 
15. University of Wales, Bangor 
16. University of Wales, Swansea 
17. University of Wales, Aberystwyth 
18. University of Aberdeen 
19. University of Bath 
20. University of Birmingham 
21. University of Bradford 
22. University of Bristol 
23. University of Cambridge 
24. University of Dundee 
25. University of Durham 
26. University Of East Anglia 
27. University of Edinburgh 
28. University of Essex 
29. University of Exeter 
30. University of Glasgow 
31. University of Hull 
32. University of Keele 
33. University of Kent at Canterbury 
34. University of Lancaster 
35. University of Leeds 
36. University of Leicester 
37. University of Liverpool 
38. Loughborough University 
39. University of Manchester 
40. University of Newcastle 
41. University of Noftingham 
42. University of Oxford 
43. University of Reading 
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44. University of Salford 
45. University of Sheffield 
46. University of Southampton 
47. St Andrews University 
48. University of Stirling 
49. University of Strathclyde 
50. University of Surrey 
51. University of Sussex 
52. University of Ulster 
53. University of Cardiff 
54. University of Warwick 
55. University of York 
* Aston University was excluded from the sample because their RAE submissions were 
few in number, making comparisons in performance difficult and open to inaccuracies. 
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Table 5.9 (A, B& C) 
Re-Doing the Testing with a 
Different Performance Measure 
(A) Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is the 
Number of Departments Graded 5A*- 5E in the UK Research 
Assessment Exercise 
(A. 1) The Number of Grade Five De artment s in 199 6 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of leader in 1992 0.34* 0.22* 0.21 * 0.21 * 
(2.22) (2.21) (2.07) (2.07) 
University income in 1992/93 0.13** 0.14** 0.14** 
(8.37) (8.36) (8.21) 
Age of leader in 1992 0.12 0.09 
(0.74) (0.52) 
Discipline of leader in 19921 -1.05 
(-0.58) 
R2 0.09 0.66 0.67 0.68 
Constant 7.82** -4.17** -11.00 -9.17 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, 1= Social Sciences & Humanities 
**p<0.01 *p<0.05 
(A. 2) The Number of Grade Five Departments in 2001 
1 2 3 4 
P-score of leader in 1996 0.71** 0.40** 0.42** 0.41 ** 
(3.02) (3.38) (3.43) (3.34) 
University income in 1996/97 0.14** 0.14** 0.14** 
(12.18) (11.972) (11.61) 
Age of leader in 1996 0.12 0.15 
(0.69) (0.80) 
Discipline of leader in 19961 0.86 
(0.54) 
R2 0.15 0.82 0.81 0.82 
Constant 13.47** -2.13 -9.24 -10.98 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, 1= Social Sciences & Humanities 
**p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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(B) Regression Equations where the Dependent Variable is the 
Change in the Number of Departments Graded 5A*- 5E in the 
UK Research Assessment Exercise 
(B. 1) The Changes in Grade 5 Departments Between 1992-1996 
Independent Variables 1 2 3 4 
P-score of Leader in 1992 0.17** 0.15** 0.14** 0.15** 
(3.30) (3.06) (2.96) (3.08) 
University income in 1992/93 0.03** 0.03** 0.04** 
(4.16) (3.40) (4.40) 
Age of leader in 1992 -0.17 -0.16 
(-1.52) (-2.05) 
Discipline of leader in 19921 -1.57 
(-1.84) 
R2 0.17 0.43 0.46 0.50 
Constant 2.80** -0.13 6.62 9.37* 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, I= Social Sciences & Humanities 
**p<0.01 *p<0.05 
(B. 2) The Changes in Grade 5 Departments Between 1996-2001 
1 2 3 4 
P-score of leader in 1996 0.23* 0.14 0.14 0.12 
(2.06) (1.28) (1.22) (1.11) 
University income in 1996/97 0.04** 0.04** 0.03** 
(3.45) (3.28) (3.03) 
Age of leader in 1996 0.08 0.14 
(0.46) (0.85) 
Discipline of leader in 1996' 2.11 
(0.15) 
R2 0.74 0.28 0.27 0.31 
Constant 6.13** 2.62 -1.47 -5.70 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, 1= Social Sciences & Humanities 
**p<0.01 *p<0.05 
103 
B. 3 The Changes in Grade 5 Departments Between 1992-2001 
1 2 3 4 
P-score of leader in 1992 0.26* 0.16 0.16 0.16 
(2.18) (1.59) (1.50) (1.49) 
University income in 1992/93 0.09** 0.09** 0.09** 
(5.45) (5.20) (5.05) 
Age of leader in 1992 -0.11 -0.12 
(-0.69) -0.71 
Discipline in 19921 -0.34 
(-0.18) 
R2 0.08 0.46 0.47 0.47 
Constant 9.51 ** 2.32 8.85 9.44 
n=55 
Coefficients are shown with t-statistics in parentheses 
(1) 0= Sciences, 1= Social Sciences & Humanities 
**p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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(C) Analysis of Results where the Dependent Variable is the 
Change in the Number of Departments Graded 5A*- 5E in the 
UK Research Assessment Exercise 
Table (A) gives results for the level of grade five submissions in 1996 and 
2001. It then reports the effects of the independent variables in 1992 and 
1996 again allowing for a lag. In 1996 the P-score coefficient is 0.34 (t- 
statistic = 2.22) which is statistically significant at the 5% level; and in 
2001 there is a coefficient of 0.71 (t-statistic = 3.02) significant at the 1% 
level. University income is significant at the 1% level in 1996 and 2001. 
There is no significant effect from the age of president or their academic 
discipline in either time phase. As mentioned above, it is possibly more 
important to examine the results incorporating a longer lag as these are 
likely to be more reliable. 
When we examine the changes in performance over time, as can be seen 
in Table B, there is a statistically significant effect from P-score on the 
changes in the number of grade five departments between 1992 and 
1996. The coefficient is 0.17 (t-statistic = 3.30) and the level of statistical 
significance is 1%. However, when we move to the next time period of 
1996-2001 the P-score has a significant effect prior to inclusion of the 
finance variable only. This is also the case between years 1992-2001, 
where P-score is significant at the 5% level until income is added into the 
regression, at which point, P-score is less statistically significant. 
The impact of organizational revenue is likely explained by size. In each 
RAE, half of all fives awarded were top-five grades of 5A*, 5B* & 5A. 
Grade fives, per se, represented 30% of all submissions in 1996, and by 
2001 the figure was up to 55%. To give two examples in the data: in 
2001 the University of Manchester submitted 46 of its academic 
departments into the RAE. Of these, 37, or 80%, received a grade five. 
Of the 37 grade fives 14, or 30% received a top five score; in the same 
year the University of Glasgow submitted 48 academic departments into 
the RAE. Of these 23, or 48% received a five grade but only 6 
departments, or 13%, received a top five rating. It is, therefore, expected 
that institutional revenue will be more important in Table 6 where the 
numbers of academic departments are considerably higher although the 
standards being reached are, on the whole, lower. 
As mentioned above, lags are used as the main protection against 
reverse causality. However, in the style of Granger causality, when we 
run a regression using, as a dependent variable, performance in all grade 
five departments in 1992 with presidents P-scores in 2001, there is no 
statistically significant relationship. The coefficient is 0.035 (t = 0.82). 
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Chapter Six 
In the Words of Leaders 
interview Data 
Introduction 
"What matters is scholarship not just management. 
We should take management for granteds2' 
Statistical data monopolise the findings reported so far. This chapter now 
turns to qualitative data. Semi-structured interviews have been conducted 
with 23 leaders26 in high ranking research universities in the UK and US. A 
list of interviewees is presented in Table 6.1 and the interview schedule is in 
Table 6.2. 
The qualitative data can be viewed as 'complementary' evidence used to 
`elaborate and enhance' the statistical contributions, and also, to `illustrate' 
the theoretical interpretations (Greene et al., 1989: 259 in Bryman 2006). 
Earlier chapters identified patterns using a statistical method that does not 
study the details of particular individuals. Qualitative data brings us closer to 
possible explanations, although to fully understand the transfer mechanisms, 
through which scholars may actually influence strategy processes, would 
require further detailed case-studies. The interviews, therefore, motivate 
the theory, and also situate leaders back into the organizational context of 
the research university. 
It is common for leadership studies that combine qualitative and quantitative 
methodologies to use a cross-sectional design (e. g. Rosener 1990, Kirby et 
al. 1992, Egri & Herman 2000). Moreover, in this style of research, 
structured interview data are quantified and statistical tests are then applied 
(see Bryman 2004). Given the fairly small sample here, simple patterns in 
25 In correspondence with a former UK vice chancellor who wished to remain anonymous. 
26 As in previous chapters the term `president' is generally used to denote head of university, 
vice chancellor (VC), principal, director, among other titles. VC is used when a quote or 
interview statement refers directly to UK vice chancellors. 
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the semi-structured interviews collected for this thesis will be observed but 
the data are presented in qualitative form. 
The responses to interviews in this chapter were documented by 
transcription. The author felt that recording interviews digitally or on tape 
may be less acceptable to the participants given their status. Interview data 
were analysed by a process of colour-coding that loosely matched the topics 
raised in the questions. It is in this form that the data are offered here. 
Structure of Chapter 
Interview data presented here are separated into three broad themes - 
1. Explaining Why the Correlations Exist 
2. General Leadership Themes 
3. Leadership Appointments and Governance 
The raw data are reported under sub-headings within these thematic 
sections. Most of the interview material collected has been distilled into this 
chapter. An attempt was made to include every major point raised by a 
participant. 
The first section focuses on the study's hypothesis - namely, that 
accomplished scholars may be particularly good people to run research 
universities. Those interviewed as part of this study were asked a number of 
questions about being a leader, but the final direction of enquiry with all 
participants (n=23) focused on the thesis research question. 
This 
happened at the end of each interview (to avoid skewing responses) when 
the author reported her statistical results to the interviewees - as 
in chapters 
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3 through 5- and asked each participant: "Why do you think the 
correlations exist? " 
It is the responses to these questions that will provide the first theme of this 
chapter. Also included at the end of this section are statements from vice 
chancellors who were interviewed by the popular newspaper published in the 
UK that serves the higher education sector, the Times Higher Education 
Supplement. These journalistic interviews are reported because of their 
relevance to this thesis. However, it is accepted here that the accuracy of 
this secondary data cannot be fully guaranteed. 
The second section turns to the broader issues of leadership. It includes 
responses to questions about the role of leader, strategy making, power and 
the top management team, among other areas. These issues are of general 
interest insofar as they present background material about leaders in 
research universities. 
The third theme is about appointing leaders and its links to university 
governance and strategy. It raises questions about the criteria and 
processes used to appoint institutional heads. 
With minor exceptions, interviews with leaders in the US took place in 2005, 
between March and May, and UK interviews took place in 2006, between 
January and June. A semi-structured interview method was used. UK vice 
chancellors were asked more questions than their US counterparts because 
the author's ideas developed as the study progressed. Nevertheless, one 
particular list of questions was almost always repeated to each set of 
participants. The interview schedule was altered a little for those who were 
not university heads, for example, deans. And in the case of John Heilbron 
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(former vice chancellor, Berkeley) correspondence was of a more informal 
nature. 
Interviews opened with questions about leaders' roles, priorities, powers and 
strategic input. After these themes were developed (expanded in the UK 
interviews), the author explained her research to each participant, sought 
their general reactions to the findings, and asked them why they thought the 
correlations might exist. It is this information that is reproduced in the first 
section below. 
The interview responses raise a number of important questions and 
theoretical issues. These will be further discussed in the next chapter (7). 
Interview Data 
Primary interview material has come from 23 leaders in universities, and also 
10 members of a panel created to appoint to the position of vice chancellor 
in a UK university (see Table 6.1 for a full list, and the interview schedule in 
Table 6.2. ) The latter is akin to a case-study. Interviews were not voice- 
recorded because of issues of sensitivity around interviewing organizational 
leaders. Interview material was recorded on paper by the author. 
Secondary interview data from university leaders interviewed in the Times 
Higher Education Supplement are also later discussed. In this sub-section 
there were statements from 10 UK vice chancellors representing a range of 
universities. Half of this group are anonymous. 
Among the primary data-set of 23 interview participants there were 18 
university heads, four of whom were retired. The majority of semi-structured 
interviews are with vice chancellors in the UK (13); five are with US heads. 
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In the case of one US president, Shirley Tilghman, President of Princeton, 
direct quotes have been included that were taken from an interview with her 
in the `The Daily Princetonian' (October 24,2005). President Tilghman was 
asked to comment on the author's work in Chapter 3 (Goodall 2006). The 
Princetonian article is available in Appendix 3. 
Three interviews were done with deans of business schools, two in the US 
and one in the UK - although 1 former vice chancellor also previously led 
two UK business schools. Finally, there were two interviews with former 
deans of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard. (Total n=23). 
Of the 18 university heads included, 4 had not come through the traditional 
academic route. One spent many years in the pharmaceutical industry 
although he continued his academic research and as a consequence 
emerges as well-cited in the literature. One president was a civil servant 
with no PhD, and 2 from engineering backgrounds although one has a PhD 
and had previously led a university in a different country. 
A simple case-study is reported in the third section on `Leadership, 
Appointments and Governance'. Here there are interviews with 10 members 
of a committee created to appoint a vice chancellor. The head-hunter was 
also interviewed as was the candidate appointed through this process (total 
n=12 - see Table 6.3). In agreement with the university involved, all 
participants and the name of the institution are anonymous. The university, 
which is research focused, is based in the north of England. Although these 
interviews were conducted for a separate study, some data are used in the 
thesis. These contributions should be viewed as of limited gererality; indeed 
they consist of one study. However, they shed some light on the 
appointment process, raise some apparently interesting issues, and also 
open the way for future research. The questions are listed in Table 6.3. 
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For reasons of confidentiality, the names of those interviewed are removed; 
in other words the statements reported are unattributed. Only the general 
position of subjects is identified, for example if they are a dean, VC or 
president, and the nationality is also revealed. Leaders who are not from a 
traditional academic background are also labelled as such if relevant to the 
section theme. Finally, it is important to note that all quotes listed under 
theme headings are from different leaders (i. e. nobody, within a particular 
theme heading, is quoted twice). The same participant never makes two 
statements within the same section. 
1. Explaining why the Correlations Exist 
There were a number of recurring themes from the interviewees when 
asked: "Why do you think the correlations might exist? " These can be 
separated into five dominant areas: 
a) Credibility 
b) Values, Motivation & Knowledge 
c) Quality-threshold 
d) Selection 
e) Non-Academics 
Interview responses are categorised under these headings. Inevitably, 
answers do not precisely separate into these categories. This is particularly 
true with the first two areas, which are overwhelmingly the most common 
types of responses given by participants. Hence, interview statements about 
`credibility' and `values, motivation & knowledge' are presented together. 
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a) Credibility and Values, Motivation & Knowledge 
Interviewees' answers that offer explanations for the correlation most 
commonly fall into these two broad areas of (i) credibility, and (ii) values, 
motivation & knowledge. Such responses are mentioned by 16 interview 
subjects. Credibility can perhaps be defined as an external factor insofar as 
others must assign credibility, whereas values, knowledge and motivation 
are arguably internal to an individual. It is noticeable that those who raised 
explanations of credibility and values were all leaders with a traditional 
academic background. None of the non-academic leaders presented these 
kinds of arguments. 
The statements below are illustrative of these themes. 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "You have to know the game. If not you lack legitimacy. Being a 
distinguished researcher gives you legitimacy in either a business 
school or a university. And legitimacy gives you authority as a 
leader. " 
UKVC- 
¢ "Having a relatively distinguished research history makes a difference 
to the job of VC for two reasons; you carry more weight and authority 
with colleagues, and second, you have an understanding of the world 
of research and all the pressures researchers are under. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "lt is important that a leader's value system is not too far from the 
values of those who are being led. " 
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UK VC - 
¢ "lt is a combination of value system and research pedigree. " 
UKVC- 
¢ "Because I am an academic I am driven by the academy and the 
development of ideas and knowledge. It is my business. It is not 
possible for someone external to the academy to understand this. " 
US dean - 
¢ "You need to engage the hearts and minds of faculty. Being a 
researcher means you have equal status, offer faculty support, speak 
the same language, have academic resonance and credibility, and 
finally, trust; trust is very important to have as a leader. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "When I was in industry, being a researcher there also helped with 
gaining credibility at many levels, because I had a particular 
understanding about the products and what was going on in the labs. 
Credibility is very important. " 
UKVC- 
¢ "Non-researchers do not have an affinity with researchers - they have 
little understanding of the culture, no credibility and therefore an 
engagement problem, and, finally, they cannot talk research. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "An academic researcher-leader understands the culture of the place 
and particularly he understands the incentives. What motivates faculty 
and how one can get them to do what you want them to do - which is 
what leaders have to do. " 
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UK VC - 
¢ "My own research was 5* quality and I was an expert in my field. It is 
very important to be a good researcher and to look others in the eye 
when they say they can't do something or are moaning about having 
to raise research funding. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "The best president is he or she whose scholarly priorities don't 
change. " 
Former US dean - 
¢ "An appointing board can signal a sound understanding of the culture 
of a research university by appointing a recognized scholar with 
administrative ability to a top leadership position. " 
US president - 
¢ "The best universities tend to have the best faculty - shared values of 
excellent research and teaching. If the president is a scholar they 
have a better sense of the culture of the academy and also they are 
perceived as being better able to create the right climate for 
academics. " 
UK dean - 
¢ "Gaining respect as a scholar is a big advantage. It also demonstrates 
that you share scholarly values and have substantial networks. But it is 
not the only factor. Running an organization needs complementary 
skills. " 
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Former US dean - 
¢ "Being a good scholar means that / can look a Nobel or Pulitzer Prize 
winner in the eye. It is very important to have been a researcher or to 
have entered deeply into scholarly enterprise. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "These results are about credibility and confidence. " 
b) Quality-threshold 
The term `quality-threshold' refers to interview statements that suggest an 
important part of the function of university head is to set the institutional 
standards. Some presidents and VCs also argue that it is easier to put 
pressure on others to perform to a high standard if you, as leader, have 
previously done so yourself. Finally, comments in this section also point to a 
signalling effect of having a scholar as institutional head. Once again, these 
types of statements came only from those who were themselves from 
traditional academic backgrounds. Examples of statements that present a 
quality-threshold perspective include: 
US dean - 
¢ "Leaders are the final arbiters of quality. Therefore it is right to expect 
the standard bearer to first bear the standard. " 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "How can you exhort others if you haven't done it yourself? " 
UK VC - 
¢ "My job is to lead, to represent the university internally and externally 
and set the quality threshold. By quality-threshold I mean articulate 
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and decide upon what level of quality the university wants to aspire to. 
When a quality-threshold is established it sends out a message that no 
one below the threshold should be accepted into the university; it sets 
the quality agenda. " 
US president - 
¢ "My job involves broad direction setting and imposing standards. In 
order to impose standards it is easier if you have first met them 
yourself. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "I feel that as the VC is the one who sets the quality tone for research 
and the strategy generally, and also is responsible for raising 
aspirations, it is important that he or she has been a researcher; 
particularly to raise the research ambition. " 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "I really know about the social sciences; being an expert in this field 
helps with being a leader. 1 have mastery of the subject and therefore / 
can grasp what is going on. " 
Statements also refer to the signalling effect that scholars can have. Some 
chiefs even use their own research activity to motivate others. 
US president - 
¢ "By having an academic at the helm, the university is stating clearly 
what it values most highly. " 
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UKVC - 
¢ "I was told by colleagues at ..., `it is good that people like you are in 
leadership positions' and by that they meant researchers. " 
US president - 
¢ "Being a researcher sends a signal to the faculty that you, the 
president, share their scholarly values and general understanding. It 
also sends an internal signal to colleagues that research success in 
the institution is important. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "It is important for VCs to be interested in research and to keep a bit of 
a hand in if possible. That way you get respect and also it sends the 
right message. " 
UKVC - 
¢ '7 continue to do research now both for myself and also the signal that 
it sends to others. Academics find it hard to complain about combining 
the pressures of administration and the demands of research when 
they hear that I am still managing to publish research as VC. " 
UKVC- 
¢ "I was submitted to the last RAE, and it gave me extraordinary weight, 
that / could fulfil the role of VC and still submit research into the RAE. 
It sends a very strong message to the community. " 
An important point raised by a former university VC suggests that the level of 
scholarship should be relative to the institution's ambitions. 
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Former UK VC - 
¢ "Whether a leader is an outstanding researcher or just respectable is 
relative. It depends on where an institution is and where it wants to be. 
A Nobel Prize winner going to lead Brighton University may not be 
appropriate. It is all relative. A third-tier university wishing to raise its 
research standing may want a second-tier academic. The leader 
should represent the aspirations of the institution. " 
c) Selection 
Other reasons were given why a VC should be a proficient researcher. It 
was very common for leaders to emphasize the importance of faculty 
appointments and retention. 
US dean - 
¢ "The most important part of the job of dean is the recruitment and 
retention of top faculty. Appointing good staff is the key to sustaining 
the position of a business school or university. " 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "A leader who is an academic helps to mobilize people. People are 
much more important in academic institutions than conditions. 
Everything in a university flows from the academic value of faculty. My 
priority was to ensure that we attracted and retained the best 
academics... I spent much of my time attracting good people and 
trying to keep our top people. " 
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UK VC - 
¢ "it is my job to think about the profile of the university; what the 
university wants to look like in 30 years - its people, intellectually and 
socially. The `people' bit is the most important. " 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "l have to inspire and motivate people, and to set targets -- to create a 
supportive environment and crucially to appoint the best people. " 
A number of participants also suggested that having eminent scholars in an 
institution can attract other top scholars. 
UKVC - 
¢ "Good people only ever want to work with good people. " 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "When I contacted top scholars many would ask, `Who else is in the 
department? " 
UK VC - 
¢ "When it comes to making academic appointments / have found that 
like-appoints-like, so you must have the best faculty on selection 
committees. Many people who are no longer research-active tend to 
put themselves forward for committees. But if selection committees 
become too full of non-researchers, the quality of appointments gets 
down-graded. " 
Some interviewees said that it can be challenging for individuals to hire 
people who are better than themselves. 
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US dean - 
"I have on occasion met faculty who put the institution above their own 
position and chose to appoint someone better than them. But it is not 
common. It's a natural human reaction to find it difficult to select 
someone above you. " 
UK VC - 
y "I was recently in an appointment committee where the academic 
department doing the recruiting thought that they (the department) 
were better than anyone else did. Three candidates were short-listed. 
The department picked the opposite order of candidates to the rest of 
the appointing committee. They put the worst candidate first. 1 think 
they did this because they were weak researchers and therefore 
lacked in confidence. Confidence is infectious. " 
US president - 
¢ "A judicious leader is someone who is capable of hiring people 
smarter than themselves. " 
d) Non-Academics 
Explanations proffered by interviewees about why the correlations exist 
included responses about the consequences of the appointment of non- 
academics to the role of university leader. There seemed general 
agreement that the appointment of business people as leaders was unlikely 
to be successful in research universities. But there was a greater tolerance 
expressed for those who came from industries where the culture was felt to 
be more similar -- for example in R&D or professional service firms. 
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The most common theme from interviewees was that respected scholars 
ought to be in charge of universities: 
UK VC - 
"A successful international business man should be appointed as CEO 
into an international business. An editor of the FT will have been a 
competent journalist. A VC of a university must have been an 
academic to understand the culture. Universities are profoundly 
intellectual and can only be led by an academic. " 
Former UK VC - 
"Research universities should have leaders with a solid academic 
background and a decent publishing record. Leaders from business or 
politics do not work. " 
US president - 
¢ "Faculty at X would look askance if their presidents were not good 
academics with a research track record. " 
Former US dean - 
¢ "I am very opposed to appointing business-men. / believe strongly that 
it is necessary to understand the culture, and also, to believe in the 
principle of meritocracy. " 
Former US president - 
¢ "Even with appointments the `experts' don't always give you the whole 
or exact picture. The president still needs to make decisions, and 
therefore, he or she needs to fall back upon their own knowledge of 
having been an academic. If you didn't have academic knowledge how 
could you make these judgements? " 
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Former UK VC - 
"Business people should not lead academic business schools. It is 
rarely successful. There are exceptions of course, for example 
Wharton was once led by a former consultant. Being from a 
professional service firm meant that he had a better understanding of 
the culture than someone from another part of the business sector. But 
he did not get involved in any academic decisions - they were taken by 
a deputy dean. In my experience, business people are usually terrible 
teachers and they are weak speakers. " 
US dean - 
¢ "A former dean of the school came from a consulting firm. For the 
academics to accept him the school had to introduce a new academic 
post of deputy dean -a system that is now the norm throughout most 
business schools. He was considered a good dean because he came 
from a consulting firm where the system was similar to managing and 
leading faculty -- leading by mutual consent, building consensus within 
an organization not top down. Also they have a similar promotional 
structure. But deans from industry are a disaster. I have seen much 
money burned through top-down attempts to lead faculty... 
Unfortunately most MBA students want Jack Welch to be dean. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "Most of those who have led universities from the corporate sector are 
from R&D ... although they 
do still have some adapting to do. " 
From a non-academic leader: 
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UKVC - 
r "Actually management problems in a university are not so different to 
those in other organizations. Academics aren't so different to other 
professional people. All are adverse to a top down style of 
management. I worked in a consultancy for a number of years, but 
also feel that in banks it is similar. I feel that I have dealt with similar 
problems and cultures elsewhere. " 
He went on to say that there are advantages also: 
L "A respected researcher is only that in one discipline, and there are 
often tensions between different disciplines. I feel that I am exempt 
from all the internal back-biting. " 
Another non-academic leader felt somewhat of an outsider, although, he 
believes he was there to perform a different role to that of his predecessor. 
UKVC - 
¢ "I still feel like an alien... My predecessor united the faculty and 
university around the RAE. But I was brought in because of my 
experience of mergers and also in dealing with politicians... I was very 
surprised to be offered the job" 
A number of participants pointed out that cycles of appointments are 
common. 
UKVC - 
¢ "Many places seem to have a cycle of appointing a researcher and 
then a non-researcher. The selection committee that appointed me 
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actually wanted a researcher to succeed the previous VC, who was 
not. " 
UK VC - 
y "Institutions often fail to take the long view. They oscillate between 
appointing different types of leaders who push the institution in 
different directions. I want to avoid this by adapting the direction to 
create more of a balance without taking away from what has been 
achieved. " 
Two interviewees said that the very best scholars do not make good leaders. 
UKVC - 
y "A Nobel Prize winner may not be best and it may be wrong to have 
them lead as they are better at something else. " 
Former US dean - 
¢ "Having top researchers in departments can cause problems - they 
can be bad managers or control freaks resisting succession. I have 
seen it happen. " 
VC Interviews in Times Higher Education Supplement 
In an issue of the Times Higher Education Supplement (THES) the 
newspaper asked eleven UK VCs to identify the essential qualities 
necessary for the job of vice chancellor (August 25 2006). It is important to 
note that these secondary data were obtained through a newspaper and, 
therefore, the author cannot verify the accuracy of the material. The 
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material is being included because of the relevance of responses, from those 
interviewed, to this thesis's research question. 
In the THES interviews with university leaders, half the sample are named 
and half are anonymous. Responses appear to have come from UK VCs in 
a cross-section of universities - new and old. Five out of 11 VCs have 
names attached. They include: Michael Thorne from University of East 
London; Eric Thomas from Bristol University (also included in the thesis 
sample); Roger Brown from Southampton Solent University; Kel Fidler from 
Northumbria University; and finally, Terence Kealey from Buckingham, the 
only private university in the UK. 
These VC statements follow a small debate in the THES about the type of 
leaders universities should be looking for. A few weeks earlier in the 
newspaper, a registrar (from University of Exeter) argued that universities 
should be appointing more non-academics as VCs. This is the theme that 
most of the VCs interviewed refer to - to lead a university should a VC come 
from an academic background? 
The overwhelming majority of those interviewed appear to support the idea 
that academics or people with knowledge of education should lead 
universities. Some of the respondents offer caveats and many expand on 
the leadership role. Only one anonymous VC does not mention that leaders 
should be academics. It is interesting to note that unlike the sample of 
leaders interviewed for this thesis, all of whom have come from top UK 
research institutions, the VCs named in the THES interviews have come 
from a range of universities. 
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Most of the interview texts have been included below except sections that go 
into more detail than felt necessary. (These interviews can be found at 
www. thes. co. uk). 
Terence Kealey, VC, Buckingham University 
Universities should be run solely by academics. The best universities 
in the world are those of the American Ivy League, and they are run by 
academics. The connection is not hard to make. 
Michael Thorne, VC, University of East London 
¢ ... We have only to contrast the deep understanding of education 
that 
the leadership of the old Further Education Funding Council had with 
the now terminal decline of the Learning and Skills Council to see what 
happens when people without a background in education are given 
high-level management responsibilities in education. 
Eric Thomas, VC, Bristol University 
¢ Why are we anxious about universities being led by academics? In 
most sectors, chief executives have substantial point-of-service 
experience; why should it be any different in academe? 
The airline industry appoints from within, as does the retail sector. A 
vice-chancellorship is all about leadership, and having experience of 
working as an academic is, I would humbly suggest, a great 
advantage. 
One of the problems in the past for National Health Service chief 
executives was that the majority of them did not have substantial 
service delivery experience - that is, only a few have been frontline 
clinicians as nurses, doctors or allied health professionals. Never mind 
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how able they are, this placed them at a disadvantage in their 
leadership of frontline service providers. 
lt is healthy for the sector that most university leaders have their roots 
in academe. Furthermore, most will argue that higher education is one 
of the UK's success stories - hardly overpowering evidence of a 
leadership deficit. 
Roger Brown, VC, Southampton Solent University 
¢ Although now a professor of higher education policy, I am one of the 
few vice-chancellors appointed without an academic background, 
although I had occupied a number of national higher education roles. 
It is obvious that vice-chancellors need good general leadership 
qualities. 
These may have been acquired in a variety of settings but you have to 
have credibility with academics, if not credibility as an academic. This 
means a real and successful effort to engage with and understand 
academic values and practices. This can be acquired outside the 
academy but it isn't easy, and so far only a handful of people have 
managed it. 
Kel Fidler, VC, Northumbria University 
¢ More and more universities are recognising that they have to be run as 
a business -a high-volume, low-margin business. In making that 
simple statement, I have already indulged in the language of business, 
and increasingly we vice-chancellors do this - we worry about 
"attracting customers" through our "product portfolio", for example. 
... 
There are other ways in which our businesses are unconventional. 
Our customers - our students - require an extensive and diverse range 
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of support activities, both academic and personal; our academic staff 
are recruited for their individuality and their passion for their subjects 
and their vocation. 
... 
For these reasons, the person at the helm has to have a deep 
understanding of the business - the nature of the university, its staff, its 
students, the balance between teaching and research, and so on. The 
successful vice-chancellor needs to be something of a businessman or 
businesswoman alongside this. Success in a vice-chancellor's post is 
more likely to come from a successful academic - not a brilliant 
academic necessarily, if the implication of that is research excellence. 
Anonymous 
y Universities are strange places to manage; academic staff have 
loyalties to both their university and their discipline, the latter often 
being the stronger. Overly dirigiste management that fails to recognise 
this is unlikely to be successful in the longer term, though it may have 
some benefits in the shorter term. What is needed in universities is not 
management but leadership, and this is the critical factor. 
Senior academic staff, particularly those who have had a leadership 
role in the development of their own subjects, are often better able to 
provide such leadership than professional managers, though the best 
marriage is probably between academic staff providing leadership and 
administrative staff providing facilitation and support. 
Vice-chancellors coming into universities from business have a mixed 
record: where they can provide leadership, particularly if they can earn 
the respect of academics, they can be very effective. But too many of 
them have found the strains of attempting to manage large and 
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amorphous institutions without the benefit of any academic respect to 
be simply too great a challenge. 
Anonymous 
¢ Being the chief executive of any organisation requires that person to 
understand the business of the organisation but also to be a good 
leader and a good manager. 
In terms of understanding the business of a university, there are clearly 
advantages to be gained from having been part of that business - an 
academic. That doesn't mean you have to have been a brilliant 
academic but it is valuable to have been active in research, have been 
involved in teaching and learning and in other activities such as 
knowledge transfer. 
This adds greatly to your credibility and also helps in making sensible 
and grounded decisions about what is possible and desirable. 
Anonymous 
¢ The modern vice-chancellor is the academic leader and the chief 
executive of a major corporation. He or she may have responsibility for 
more than £1 billion of public money, for the financial solvency of the 
institution, for many thousands of staff, have formidable personal 
responsibility for the implications of health and safety, discrimination 
legislation, corporate manslaughter and so on. 
The main task is having a leadership role in producing and delivering a 
comprehensive strategic plan, working within a funding regime that is 
at best annual for some funding but more likely to have a lead time of 
weeks, set against expenditure commitments that are long term. No 
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wonder head-hunters tell you how difficult it is to obtain ideal 
candidates for these posts. 
To be a successful modern vice-chancellor, you need serious 
academic credibility; and to drive research and enterprise excellence, 
you need to understand and appreciate academics and their needs 
and drivers. You also need to understand basic business operation, 
business leadership and strategy. Both the academic and business 
roles come to a focus in the vice-chancellor position - that is where the 
buck stops and both aspects of the job are equally important. It is not 
an either/or. 
Anonymous 
¢ There is an expectation that the fundamental purposes of a university 
are academic and for a vice-chancellor to be credible and to have 
legitimacy among academic colleagues one needs to have gone 
through the ranks and have an understanding of the issues and 
pressures that staff face. / am not sure that this is always a sound 
criterion, though / can think of a couple of cases where that lack of 
experience or empathy has been problematic. My own view is that 
vice-chancellors do benefit from opportunities for formal training and 
mentoring by more experienced colleagues and that the ability to lead 
a university effectively is neither innate nor God-given. I have probably 
learnt more about running this university profitably through my youthful 
experience of my parents' hotel business than I have learnt from the 
seminars and workshops offered by the major accounting or 
management firms or, for that matter, the Leadership Foundation - 
excellent though their contributions may be. 
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Anonymous 
¢ Organisations need to be run by people who have skills in leadership, 
decision-making, managing people, financial and business 
understanding, communication skills and common sense. 
Unfortunately, many of these essential skills are lacking in the people 
put in charge of running large institutions. 
2. General Leadership Themes 
This section returns to the author's primary data. It expands on the areas of 
general leadership that were asked in the beginning of the interviews with 
participants. The section opens with respondents' statements about how 
leaders perceive their role. It then moves on to address questions of 
strategy and the important issue of power asking, in particular, whether 
leaders believe that they can affect organizational performance in the 
Research Assessment Exercise. Finally, leaders are asked whether they 
appointed their own top management teams. 
Again there are a number of pivotal themes raised. 
a) The Role of Leader 
  Leadership 
  Management 
b) Strategy 
c) Power 
d) Top Management Team 
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a) The Role of Leader 
Each university president was asked to summarize the most `important 
element' of their job. 
  Leadership 
One interesting and common thread raised by most participants relates 
directly to the leadership literature. It is about the difference between 
leadership and management -a subject that has been debated for decades 
according to Yukl and Lepsinger (2005). This takes us back to the 
introductory chapter of the thesis where the issue of managerialism was 
raised, where it was suggested that knowledge-intensive organizations may 
require leaders who are experts in their field, and, concomitantly, that 
professional expertise may be more important than managerial skills. 
Statements, given to the author during interviews, that specifically separate 
`managing' from `leading' include: 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "The chief function of a VC is leadership. Leadership is most important 
- not management or finance, these can be hired in. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "Academic leadership can be inspirational and directional. Leadership 
and management are profoundly different. I set goals for the institution 
in discussion with colleagues 
environment for academics. " 
My aim is to create the best 
The majority of participants include `leadership' in their statements: 
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UK VC - 
¢ "To lead and transform the institution without changing it or destroying 
its raison d'etre. " 
UK VC (from a non-academic background) - 
¢ "Providing leadership to an institution. Sounds nebulous. I feel that I 
am like the captain of an aircraft carrier - an academic institution. 
have to steer the ship and facilitate planes taking off and landing, and 
make sure that the carrier is steady, on a course, and the platform is 
safe from which to launch. Ensure that the finances are stable, safe for 
academics to do what they do best. " 
UKVC- 
¢ "My job is to lead. If there were no VC, the place would carry on as it 
was for a short time. But after 1-4 years the university would lose 
direction, performance indicators would start to drop, the future of the 
organization would be unclear. VC's make a big difference! The VC is 
the only person who can ask `where are we going? ', `what is our 
strategy? ' I am validated to put ideas forward and design strategy. No 
one else can do that. The VC can articulate the university's ambition. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "The base principle of CEO leadership is that someone has to get the 
team from base camp to the top of the mountain. Leadership is about 
developing a clear strategic plan, and then, having a logical view of 
implementation. Making sure everyone knows how we are going to get 
to base camp. " 
US president - 
¢ "Leadership through collaboration and change through collaboration. " 
135 
  Management 
An interesting point was raised by a former dean in the US. It questions the 
notion that academics are any worse than those in any other sector at 
leadership and management. He also suggests that universities are more 
similar to professional service firms than other industries: 
Former US dean - 
¢ "A fair percentage of faculty are good managers with innate skills. In 
many ways this is akin to any profession because there will always be 
some who are better at leadership and management than others. 
don't think academics are any different from others in this way. Being 
a dean at X is like being a CEO of a half billion business ensuring it 
runs effectively. All faculty salaries are set by the dean. The position 
is more similar to running a large law firm than running a car company, 
for example. " 
The term `management' appears considerably less than leadership. Indeed 
only two participants actually mention, during interview, the term as part of 
their role as institutional leader - both of whom had come from non- 
academic backgrounds. 
UKVC- 
¢ "The two most important areas are management of people and 
resources. " 
UKVC - 
¢ `7 manage and lead - some parts need managing and some leading. 
There is a management job which is to make sure the aircraft carrier 
runs okay - particularly all the non-academic infrastructure. / am 
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accountable for the non-academic performance of the organisation. In 
terms of leadership I lead the academic departments through salaries, 
appointments and promotions. " 
The same university boss then goes on to account for how he prioritizes his 
time: 
¢ "My time is spent: 20% fundraising, 40% management - committees 
etc, 20% external meetings and liaison, 20% own writing and 
research. " 
b) Strategy 
Participants in the interviews with the author were asked `whose role do you 
believe it is to write or construct the strategy for the university? ' There was 
little or no hesitation among respondents, who, with few exceptions, stated 
that it was the responsibility of the leader. Indeed it has been argued earlier 
that university chiefs may have more power than those at the helm of many 
other industries. It will also be argued that powerful heads may be right for 
universities if governance mechanisms are functioning properly. One 
statement, mentioned in the introduction, from a head-hunter who frequently 
appoints UK VCs seems poignant: 
¢ "There is no doubt that leaders have an enormous amount of power in 
universities -- more than in many other organisations where the long- 
term strategy is firmly laid out. For example, in the civil service, or at 
the other extreme in Asda/Walmart where the leader is a motivator for 
the `troops' but has very little say about the strategy of the business. 
That is all mapped out long before in somewhere like Ohio. " 
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The important issue of whether leaders merely think that they write the 
strategy and whether they actually do cannot be dealt with fully here. 
However: 
UKVC - 
¢ "The VC sets the agenda and tone - this is where the VC makes a 
difference... The VC is the only person who can ask `where are we 
going? What is our strategy? ' You are validated to put ideas forward 
and design strategy. No one else can do that. The VC can articulate 
the university's ambition. " 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "The vision has got to come from the VC. You shouldn't announce on 
high but you should have a clear idea of where you want to go. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "I determine the shape of strategy. It is rare for me to have a decision 
rejected. Debates will emerge out of the top team but it is the 
responsibility of the VC to finally say yes or no about an area of 
strategy. The buck stops with me. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "The final draft has to come off the VC's PC. It is the role of the VC to 
put it together and then to get it approved and negotiate the details. It 
is not the job of any committee. " 
UKVC- 
¢ "The VC creates the vision and inspiration about what the place could 
look like in 2010. In my case, a big group of us went away for a week- 
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end and I presented my vision. We discussed it and decided how best 
to implement it. I had to sell it to them. " 
UKVC- 
¢ "The VC should have the leading voice regarding the strategy and 
should draft the vision statement. The VC has most interest in the 
strategy. " 
Former US president - 
¢ "The background of presidents is most intriguing. Though 80% of their 
day may not be spent undertaking academic activities (i. e. fundraising, 
etc) the overall direction needs to be decided upon and led by the 
president. The president is often the only one who has the big-picture 
perspective about his or her university. If you devolve decision-making 
too far down you lose control, particularly of the academic direction". 
US president - 
¢ "I am very involved with the nuts and bolts of deciding the overall 
strategic direction of ... / also 
decide the policy level direction. " 
The same president then goes on to make an interesting point about how 
leaders are perceived in universities by their peers: 
¢ "Most faculty care who their president is but they don't believe that 
presidents can actually create change. This is not done through 
command and rule but by leading in a fuller sense, and setting the long 
vision. " 
Views from two non-academic leaders: 
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UK VC - 
"The head of the institution is the only one who can develop strategy, 
because you are most informed about the organization. But there is 
less freedom in a university. The strategic degrees of freedom are 
restricted in a university. It is more difficult to change the course - the 
outputs are always going to be about the same. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "There is a strategic planning division that collects data and watches 
key performance indicators. The Deputy VC, who is a distinguished 
professor, is very involved. The main question is how to succeed 
when bench-marking against other UK and international universities. " 
Only one UK VC expressed the view that strategy design should be a team 
venture although he still believes that the VC thinks more about the 
institution's vision. 
UK VC - 
¢ `7t is not the job of an individual but of a group among the senior team 
to shape the strategy. The VC is the person who thinks mostly about 
the vision but not exclusively. / need a team to question and speak out 
against me sometimes. I like lots of ideas. " 
c) Power 
This section is about power. Specifically, it uncovers the extent to which 
leaders believe they have the power to change an institution, and also the 
mechanisms they use to make changes. Chapter 5 is particularly relevant to 
this section because it focuses on leaders of universities and improvement in 
the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) between 1992,1996 and 2001. 
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The answers reported in this section are responses to questions that were 
only directed towards UK VCs, current and former. As an introduction to the 
topic the author asked VCs: `How important do you consider the RAE to be? ' 
This area, about the RAE, is substantially different from the thesis focus and 
therefore, responses to this question have not been reported in this chapter. 
The follow-up query was more relevant: `How much can a VC influence the 
RAE and generally raise the research quality of a university? ' This question 
was designed to uncover how much power a VC perceives he or she has to 
make such changes. 
There was little doubt expressed by VCs that they could influence their 
institution's RAE performance: 
UKVC - 
¢ "You can affect the RAE by appointing and retaining staff. I am 
involved with all (or most) appointments and promotions. / believe this 
is very important. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "The VC is the only one in the university who can influence the RAE. A 
VC must set the quality standards and keep reinforcing them - pushing 
the quality line up. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "A VC can make a difference to RAE through a number of mechanisms 
- research committee, promotions committee, and through 
appointments. " 
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UK VC - 
¢ "1 spend a large amount of time hiring people and trying to attract them. 
became directly involved and managed the process of making 
appointments, and also internal promotions. At the previous university 
/ worked at, where I was PVC for research, I spent a great deal of time 
head-hunting and systematically searching for faculty. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "The VC can have an impact on RAE by creating the right conditions, 
setting up the right schemes to motivate the best people, offering good 
facilities and creating the right environment. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "Appointments are crucial -I believe in the Clark Kerr model (creator 
of the University of California). It is important to make sure the culture 
a VC creates signals that you are interested in research and allow 
research ideas to surface. " 
UKVC- 
¢ "The VC can do a lot especially in facilitating recruitment. It is a very 
important role for VCs to make deals at the top. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "A university must be prepared for it (the RAE) even though its 
research strategy cannot be designed around it. Having said that, if a 
VC messes up in the RAE he or she should be sacked! It is the VCs 
responsibility to make sure that the process is done efficiently and to 
the best standard possible. " 
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UKVC - 
¢ "The RAE is very important in appointment committees and also 
severance and early retirement committees. Who is entered into the 
RAE is decided centrally. " 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "The RAE is very important. I wanted to make Xa top research 
university. Now it is around number ... in league tables. We 
anticipated that it would take at least 10 years but we managed to lift it 
in 5. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "A VC can only use gentle persuasion, and encourage through 
mechanisms like appointments, and research grants to some extent. 
The VC can encourage dialogue and support researchers. 
A non-academic VC commented on his predecessor's input into the last 
RAE: 
¢ "He was obsessive about the RAE. He united the faculty and university 
around the RAE. He and they understood how important the journey 
was. It was (my predecessor) who really put the place on the map in 
terms of its RAE success. He turned the university's fortunes around, " 
d) Top Management Team 
Interviewees were asked the question `did you select your own top 
management team (TMT) after you started? ' As suggested in Chapter 1, the 
importance of the TMT has been widely covered in the literature on strategic 
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leadership, initially through the work of Hambrick and Mason (1984) in upper 
echelons theory. 
TMTs in a university setting tend to include the university head plus deputy 
leaders (who have all been titled pro-vice chancellors -- PVCs for simplicity), 
but they can also include senior non-academic administrators, most 
commonly, registrars and finance directors. 
Turning to the data, it is interesting to note that almost all the interview 
subjects in this study selected their own TMT, although it is noticeable that in 
the UK making one's own appointment into senior positions is not always 
easy. Indeed, all the UK VCs mention that they had to make changes in 
their institutions, to allow them to appoint their own people. In the US, in 
private universities particularly, it is normal for leaders to select their own top 
team (Rosovsky 1991). 
The frustration of appointing into these positions in the UK is expressed 
clearly in some interview statements. 
UKVC - 
¢ "I changed the top team gradually over time. I had Pro-Vice 
Chancellors (PVCs) in place when I started ... two of them 
blocked me 
from doing anything for 2 years! PVCs were appointed by Senate that 
had 200 members when 1 arrived. The system is not right in the UK. It 
is far too difficult to select our own top team. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "PVCs are elected by Senate who make nominations. I think it is 
madness that a VC cannot select his or her own top team. I do now 
have some input through consultation - and / almost always get who / 
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want. / did put my own admin people in place though, some of whom I 
appointed from the private sector. " 
Among interviewees, changes in top teams are reported on a continuum 
from the more direct approach: 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "They all went! / introduced new PVCs, COO, registrar, etc. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "I picked my own top team. When I arrived I had 80 people reporting to 
me, now it is 10. " 
to those who introduced change more slowly: 
UKVC - 
¢ "I inherited my top team and maintained them for 2 years. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "Over time 1 will but not immediately. I will probably keep some in 
place and move some on. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "I did not set up my own top team exactly but / have a veto on PVCs 
who are put forward. / also set up weekly management team meetings 
and selected the membership. This is the top management team. " 
And some were in a position where they had a clean slate: 
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UKVC - 
¢ "Previously there was no top management team, only one DVC. 
appointed full-time PVCs, most importantly for research, and teaching 
and learning. The Research PVC is a top scholar from a double 5* 
department. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "There was no top team to speak of when I arrived. I had the chance to 
start over completely. I appointed a registrar from the private sector, 
plus 4 PVCs and a deputy registrar. " 
As suggested above, the position of US presidents is less ambiguous: 
US president - 
¢ "I do not micro-manage but 1 appoint deans and provosts who act on 
my behalf. /oversee their work. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "Amy Gutmann (President of University of Pennsylvania) and Shirley 
Tilghman (President of MIT) are amazed about the amount of work that 
have to get involved with where they can appoint line managers or 
provosts. " 
All the UK leaders interviewed reported that they made changes to the 
system of appointing top teams (n=13). The most common complaint is 
about the role of senate in choosing PVCs, and sometimes heads of 
departments (HoDs). Some of these include: 
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UK VC - 
¢ "We have just changed the appointment process for PVCs at X. It is 
now going to a committee of council. The VC has a veto if he or she 
does not want a person appointed. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "1 now appoint all the PVCs and deans but I had to change the 
structure to do this. Previously they were elected. " 
UKVC- 
¢ "Heads of Departments (HoDs) used to be appointed by nomination 
from departments to senate and council. Again, / think this is madness 
and I have now had it changed. HoD decisions are now made by 
departments and the VC. " 
Leaders in the UK have apparently started to flex their muscles when it 
comes to the old notion of collegiality: 
UKVC - 
¢ "I made it clear to Senate that has 60 members; they may have had 
access and input into planning and resources before but not any more. 
Senate is to have no budgetary powers and if they were not willing to 
accept this then / was not willing to stay in the job... Collegiality 
doesn't mean everyone makes decisions. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "The committees do not take decisions - even if that is what they think 
they do. They merely endorse decisions. I have tried to weaken the 
committee structures or at least function outside of it. / feel that I tend 
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to take the committees with me in terms of the decisions i want to 
make. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "The VC now has total say on who gets the job (of PVC). Faculty don't 
have any input. " 
And from a former US dean: 
¢ "I am strongly opposed to faculty making the selection of presidents, 
and generally I am against the notion of democracy. " 
It is interesting to note that non-academic leaders reported that they rely on 
members of their top team for input into academic issues, for example, in 
appointing faculty: 
UKVC - 
¢ "I always use academic leaders to mediate with faculty and rely very 
heavily on them. 1 have felt like an alien many times. I use academic 
members of my top team as cultural mediators, particularly my Deputy 
VC who is a very distinguished professor. He was the person my 
predecessor put in charge of the RAE. I promoted him to Deputy VC. 
He is my academic conscience and broker. / recognized that running a 
university is not like running a company and that I needed a link 
person. " 
UK VC - 
> "When I make senior appointments I tend to rely on senior faculty for 
advice -I generally draw on the extensive academic networks 
available to me. " 
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One VC emphasized the importance of delegation. 
UK VC - 
¢ "1 do not micro-manage nor do I get into any area of operations. 
devolve all responsibility for operations to my top team. There are 4 
PVCs and a registrar and deputy registrar. There are 2 women in the 
TMT. I feel that women in the team are very necessary. J closely lead 
and manage the top team but I also recognise what I can actually do in 
terms of time. " 
3. Leadership Appointments and Governance 
The third section of this chapter looks briefly at how leaders are selected into 
their positions. Two sets of interviews are reported. The first group of 
statements are drawn from the same 23 university heads. However, only the 
sample of UK VCs was asked questions about their appointment process. 
The second sets of statements are from members of a committee created to 
appoint to the position of vice chancellor. Before the interview material in 
this section is presented, a number of theoretical issues are raised and 
discussed. 
The topic of this thesis is leadership and organizational performance. A 
potential outcome is that the findings may help shed new light on the types 
of leaders that research universities should be appointing. 
There are two other significant issues attached to the process of appointing 
leaders. The first, and arguably the most important, is about governance. 
university governing bodies, usually titled `councils' in the UK and `boards' in 
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the US, are made up of academic members from key university groups such 
as a `senate', and also lay members from business or the community. 
The above comments from participants on strategy and power suggest that 
university leaders have extensive strategic and executive authority. If this is 
the case then it raises further questions about the appointing process, in 
particular about the role of the governing body in deciding both the future of 
the institution and its leader. For example, it is pertinent to ask, who 
ultimately decides upon the long-term strategy of a university? Is it the leader 
or the governing body? This is especially relevant if leaders are only in post 
5-7 years. Yet it may take an institution twenty or thirty years to make 
substantial changes, like becoming a top-class research university. 
A problem may arise in a university if a new leader is appointed every few 
years, being given quite substantial executive powers, but having different 
strategic priorities from his or her predecessor. In this case the institution 
could perhaps be pulled in a number of different directions over a ten to 
twenty year period. Potentially, some leaders may even choose strategies 
that can be achieved within their tenure of office but which may not be 
beneficial in the long-term for their university. 
Arguably, a difference in emphasis between leaders at some level is 
warranted and desirable; also, opportunities and unplanned events will 
inevitably arise during each head's tenure. But what if a university president 
proposes a substantial change for their institution, for example an acquisition 
or merger, or establishing a campus overseas? Who then should decide the 
right course of action -- the faculty, the top management team or the 
governing body? As the key workers within a knowledge-intensive 
organization, the faculty are undoubtedly an important constituency. But 
they may also have many different priorities, and importantly, if they feel 
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unhappy they can withdraw their labour and move to another university. 
The top management team have likely been appointed by the leader, and 
therefore they may not be impartial decision-makers. 
So, then, does the long-term future of the university lie in the hands of the 
governing body? Should it be assumed that it is the university council 
looking out for the lasting development of the institution? This raises the 
important issue of `governance as leadership' (Chait, Ryan & Taylor 2005) 
which will be opened again in Chapter 7. 
These issues are further turned over in the interview data. Different 
questions have been posed to the different constituencies reported in this 
section - UK VCs, and members of a VC selection committee. The group of 
leaders were asked: `Taking you back to your appointment process, were 
you aware of what the selection committee was looking for in terms of a 
candidate? ' It was then followed up with: `Did you feel that you sold the panel 
a strategy, or alternatively did you fit a predetermined type that they were 
looking out for? ' They were also asked who was on their appointment panel. 
The responses from UK VCs presented below shed some light on the 
questions raised in the introduction to this section, as potentially do the 
statements from members of a selection committee whose responses follow. 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "With both chair and the committee neither had a strategy but they had 
a view about what was wrong. There were 50% academics and 50% 
lay members plus a lay chair. " 
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UKVC- 
"The selection committee had certain views and my opinions married 
with theirs to produce a match. " 
UK VC (from a non-academic background) - 
¢ "The selection committee were very keen to have certain things - 
someone with a public profile, engagement in public policy, knowing 
how to manage a complex organization. Beyond that it felt quite 
unclear. It is a bit of a game to show that you can think of strategy, but 
you can't really know the place until you are in the job. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "I really didn't want the job unless I could have carte blanche to do 
something very new. / sold them a strategy more than the other way 
round. " 
UK VC (from a non-academic background) - 
"The job requirement was not precisely defined. I was amazed to be 
selected because there were a number of very successful academics 
on the shortlist. I think the main reason / was appointed was because / 
had experience of mergers in my former career and the Chair of 
Council was himself a former industrialist. I also think the committee 
believed that I would be good with liaising with government. The 
selection committee had 50% academics and 50% lay people and the 
secretary as observer. " 
UKVC - 
¢ "The committee wanted a change when they chose me. I was aware 
of that. The selection committee understood me well. We had an 
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interesting exchange about strategy when I made it clear that I decide 
the strategy for the university. " 
In some ways the confusion about whom to choose as university leader is 
clear from the next statement. The context is a top research-oriented 
university. It attempted to appoint a civil servant as leader who does not 
take the job. The university then went on to appoint an extremely 
distinguished scholar. The leader selected after the scholar was again a civil 
servant. 
Former UK VC - 
¢ "I was only appointed because their first choice turned them down - 
he was a civil servant. It then went to head-hunters which was how 
they found me. " 
One important question that arises from these statements is: How much do 
lay council members understand research universities? 
UKVC - 
¢ "Regarding the Council and how much they know, we interviewed our 
council members and some interesting stuff came out about how little 
they do know. For example, one didn't even know what the RAE was. " 
UK VC - 
¢ "Lay members of council and especially business people profoundly do 
not understand the culture and business of a university. I think that lay 
members judge by character not by using objective evidence. " 
A comment about the US comes from one former president: 
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¢ "Private universities are much better at selecting boards. They choose 
people who are only deemed to be good for the university. " 
Interviews with Members of a Selection Committee 
Created to Appoint a UK Vice Chancellor 
University appointment committees in the UK are commonly made up of a 
combination of lay people and academics (with one or more non-academic 
administrators as observers). The process is typically organized and 
controlled by university governors, and led by the chair of council, usually a 
lay member, whose position is potentially vital. It has been suggested above 
that governing bodies could be viewed as the guardians of universities, in 
particular of their long-term strategic development. If this is the case then it 
is not unreasonable to assume that those appointed into the post of VC 
might have been selected with a specific long-term perspective in sight. 
However, the extent to which this is central to the practice of VC 
appointments seems questionable from the data in this single case-study. 
It is clear from selectors' responses here that information about the type of 
leader felt to be appropriate came from many places. Indeed, the most 
common source was from interviews between the head-hunters and a broad 
cross-section of the university community; who included "administrators, 
students, academics, union representatives, council members, and we took 
suggestions from an email that was sent out from the chair of the selection 
committee". This perhaps even means that, in practice, a university leader 
might be chosen based on random opinions of university staff and 
stakeholders, instead of being selected according to criteria that link to the 
long-term aims of the institution. 
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The interviewees in this section, whose statements are set out below, were 
members of a VC appointing committee from a research university in the 
north of England. There were 13 members in the group, who included four 
lay people, one of whom was chair of council and also chair of the 
committee, three academics, one administrator, and a representative from 
the student union. Finally, three senior administrators were in attendance as 
observers only. 
A little background information about the selection process is necessary. It 
involved a number of stages: the first being to appoint a search company or 
head-hunters. The head-hunters worked with the appointment panel to 
develop the selection and interview program. A central coordinator 
throughout the process was the chair of council, a lay member, who also 
chaired the appointment committee. 
The second stage involved communication. The chair of the committee sent 
an email to all staff asking them to comment on the type of leader the 
university should be looking to interview, and also requesting potential 
names of candidates. Feed-back was then fed into the group. This was 
followed by interviews held with head-hunters and a cross-section of staff, 
students, academics, administrators, union representatives and council 
members. The decision about whom to approach came out of discussion 
between the head-hunters and members of the selection panel. 
In this case-study a selection of people were interviewed by the author. 
Seven members of the appointment committee were interviewed, 3 
observers from the administration, a head-hunter, and the successful 
candidate (n=12). The responses, presented below, were in reply to the 
questions: `Who or how did you and the selection group decide upon the 
type of person you were looking for? ' and `how much was it a group 
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decision, how much did it come from outside? ' Only the occupational 
position of a person is identified. 
According to these interviews the dominant source of information came 
apparently through the head-hunter's interviews (although there is some lack 
of clarity). 
Faculty member 
¢ "The most important impetus came from the head-hunter's one-on-one 
interviews with faculty. This is where the person-spec came from. 
There was never any agreement about it. A similar spec came from 
lots of sources. " 
Faculty member 
¢ "The head-hunters interviews were very important and were 
condensed into a useful document. The chair's emails were also 
constructive. Feedback came from Senate and Council in an 
understated way. Head-hunters interviews were much more important. 
The research profile became solid later. " 
Senior administrator, observer 
¢ "The spec came through the consultation process, mostly the head- 
hunters' interviews. The university had no strategy. " 
Head-hunter 
¢ "Input came from a bit of everywhere. We spent three days consulting 
with stakeholders in the university -- students, academics, 
administrators, union representatives, council members, and the email 
that was sent out from the chair of the selection committee. " 
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Senior administrator, observer 
Y "Input came mostly from two areas, from the senior academic 
community especially from individual interviews with the head-hunters, 
and also from the observers. " 
Student union representative 
¢ "Head-hunters' interviews with people one-on-one were very helpful. 
The head-hunters' interviews outlined what people wanted for a VC. In 
the first meeting we chatted about feed-back. Not a lot of conversation 
about who we were looking for. " 
Faculty member 
¢ "Through emails and any other method of stimulating greater interest 
from the academic community. A highly respected researcher was the 
first choice. " 
Senior administrator, observer 
¢ "The feedback invited from the community was very helpful. A lot of 
people tell you what they don't want. Strong academic came out of 
head-hunter interviews with academics and in the emails. " 
Administrator, member 
¢ "We were influenced by the quality of leaders and their experience. 
The main information came from academic members - strong research 
focus and credibility. Balance between academic and leadership. " 
The chair of the selection committee and a second lay member both said 
that the type of person the institution was looking for was identified earlier. 
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Chair of committee and lay member 
"We had quite a clear model of the type of person we wanted. This 
was created in advance. Of course humans don't all fit models exactly. 
We had a long list of what we were looking for. The input for the list 
and model came from Senate discussions and with Council members 
who were singing a similar song -- researcher, researcher, researcher! " 
Lay member 
¢ "It came out of the discussion beforehand. That's where the ideal type 
was decided. But you can't stick to boxes. We wanted a strong 
researcher. " 
The candidate who was selected to be vice chancellor was quite clear that 
she was selected according to a clear strategy by the university. 
The selected candidate 
¢ "1 felt that there was unanimity in terms of what they were looking for. I 
felt that I fitted a template of being research active -- that the university 
had a clear strategy. " 
Overwhelmingly the characteristic identified by most on the selection 
committee was that the candidate should be an academic with a strong 
research background. This spec may have stemmed from the selection 
panel's discussion, and also in the feed-back from head-hunter interviews 
and emails from the chair. However, it seems interesting to note that the 
candidate who was runner-up -- their second choice -- was quite different 
from the successful applicant. Although the person had come from a 
traditional academic background the candidate was not an accomplished 
researcher. Using the method described in Chapter 2, the P-score of the 
runner-up candidate is substantially below the average P-score of the 165 
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VCs in the longitudinal study presented in Chapter 5, whereas the candidate 
selected for the position of VC has a P-score well above the average in the 
same group. 
This small case-study raises two important questions: First, to what extent 
did the selection committee select a leader that fit with a predetermined 
university strategy? Drawing from the interviews it would appear that the 
main input came from emails and meetings with a range of university 
stakeholders. Second, with regards to the dominant characteristic or leader- 
type identified through the above process, the term `researcher' appears in 
people's interviews the most. The committee did eventually appoint a 
distinguished scholar but the fact that the runner-up candidate had a weak 
research background stands out in contrast. 
The issues that have been raised here are expanded upon in Chapter 7. 
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Table 6.1 
Participants in Qualitative Interviews 
With some exceptions, US interviews (in the first table) took place in 2005 
between March and May and UK interviews (in the table overleaf) took place 
in 2006 between January and June. Professional affiliations correspond to 
the dates the interviews happened. 
US Interviews 
PARITICANT POSITION INSTITUTION 
1. Derek Bok Former Harvard 
President 
2. Kim Clark Dean Harvard Business 
School 
3. Amy Gutmann President University of 
Pennsylvania 
4. Patrick Harker Dean Wharton School 
5. Jeremy Knowles Former Dean Faculty of Arts and 
Sciences, Harvard 
6. Henry Rosovsky Former Dean Faculty of Arts and 
Sciences, Harvard 
7. Lawrence President Harvard 
Summers 
8. John Heilbron Former Vice Berkeley, University 
Chancellor of California 
9. Shirley President Princeton 
Tilghman* 
* President Tilghman was asked to comment on my work (see Goodall 2005) 
for the newspaper The Princetonian. She was not interviewed by the author 
but her comments have been included in the thesis. 
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UK Interviews 
PARITICANT POSITION INSTITUTION 
10, George Bain** Former Vice 
Chancellor 
Queen's University, 
Belfast 
11 Glynis Breakwell VC Bath University 
12 Bob Burgess VC Leicester University 
13 Ivor Crewe VC Essex University 
14 Howard Davies Director London School of 
Economics 
15 Anthony 
Giddens 
Former 
Director 
London School of 
Economics 
16 Alan Gilbert VC and 
President 
Manchester 
University 
17 David Grant VC Cardiff University 
18 John Hood VC Oxford 
19 Andrew 
Pettigrew 
Dean Bath School of 
Management 
20 Richard Sykes Rector Imperial College 
21 Eric Thomas VC Bristol University 
22 Nigel Thrift VC Warwick University 
23 Bill Wakeham VC Southampton 
University 
** Also former Dean of Warwick Business School and London Business 
School. 
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Table 6.2 
Interview Schedule 
1. What do you consider the most important element of your 
job? 
2. Did you select your own TMT after you started? 
3. Whose role do you believe it is to write or construct the 
strategy for the university? 
4. How important do you consider the RAE to be? (UK VCs 
only. ) 
5. How much can a VC influence the RAE and generally raise 
the research quality of a university? (UK VCs only. ) 
6. How involved are you in investing/de-investing in academic 
departments? (UK VCs only. ) 
7. Taking you back to the appointment process, were you 
aware of what the selection committee was looking for in 
terms of a candidate? Did you feel that you sold them a 
strategy or that you were fulfilling a prototype of theirs? (UK 
VCs only. ) 
8. (Author explains her research and statistical findings. ) Why 
do you think the correlations exist? 
Note: These questions were asked in interviews with UK VCs. 
Questions directed towards US participants were marginally 
different. This was because the interview schedule became more 
focused as the study progressed. 
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Table 6.3 
Appointment Committee Interviewees and Schedule 
10 interviews were held with members of a selection committee and one 
interview was with the individual chosen to be vice chancellor. The 
university is research focused and is based in the north of England. Its 
identity will remain confidential as will all panel members' names. 
The interviews were completed with members of the appointment committee 
as part of a report that is separate from this thesis. However, some of the 
data from these interviews are referenced in this study. These two questions 
relate to the material that has been used. 
1. How did you and the (selection) group decide upon the type 
of person you were looking for to lead the university? 
2. How much was it a group decision? How much did it come 
from outside? 
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Chapter Seven 
Analysis and Discussion 
"The leader should represent the 
aspirations of the institution" 
Former UK Vice Chancellor. 
A theory of strategic leadership in knowledge-intensive organizations was 
offered in Chapter 1. It attempts to explain why a scholar-leader might be 
associated positively with the success of a research university. 
Statistical evidence supporting the proposition was offered in Chapters 3 
to 5. This chapter draws on the interview data to further discuss the 
analytical arguments. 
The theoretical framework, presented earlier in the thesis in (Figure 1.2 p. 
23), has two interrelated parts. The first, which is behavioural, suggests 
that leaders with high professional ability have 'inherent knowledge' of the 
organization's core business. This influences a leader's `inherent 
preferences' causing a scholar-leader to prioritize, over other activities, 
those related to research. The second factor refers more to those who 
follow. Therefore, it is external to leaders. It argues that if those being 
led view their organizational head as credible, a leader's influence and 
authority is substantially enhanced. Inherent preferences and credible 
leadership are viewed as being requisite conditions or different sides of 
the same coin. 
As has been raised several times, central to this theory of strategic 
leadership is the context in which it is being examined. The arguments 
laid out are not necessarily generic to all leaders. They may be relevant 
only to those in knowledge-intensive organizations, and possibly, 
because of cultural similarities, heads of professional service firms. 
In addition to a concluding discussion and analysis, this chapter also 
offers a short section which raises questions about the appointment of 
university leaders. It draws from a case-study, presented in Chapter 6, 
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and therefore the comments are limited to identifying possible 
weaknesses in the selection process. It highlights an area for future 
research. 
Inherent Preferences and Credible Leadership 
This thesis argues that if a governing body has decided upon a strategy 
of raising or maintaining the research status of their university then there 
may be a strong organizational `ethos' (Cummings and Wilson 2003) to 
appoint a leader who is a scholar. The central argument is put succinctly 
by a former head interviewed for this study: "Whether a leader is an 
outstanding researcher or just respectable is relative. It depends on 
where an institution is and where it wants to be... The leader should 
represent the aspirations of the institution. " 
The notion that universities should only be led by experienced academics 
was a view expressed by almost all presidents and VCs interviewed. 
Two leaders from non-academic backgrounds said that it had been 
initially difficult for them to be accepted as head of their university. One 
VC described feeling like an `alien'. Most interviewees were somewhat 
more positive about the principle of appointing leaders from professional 
service firms or R&D, because it was suggested that the culture is 
relatively similar. One of the non-academic appointments was clear that 
he had been given the top job because he had experience specific to an 
area that was required by the university at that time. Overwhelmingly, 
participants spoke out against the appointment of business people to 
head up universities and business schools. 
Interestingly, of the presidents leading the top 100 universities in the 2004 
world ranking (as discussed in Chapter 3), all had PhDs and only two had 
ever worked outside academia. That 98 of the top 100 universities in the 
world appointed a scholar seems significant. Somewhat less surprisingly 
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maybe, of the 100 deans in Chapter 3, nine came from a non-academic 
background, though two of the nine have PhDs. Finally, of the 165 UK 
vice chancellors in Chapter 5, only eight, or 4%, are not career 
academics. Of the eight, one came from an R&D background in industry, 
another came from a professional service firm, and six were civil 
servants. 
A particularly common theme expressed by heads of universities was the 
importance of faculty selection to the future success of a university or 
business school. This issue was raised by most of those interviewed. A 
US dean said: "The most important part of the job of dean is the 
recruitment and retention of top faculty. Appointing good staff is the key 
to sustaining the position of a business school or university. " 
But the process of selecting others may be deeply psychological and 
social. Another VC highlights this point: "... I have found that like- 
appoints-like, so you must have the best faculty on selection committees. 
Many people who are no longer research-active tend to put themselves 
forward for committees. But if selection committees become too full of 
non-researchers the quality of appointments gets down graded. " 
An interesting example is offered by one VC: "I was recently in an 
appointment committee where the academic department doing the 
recruiting thought that they (the department) were better than anyone 
else did. Three candidates were short-listed. The department picked the 
opposite order of candidates to the rest of the appointing committee. 
They put the worst candidate first. I think they did this because they were 
weak researchers and therefore lacked in confidence. Confidence is 
infectious. " 
A US university president commented that it might be difficult for, in the 
president's words, a level 2 or 3 person to appoint a level 1 person, 
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because someone who is classed as `better' may induce negative self- 
feelings. Thus we as humans may avoid such situations. This argument 
draws from social comparison theory (Festinger 1954) in that we assess 
ourselves against others. Indeed, negative self-feelings can be traced 
directly to, and are antecedents of, processes of social comparison (Stiles 
& Kaplan 2004). Clark & Oswald (1996) and Luttmer (2005) show that 
job satisfaction and happiness seem to be related to how the self 
compares to similar others and to neighbours. 
The challenge of selecting someone better than ourselves is expressed in 
a statement from a US dean: "I have on occasion met faculty who put the 
institution above their own position and chose to appoint someone better 
than them. But it is not common. It's a natural human reaction to find it 
difficult to select someone above you. " 
This can be further explained through self-verification theory. It posits 
that individuals need their self-view constantly confirmed, whether that 
self-view is positive or negative (Swann 1990, White and Harkins 1994). 
Swann suggests that "good researchers have positive views of their 
research capability and weaker researchers have positive views of other 
talents, such as administration, teaching or whatever. So they may prefer 
similar others because they give them verification of their specific self- 
view, or because they have the same `shared reality' (Hardin & Higgins 
1996) in that they value the same things" (personal correspondence with 
Swann, June 3 2005). As one UK VC said: "Good people only ever want 
to work with good people. " This may explain the attraction emanating 
from a group of respected researchers: "When I contacted top scholars 
many would ask, `Who else is in the department? "' (Former UK VC). 
Eminent researchers are also more likely to exert a pull on research 
funding and top quality equipment. This links to the section in Chapter 6 
on the concept of a `quality threshold', specifically the importance of 
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leaders setting the standard in their institutions. This argument is put 
succinctly by one US dean: "Leaders are the final arbiters of quality. 
Therefore it is right to expect the standard bearer to first bear the 
standard. " 
If, as one former UK VC said: "Everything in a university flows from the 
academic value of faculty"; then this takes us back to the issue of 
selection. Thus, given the psychological difficulties attached to selecting 
individuals who are `better' than us, it may be prudent to appoint a leader 
who is a top scholar, or at least one who represents "... the aspirations of 
the institution". 
These arguments suggest that having inherent knowledge of the core 
business not only influences leader-behaviour towards prioritizing the 
selection of faculty but that it may also instil the confidence to assess 
quality. 
The second part of the thesis's theoretical explanation is about the role of 
credible leadership. Responses referring to issues of credibility were the 
most common when interviewees were asked why they believed the 
correlations in the study exist. Credible leaders can be symbolic (Pfeffer 
1981). For example, university governors may wish to use the 
appointment of a top scholar to signal a change in institutional strategy, or 
even that there will be more of the same. Signals are important, both to 
internal and external stakeholders, as expressed by one US president: 
"Being a researcher sends a signal to the faculty that you, the president, 
share their scholarly values and general understanding. It also sends an 
internal signal to colleagues that research success in the institution is 
important. " Crucially, a scholar-leader may also be viewed as credible 
because he or she signals that a leader's "value system is not too far 
from the values of those who are being led" (UK VC). 
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Being a successful research academic may also help in attracting faculty, 
particularly `stars', to a university, which has perhaps become a 
preoccupation the world over. Having a president who is a notable 
scholar may enhance the appeal of an institution to students and potential 
faculty. Appointment committees may also select high-profile academics 
as presidents for external reasons. The alumni may be encouraged to 
give more generously. Gaining greater media exposure for the institution 
may also be a motive. 
Leadership and Power 
The important issue of power emerged clearly from the interviews in 
Chapter 6. For a scholar-leader, or in fact any leader, to be able to make 
an impact in an organization they arguably must have power. The 
concept of power can be loosely defined as having influence and 
authority27. 
It was evident from the vice chancellors interviewed for this thesis that, in 
UK universities, leaders perhaps are gaining more power. That European 
universities are moving more in the direction of the `strong president' 
model was suggested earlier by Trow (1999). In a paper analyzing the 
processes involved in reforming biology at Berkeley in the eighties, Trow 
is quite clear that the changes that led to great expansion and intellectual 
developments at Berkeley would not have happened if the then leader 
had not had substantial powers (1999). Trow asks how it is possible for 
weak leaders with minimal resources and no direct reports to respond to 
the internal problems that arise in disciplines, for example a decline in 
research quality, or the big changes that happen intermittently in science. 
Many attribute the decline of some of Europe's great universities to weak 
27 The nature of a leader's power has been debated since Machiavelli and Max Weber. 
In more recent literature it has been discussed by Handy (1984), Bass (1985), Bryman 
(1986), House (1988,1991), Bensimon (1989) among others. 
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institutional leadership married with an overly powerful faculty (Trow 
1971, Rosovsky 1991, Middlehurst 1993, Graham & Diamond 1997) 
Trow states that `every advanced nation has to ask the question of where 
authority and resources are best located to respond to problems of rapid 
scientific advance (and decline)' (1999, pp. 25); in other words, who are 
the arbiters of quality and the propagators of change? His answer is 
`strong presidents' of research universities. Trow's paper is interesting 
because he argues `that authority must have certain characteristics to be 
effective' (1999, pp. 25). He goes on to raise a number of factors that 
are required, for example adequate resources attached to the position of 
president, an intimate knowledge of the scientists in their institution, a top 
management team, among others. Yet he falls short of suggesting the 
one leader characteristic that is in some ways synonymous with 
institutions like Berkeley -a high level of scholarship. 
In the world ranking reported in Chapter 3, Berkeley is positioned number 
four. It is led by Robert Bergeneau28, a Canadian who is one of the most 
highly cited physicists in the world; according to ISI he is among the top 
1% (see www. isihighlycited. com). The leader of Berkeley (titled vice 
chancellor) that Trow refers to as having been central to the successful 
changes in Biology, Roderick Park, was himself a renowned scholar. Yet 
this observation is not made by Trow (1999). 
Case-Study of a Leader's Appointment 
The focus in this brief concluding section is on those who choose leaders. 
It emerged from the interview data in Chapter 6 that there can be a 
degree of ambiguity surrounding the selection of a leader, particularly in 
terms of knowing the type of candidate a university should be looking for. 
28 When this research was being conducted in 2004-2006. 
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Although only a single case-study is included in the thesis - ten members 
of a university appointing panel, one head-hunter and the successful 
candidate (n=12) - it raises interesting questions about the selection of 
university heads, and issues of strategy and governance. Vice 
chancellors interviewed for this study also report on their own 
appointment process. 
Universities are governed by councils in the UK and by boards in the US. 
Governing bodies are generally accepted in the literature as being 'in 
charge' of universities in the long-term (Birnbaum 1988, Bowen 1994, 
Freedman 2004, Hammond 2004). Chait et al. (2005) suggest that, in 
not-for-profit organizations, `... in theory if not in practice, boards of 
trustees are supposed to be the ultimate guardians of institutional ethos 
and organizational values' (Chait, Ryan & Taylor, 2005, pp. 3). They go 
on to suggest that boards are 'charged with setting the organization's 
agenda and priorities, typically through review, approval, and oversight of 
a strategic plan' (Chait et al. 2005, pp. 3). 
Although there are many differences between the private sector's remit 
and that of universities, which will be reflected in the actions of boards 
(see Bowen 1994), their specific function is very similar. O'Neal and 
Thomas (1996) summarize the three primary roles of executive boards in 
private companies as being supporting top management, monitoring and 
controlling the top team, and designing corporate strategy, although they 
point out that the board's involvement in strategy is usually limited to 
overseeing and ratifying. 
Figure 7.1 presents a model representing an `ideal' governance structure 
in a university that wishes to raise its performance in, say, the Research 
Assessment Exercise. An obvious question emerging from this model is 
how many university governing bodies actually have long-term strategies 
for their institutions? To change the direction of a research university 
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perhaps takes many tens of years and, importantly, it also means being 
influenced by the strategy when appointing appropriate leaders. Of the 
sample of VCs interviewed for this thesis, only one reported that his 
university had a strategy that would continue beyond his tenure as leader. 
Manchester University has a strategic plan that runs to 2015. 
Figure 7.1 
Model Explaining `Ideal' Governance Structure 
Sets long-term direction of 
institution and selects leaders 
Governing Body 
Improve position in Research 
Assessment Exercise 
Institutional 
strategy & priorities 
influence choice Performance feeds back into 
of leader 
GOVERNANCE 
redefining future institutional 
strategy & priorities 
CONTEXT 
Research 
University 
CORE BUSINESS: 
F LEADER Academic research & PERFORMANCE teaching 
Role Specific 
Characteristics 
- Successful scholar 
Generic competencies 
(managerial and 
leadership skills) 
Leader influences 
organizational performance 
Performance 
Measure 
- UK Research 
Assessment 
Exercise (RAE) 
In both not-for-profits and the private sector one of the main functions of 
boards is to appoint the organization's leader. It seems clear from most 
of the statements in chapter 6, in the case-study university, that there was 
little initial consensus about the type of leader the panel were looking for. 
Also, in determining the right sort of individual to appoint, a range of 
173 
opinions were sought and seemingly relied upon. The most common 
source, as identified by the committee members, came from interviews 
with the recruitment firm. 
This was explained by the head-hunter himself: "Input came from a bit of 
everywhere. We spent three days consulting with stakeholders in the 
university -- students, academics, administrators, union representatives, 
council members, and we took suggestions from an email that was sent 
out from the chair of the selection committee. " 
A senior administrator confirms this: "The spec came through the 
consultation process, mostly the head-hunter's interviews. The university 
had no strategy. " This comment identifies one of the potential 
weaknesses in the governing body's approach to the VC's appointment. 
The panel was selecting a new leader who, according to the vice 
chancellors interviewed for this thesis, will have power. Yet it would 
seem that there was ambiguity about the person spec insofar as the 
governing body appeared to have no predetermined strategy. Indeed 
almost all of those interviewed emphasised that input came mostly from 
interviews and emails with members of the university community. 
It might be fair to conjecture that it is unlikely that the CEO of a private 
company, with a £400 million turn-over, would be selected by inviting 
comments from all staff about the type of leader the board should 
appoint. Instead one might expect a governing body to look for a leader 
who fits, generally, the criteria that they believe are necessary to develop 
further the university's strategy (preferably long-term). Indeed, this is built 
into the roles and processes of private sector boards which have 
selection and recruitment as a formal part of their responsibilities (having 
sub-committees with this as their sole purpose). 
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A problem that might exacerbate this situation further, and of relevance to 
this research, is the lack of empirical evidence available about the type of 
leaders most suited to running knowledge-intensive organizations. It is 
hoped that this study goes some way to providing information for 
governing bodies and recruitment agencies. 
Developing a better understanding of university governing bodies would 
also be beneficial. For example many, if not most, university councils and 
boards are chaired by people who have not come from academia. A 
number of those interviewed for this thesis said that they felt their lay 
council members had very little understanding of the core business of 
universities. Yet these bodies perform a central role in appointing 
university leaders, as mentioned above. One non-academic VC who 
came from industry expressed his surprise at being given the job of 
leader. He said that he believed the decision to appoint him had been 
favoured by the chair of the university's council who himself had come 
from industry. 
This section has raised some peripheral but important issues associated 
with appointing presidents and vice chancellors. It focuses on how 
governors choose leaders, and asks are they being selected as part of a 
long-term strategy? The leaders interviewed in Chapter 6 reported that 
they write their university's strategy. How then do these two situations 
co-exist? This may be an area for future research. 
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion and 
Future Work 
"You have to know the game -- if not you lack legitimacy. Being a 
distinguished researcher gives you legitimacy in either a business 
school or a university. And legitimacy gives you authority as a 
leader. s29 
This is the first study that goes some way to answering a question that 
has circulated for many years: should universities be led by scholars? 
The answer is yes. Using empirical evidence from four data-sets, this 
thesis argues that research universities tend to perform better if led by an 
accomplished scholar. This suggests that technical ability should be 
prioritized over managerial expertise. It is argued that because the core 
business in these organizations is knowledge centered, specialists, not 
generalists, are required as leaders. The study contends that research 
universities ought to be treated as knowledge-intensive organizations, not 
as public-sector bodies, because their core business is in generating 
knowledge not in service provision. The approach adopted here 
contrasts somewhat with recent trends, particularly in the UK, towards a 
culture of managerialism. 
This dissertation does not claim that research universities should in every 
circumstance be led by scholars. There may be important exceptions. 
On occasion, different types of leaders will be required to address 
different types of problems or challenges. But there is strong evidence 
presented to suggest that if a research university chooses to improve its 
performance, or alternatively maintain a consistent path, it may be 
propitious to select a noted scholar as its head. As one former UK VC 
suggested, a leader should represent the aspirations of a university. If 
the institution wishes to raise its research performance from third to 
second tier it should appoint a second or first tier academic leader. 
29 Former UK VC and business school dean. 
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This thesis argues that scholars make more effective heads of research 
universities for reasons that are both internal and external to the 
individual. The first factor is behavioural. It is suggested that by having 
inherent knowledge of scholarship, derived from a focus on research 
whilst a career academic, a scholar-leader has a greater knowledge of 
the core business of a university, which will give them an advantage in 
making decisions. Inherent knowledge is partly expressed through a 
process of inherent preferences, which lead to a prioritization of those 
areas linked to research performance. A leader also sets the quality- 
threshold of an institution; therefore, if a university is striving to raise its 
research reputation or hire top faculty, it may be beneficial for its leader to 
be at least equal in quality of scholarship to the desired target. 
The second explanatory factor presented here is that credibility is 
essential when leading knowledge workers. This comes from followers. 
It is established partly through the level of technical ability a leader has 
acquired in his or her career. Credible leaders signal their shared values 
to the community. They are more likely to instil trust and concomitantly to 
command greater authority. In universities, where traditional hierarchical 
manager-employee relations do not operate, this may be crucial. A 
distinguished scholar at the apex also sends a message to his or her 
university community that a culture of research will prevail. 
This thesis goes on to raise questions about how leaders are appointed. 
It suggests that governing boards may not be making selections to the 
top post according to a predetermined university strategy. In a case- 
study in Chapter 6, interviews with members of a single appointment 
panel in a UK university suggest that selection criteria seem to be arrived 
at through an arbitrary and somewhat random process -- one that is 
unlikely to be found when appointing to the post of CEO in companies 
with a similar financial turnover. It was acknowledged, however, that this 
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situation may have arisen because of a lack of empirical evidence 
available about leaders of knowledge-intensive organizations. 
Future Work30 
As mentioned earlier, this is one of the first inquiries of its kind. Empirical 
studies focusing on institutional leaders in higher education, and 
generally in knowledge-intensive firms, are rare -- as is research that 
combines quantitative with qualitative methods. 
Future work must attempt to replicate these findings among larger 
populations of university leaders. This would also allow for a greater 
number of control variables to be used, for example executive pay or 
research income. 
It is also suggested in this thesis that leaders who are top scholars attract 
other scholars. This assertion should be tested further. Academic 
appointments prior and post to the arrival of a scholar-leader need to be 
examined. 
Universities in the US are likely to offer the best source of data because 
of the mixed economy of higher education institutions. The US case 
would allow for comparisons to be made between public and private 
universities. It would be interesting to explore whether the hypothesis 
holds in other forms of knowledge-intensive organizations, for example in 
professional service firms such as managing consultancies, accounting 
and legal firms, and in research and development services. 
This thesis also throws up research questions about how leaders are 
selected, and these should be explored by future researchers. Leaders 
30 The suggestions for future work outlined in this section form part of a proposal 
submitted for funding by the author. 
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are appointed by governing boards. Yet a number of university heads 
interviewed said they had doubts about how much lay members on 
governing councils understand the business of universities. A former US 
President said: "Private universities are much better at selecting boards. 
They choose people who are only deemed to be good for the university". 
How then are members of governing bodies selected? If, as is suggested 
in the thesis, like-appoint-like then does this also happen more widely at 
the board level in that people appoint leaders who look like themselves? 
It will be interesting to compare data on the membership of boards in 
private US universities with those in US public institutions and on 
university councils in the UK. Does involvement of the public purse 
influence board membership? Again, new research, stimulated by the 
ideas of this thesis, is needed. 
A number of important questions also emerged from the case-study on 
the selection of a UK vice chancellor. For example: what type of person 
does a board want, and is there consensus among governors about the 
type of person for whom they are looking? What strategy does the board 
believe a candidate should fulfil, and what brief is passed on to the 
selection panel? Finally, how close is the ex-post fit between the 
successful candidate and the type of person the board ostensibly sought? 
These questions should be addressed in follow-up research. 
Though not reported in the thesis' findings, another noticeable pattern 
that emerged from the data warrants further examination. It appears from 
the UK data that leaders selected into a university tend to alternate 
between being a strong scholar only to be followed by a weaker scholar. 
We might call this an alternating-leader cycle. This raises the question: 
are individuals being selected in part because they differ markedly from 
their predecessors? Anecdote might have us believe that an alternating- 
leader cycle is common. But there is no empirical literature that 
examines this issue. An important next step would be to try to identify 
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whether there is statistical evidence for this pendulum effect in the 
selection of leaders (guarding against measurement error that might 
generate a spurious statistical relationship) and, if so, whether it affects 
organizational performance. 
Possible Limitations 
There are, potentially, some weaknesses in the methodology used in this 
thesis. These are outlined below with suggestions of how they might be 
addressed in future research. 
  Many factors influence the performance of a university. This makes 
the precise role of a leader difficult to identify. 
In the longitudinal chapter, apart from the main independent variable 
of a leader's citations, three control variables are included. Beyond 
these three, identifying other independent variables may be beneficial 
for future studies, for example, allowing for institution's age, history 
and reputation -- although some of these may be hard to quantify. 
Future research might attempt to further understand how university 
leaders influence organizational performance by more precisely 
separating institutional fixed effects from leader-related variables. 
  To understand more exactly the `how' processes it might be valuable 
to include detailed case-studies of leaders in universities. 
Theoretical propositions are offered in Chapter 1 with further analysis 
in Chapter 7. Future research might choose a different method of 
explaining the `how' processes or transfer mechanisms, by recording 
the actions of leaders over time, through case-studies. Doing this, 
might allow for greater weight to be assigned to causal explanations. 
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  The longitudinal sample is quite small. Future work might use a larger 
sample, one that can be observed over a longer period of time. 
UK universities were chosen for the longitudinal study because of the 
usefulness of the measure of university performance available in that 
country as explained in Chapter 5 -- namely the Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE). The performance of 55 universities was 
measured between RAEs 1992,1996 and 2001. The number of 
institutions was chosen because they, and only they, appeared in the 
three assessments31. The higher education (HE) sector expanded in 
the UK in 1992, making it difficult to include post-1992 or `new' 
universities in this study. Future research might examine whether a 
similar pattern exists across all UK universities or even just among the 
newer institutions. It is also important to note that universities may 
take many years to develop and change. Looking at patterns over a 
longer stretch of time would be beneficial if a reliable performance 
measure can be identified. This might be possible using a US sample 
because of the size, variation and age of the HE sector there. 
  Working out what is cause and effect and what is reverse correlation 
is complicated. The cross-section results could possibly be explained 
by assortative matching. 
This would mean that what is being observed is selection on both 
sides of the equation. For example higher-quality universities may be 
matched with higher-quality presidents and vice chancellors. That 
some level of selection is happening is undeniable, and will be most 
evident in the cross-sectional equations. But the longitudinal study 
weakens the argument that the results are caused by a matching 
effect. Chapter 5 shows that performance of a university in time 
period T+2 or T+3 is dependent on the appointment of a VC in time 
31 Except Aston University that was excluded from the thesis's data-set. See Chapter 5. 
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period T-1. This evidence would be strengthened by further 
longitudinal research. 
  Measurement error may cause attenuation bias in the independent 
variables. This would weaken the correlations. 
It is likely that there is measurement error in the independent 
variables, in particular the key variable of leaders' life-time citations. 
There will have been counting errors in the collection of bibliometric 
data and further possible inaccuracies through the normalization 
process. Also, importantly, the research quality of a leader is unlikely 
to be measured perfectly by using citations. Such error will have the 
effect of weakening the statistical relationships in the regressions in 
that the estimated coefficient on citations will be lower than the true 
one (Wooldridge 2003). It may be possible to develop more accurate 
measures in the future, although some error will always be present. 
  The thesis claims in a number of places that managerial skills are 
important to university heads, but there is no measure in the thesis to 
assess how important they might be. 
A measure for scholarly ability is used in this dissertation but it does 
not factor in a variable for management expertise. Understanding the 
balance of technical ability versus managerial experience would be an 
important part of future work in this area. 
  There is relatively little empirical work in this field, and none, as far as 
the author is aware, that focuses on the technical ability of leaders. 
This means that there is a small base of literature to draw upon. 
It is hoped that work of this kind will continue to be developed in the 
future. This could take the form of checking the results in this 
dissertation by testing for similar patterns in different university data- 
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sets, or by examining whether the relationships observed here are 
similar in professional service firms and other knowledge-intensive 
organizations. 
  The interviews may not be fully trustworthy as participants may have 
told the author what they thought she wanted to hear. 
A great deal of care was taken by the author to ensure, where 
possible, that interviewees were unaware of the focus of the thesis 
prior to interview. If participants had known of the research question 
in advance it might have skewed their responses. Despite this, 
interview data in general can be susceptible to methodological 
weaknesses both in the process of data collection and analysis. 
Again care has been taken to try to ensure that interviewees' 
statements have been fairly reported. 
  Many parts of the world are missing from the data-set which 
potentially skews the study towards a wealthy-country view. 
The longitudinal study is focused on UK universities and, although the 
cross-sectional studies include international institutions, western 
universities still dominate. It is likely that the research question 
addressed in this thesis has relevance around the world, therefore 
future studies in nations beyond Europe and the US would be 
interesting. This is especially poignant in developing countries that 
have suffered from the problem of brain drain. 
  The distinctions between public and private universities have not been 
examined carefully here. 
The US has the most buoyant mixed economy in higher education, 
unlike most other countries, where public universities dominate 
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overwhelmingly. It has been suggested in the introductory chapter 
that governments may place demands on universities because of 
issues of finance and politics. This has been observed in the UK and 
more recently in the US where States are increasingly appointing 
politicians to head universities. Thus it would be interesting to 
undertake comparative research on leaders in public and private 
institutions. This may only be possible in the US. 
Conclusion 
It is argued in this thesis that where expert knowledge is the key 
factor that characterizes an organization it is expert knowledge that 
should also be key in the selection of its leader. 
Although this thesis focuses on those who lead universities, the 
theoretical explanations outlined here are more general. They could also 
apply to other heads of key strategic units within institutions, for example, 
department chairs. But another question of importance to the university 
system as a whole is that of whether top scholars should be leading 
national research institutes and funding bodies? These are organizations 
such as the National Institutes for Health and the National Science 
Foundation in the US, the research councils in the UK (e. g. Medical 
Research Council, Economic and Social Research Council) and also 
bodies such as the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE). The importance of such bodies seems indisputable, and some 
might argue that their leaders are among the guardians of the higher 
education sector, and therefore that they should have extensive inherent 
knowledge about scholarship, and be seen to be credible by those they 
serve in universities. 
The research findings of the thesis can, arguably, be directly applied to 
the real world. This leads us to ask: who might be interested in the 
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thesis? There are a number of potential beneficiaries. Universities as 
institutions do not differ substantially the world over. It is anticipated 
therefore, that interest may come from universities and also policy 
analysts, government officials and politicians in countries considering 
making changes to their higher education systems -- for example, 
Portugal, Italy and Germany32 
There is limited public information about what research universities 
should be looking for in their leaders. Thus, it is anticipated that those 
who appoint to the top university jobs, such as members of university 
governing boards and also head-hunters from recruitment firms, should 
be interested in these findings. 
This empirical work is about leaders of institutions dominated by experts 
and professionals. Hence, the findings are also relevant to firms such as 
architects, lawyers, accountants and management consultancies. It could 
also be argued that the recommendations will be of equal significance to 
arts organizations such as theatres and galleries. 
This study will make an intellectual contribution that will be of benefit to 
the academic community. Specifically, the thesis will add to the body of 
work in leadership and strategic management. The work also contributes 
towards education research and furthers our understanding about the 
appropriate selection of leaders and the important role of governance. 
32 Contact and interest has already been shown in this work from parties mentioned in 
this section, specifically policy-makers, universities and the media in a number of 
countries. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Top 500 World Universities (1-100) 2004* 
World 
Rank 
Institution Country Total 
Score 
Score 
on 
Alumni 
Score 
on 
Award 
Score 
on 
HiCi 
Score 
on 
N&S 
Score 
on SCI 
Score 
on Size 
1 Harvard Univ USA 100.0 98.6 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 60.6 
2 Stanford Univ USA 77.2 41.2 72.2 96.1 75.2 72.3 68.1 
3 Univ Cambridge UK 76.2 100.0 93.4 56.6 58.5 70.2 73.2 
4 Univ California - Berkeley USA 74.2 70.0 76.0 74.1 75.6 72.7 45.1 
5 Massachusetts Inst Tech (MIT) USA 72.4 74.1 78.9 73.6 69.1 64.6 47.5 
6 California Inst Tech USA 69.0 59.3 66.5 64.8 66.7 53.2 100.0 
7 Princeton Univ USA 63.6 61.0 76.8 65.4 52.1 46.8 67.3 
8 Univ Oxford UK 61.4 64.4 59.1 53.1 55.3 65.2 59.0 
9 Columbia Univ USA 61.2 77.8 58.8 57.3 51.6 68.3 37.0 
10 Univ Chicago USA 60.5 72.2 81.9 55.3 46.6 54.1 32.7 
11 Yale Univ USA 58.6 52.2 44.5 63.6 58.1 63.6 50.4 
12 Cornell Univ USA 55.5 46.6 52.4 60.5 47.2 66.2 33.6 
13 Univ California - San Diego USA 53.8 17.8 34.7 63.6 59.4 67.2 47.9 
14 Tokyo Univ Japan 51.9 36.1 14.4 44.5 55.0 91.9 49.8 
15 Univ Pennsylvania USA 51.8 35.6 35.1 61.2 44.6 72.6 34.0 
16 Univ California - Los Angeles USA 51.6 27.4 32.8 60.5 48.1 79.9 24.8 
17 Univ California - San Francisco USA 50.8 0.0 37.6 59.3 59.5 62.9 48.8 
18 Univ Wisconsin - Madison USA 50.0 43.1 36.3 55.3 48.0 69.2 19.0 
19 Univ Michigan - Ann Arbor USA 49.3 39.8 19.3 64.8 45.7 76.7 20.1 
20 Univ Washington - Seattle USA 49.1 22.7 30.2 57.3 49.6 78.8 16.2 
21 Kyoto Univ Japan 48.3 39.8 34.1 40.0 37.2 77.1 46.4 
22 Johns Hopkins Univ USA 47.5 48.7 28.3 43.7 52.6 71.7 14.2 
23 Imperial Coll London UK 46.4 20.9 38.1 46.2 39.4 65.8 44.5 
24 Univ Toronto Canada 44.6 28.1 19.7 39.1 41.2 78.4 42.8 
25 Univ Coll London UK 44.3 30.8 32.9 41.0 41.0 61.1 42.6 
25 Univ Illinois - Urbana Champaign USA 43.3 41.7 37.4 
46.2 36.0 58.2 17.8 
27 Swiss Fed Inst Tech - Zurich Switzerland 43.2 40.3 37.0 
39.1 43.2 47.1 41.5 
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28 Washington Univ - St. Louis USA 43.1 25.1 26.6 41.9 46.8 56.2 44.9 
29 Rockefeller Univ USA 40.2 22.7 59.8 31.5 43.6 27.1 38.6 
30 Northwestern Univ USA 39.5 21.8 19.3 47.9 35.8 57.2 37.0 
31 Duke Univ USA 38.9 20.9 0.0 48.6 46.8 62.7 36.2 
32 New York Univ USA 38.7 33.9 25.0 43.7 39.3 50.9 19.1 
33 Univ Minnesota - Twin Cities USA 38.3 36.1 0.0 53.9 35.9 69.6 12.8 
34 Univ Colorado - Boulder USA 37.8 16.6 29.8 43.7 38.3 47.5 27.4 
35 Univ California - Santa Barbara USA 37.0 0.0 28.5 45.4 41.4 44.0 36.2 
36 Univ British Columbia Canada 36.3 20.9 19.3 36.0 31.6 59.5 34.9 
36 Univ Texas Southwestern Med Center USA 36.3 16.6 33.9 33.8 40.5 40.0 34.9 
38 Vanderbilt Univ USA 35.1 12.6 30.2 37.1 23.8 50.2 41.7 
39 Univ Utrecht Netherlands 34.9 30.8 21.4 31.5 29.9 58.1 22.1 
40 Univ Texas - Austin USA 34.8 21.8 17.1 50.2 28.8 53.7 12.8 
41 Univ Paris 06 France 33.9 35.7 23.9 23.1 24.7 56.7 32.6 
42 Univ California - Davis USA 33.6 0.0 0.0 48.6 37.2 64.7 20.7 
43 Pennsylvania State Univ - Univ Park USA 33.5 14.1 0.0 50.2 37.7 58.7 14.2 
44 Rutgers State Univ - New Brunswick USA 33.4 15.4 20.4 38.1 36.1 48.2 19.5 
45 Tech Univ Munich Germany 33.3 43.1 24.1 27.6 20.4 50.0 32.0 
46 Karolinska Inst Stockholm Sweden 33.0 30.8 27.8 32.7 21.6 49.8 21.5 
47 Univ Edinburgh UK 32.9 22.7 17.1 27.6 36.7 49.1 31.6 
48 Univ Paris 11 France 32.5 33.3 34.2 21.4 21.3 46.8 31.2 
48 Univ Pittsburgh - Pittsburgh USA 32.5 18.9 0.0 42.8 26.5 67.0 20.0 
48 Univ Southern California USA 32.5 0.0 27.3 41.9 23.0 53.5 20.5 
51 Univ Munich Germany 32.4 37.2 21.1 12.4 32.0 56.0 31.1 
52 Univ Rochester USA 32.0 33.3 9.1 30.3 27.2 44.9 50.1 
53 Australian Natl Univ Australia 31.9 17.8 12.9 41.0 31.4 43.6 30.7 
54 Osaka Univ Japan 31.5 12.6 0.0 26.2 31.2 72.1 30.2 
55 Univ California - Irvine USA 31.4 0.0 25.0 
33.8 29.6 47.2 29.9 
56 Univ North Carolina - Chapel Hill USA 31.2 12.6 0.0 
38.1 34.5 60.5 20.3 
57 Univ Maryland - Coll Park USA 31.1 25.9 0.0 
40.0 33.2 54.0 17.4 
57 Univ Zurich Switzerland 31.1 12.6 27.3 21.4 30.3 48.9 29.9 
59 Univ Copenhagen Denmark 31.0 30.8 24.7 23.1 22.6 48.1 29.8 
205 
60 Univ Bristol UK 30.6 10.9 18.2 32.7 26.6 49.1 29.4 
61 McGill Univ Canada 30.4 28.8 0.0 31.5 26.3 59.0 29.? 
62 Carnegie Mellon Univ USA 30.3 18.9 30.2 32.7 17.4 38.8 34.0 
63 Univ Leiden Netherlands 29.8 25.1 15.8 30.3 22.0 47.3 30.3 
64 Univ Heidelberg Germany 29.7 10.9 27.7 23.1 22.1 49.7 28.5 
65 Case Western Reserve Univ USA 29.6 37.2 11.8 23.1 22.2 46.1 40.6 
66 Moscow State Univ Russia 29.5 51.5 34.9 0.0 8.1 58.5 28.3 
67 Univ Florida USA 29.3 15.4 0.0 33.8 24.3 66.4 16.3 
68 Univ Oslo Norway 29.2 25.9 34.1 19.5 17.2 42.1 28.0 
69 Tohoku Univ Japan 28.8 18.9 0.0 19.5 26.1 69.3 27.7 
69 Univ Sheffield UK 28.8 23.5 14.4 23.1 28.8 46.2 27.7 
71 Purdue Univ - West Lafayette USA 28.7 18.9 17.1 31.5 22.1 50.5 13.8 
72 Univ Helsinki Finland 28.6 18.9 18.2 15.1 23.7 56.9 27.5 
73 Ohio State Univ - Columbus USA 28.5 17.8 0.0 41.0 20.6 61.3 9.6 
74 Uppsala Univ Sweden 28.4 25.9 32.9 0.0 30.4 52.5 14.5 
75 Rice Univ USA 28.3 21.8 22.3 26.2 23.7 30.2 44.6 
76 Univ Arizona USA 28.1 0.0 0.0 31.5 37.7 56.5 18.1 
77 King's Coll London UK 28.0 16.6 23.5 23.1 19.8 46.2 26.9 
78 Univ Manchester UK 27.9 25.9 19.3 21.4 18.2 48.6 26.8 
79 Univ Goettingen Germany 27.4 38.8 20.4 17.5 18.2 42.8 26.3 
80 Michigan State Univ USA 27.0 12.6 0.0 39.1 28.4 50.5 10.5 
80 Univ Nottingham UK 27.0 15.4 20.4 23.1 20.1 45.1 25.9 
82 Brown Univ USA 26.8 0.0 13.9 30.3 27.9 41.4 30.4 
82 Univ Melbourne Australia 26.8 15.4 14.4 21.4 19.2 53.0 25.8 
82 Univ Strasbourg 1 France 26.8 29.5 22.9 21.4 21.3 35.2 25.7 
85 Ecole Normale Super Paris France 26.5 47.9 25.0 17.5 18.2 29.6 25.4 
86 Boston Univ USA 26.3 15.4 0.0 32.7 29.6 51.5 9.6 
86 Univ Vienna Austria 26.3 25.1 15.8 8.7 22.0 54.5 25.3 
88 McMaster Univ Canada 26.0 16.6 19.3 23.1 16.2 45.2 25.0 
88 Univ Freiburg Germany 26.0 25.1 21.4 19.5 18.0 40.9 25.0 
90 Hebrew Univ Jerusalem Israel 25.9 15.4 0.0 26.2 29.5 48.3 24.9 
91 Univ Basel Switzerland 25.8 25.9 17.5 21,4 24.2 35.5 24.8 
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92 Lund Univ Sweden 25.6 29.5 0.0 26.2 22.0 54.0 11.2 
93 Univ Birmingham UK 25.5 25.1 11.2 24.7 14.0 47.6 24.5 
93 Univ Roma - La Sapienza Italy 25.5 16.6 15.8 12.4 24.3 57.4 7.9 
95 Humboldt Univ Berlin Germany 25.4 29.5 21.9 8.7 14.8 49.7 24.4 
95 Univ Utah USA 25.4 0.0 0.0 32.7 30.7 48.4 20.1 
97 Nagoya Univ Japan 25.2 0.0 14.4 15.1 23.7 55.3 24.2 
97 Stockholm Univ Sweden 25.2 29.5 30.2 17.5 14.9 35.7 15.3 
99 Tufts Univ USA 25.1 18.9 17.1 19.5 19.1 40.6 29.2 
99 Univ Bonn Germany 25.1 19.9 20.4 17.5 16.7 43.9 24.1 
Copyright 0 2004 Institute of Higher Education, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 
All Rights Reserved. 
* The methodology for the 2005 Global Ranking produced by SJTU has 
been slightly modified (see http: //ed. sjtu. edu. cn/ranking. htm). 
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Appendix 2 
Citation Thresholds for Scientists 
Across Different Disciplines 
(Created in October 2004) 
Subject area Scientist 
Agricultural Sciences 154 
Biology & Biochemist 780 
Chemistry 648 
Clinical Medicine 1095 
Com uter Science 84 
Economics & Business 169 
Engineering 182 
Environment/Ecology 248 
Geosciences 433 
Humanities, General* 35 
Immunology 763 
Materials Science 219 
Mathematics 130 
Microbiolo 534 
Molecular Biology & Genetics 1234 
Multidisciplinary 123 
Neuroscience & Behaviour 908 
-Pharmacology & Toxicology 312 
Physics 1832 
Plant & Animal Science 292 
Ps chiat /Psychology 393 
Social Sciences, General 117 
S ace Science 1301 
Thomson ISI Highly cited, available from 
http: //in-cites. com/thresholds-citation. htmI 
* Humanities score created by Amanda H. Goodall 
Note to Table: The above citation thresholds represent 
approximately the top 250 authors in each disciplinary 
field 
between 1994 - 2004. 
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Appendix 3 
DAILYPRINCETONIAN. COM =: °_^ý_ 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
Strong researchers lead top colleges 
By Alex Gennis 
Princetonian Contributor 
A recent study in higher education questions the common belief 
that presidents of the most well-known universities are chosen 
based on their fundraising and leadership qualities. 
The study, which will be published in the Journal of 
Documentation, instead says there is a positive correlation between 
"the lifetime citations of a university's president and the position of 
that university in the global rankings. " 
President Shirley Tilghman, who was on the search committee for 
Princeton University's president before being nominated herself, 
found the results of the study consistent with what she looked for in 
Princeton's next leader. 
"The rationale for ranking academic excellence very highly is the 
enormous importance we place on the president having the respect 
of the faculty. Without that, it is very difficult to lead a research 
university, " Tilghman said in an email. "By having an academic at 
the helm, the university is stating clearly what it values most highly. " 
"I am not at all surprised by the findings in this paper. It seems 
entirely consistent with what I would have predicted in advance, " 
she said. 
Amanda H. Goodall, the postdoctoral researcher at Warwick 
Business School who conducted the study, listed several possible 
hypotheses to explain the correlation she found. For instance, a 
highly cited researcher carries symbolic significance in the eyes of 
faculty, or research ability might simply be a proxy for leadership 
and fundraising ability. 
"The best researchers might have greater inherent knowledge 
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about the core business of the university, " Goodall said. 
The study found that the United States is far ahead of the rest of 
the world in terms of attracting the best researchers for its 
administrative positions. 
Goodall said this might be due to the more bureaucratic style of 
education systems in Europe, which could put off potential leaders. 
Tuition at American universities also tends to be higher, she said, 
allowing for higher compensations for their faculty and 
administration. 
Goodall also found that, of the 15 female presidents at the top 
100 universities, six of them lead universities in the top 20. "Top 
universities may be more progressive in terms of hiring their 
leaders, " she said. 
The study used the number of references to the works of a 
particular researcher in other academic papers as the criteria for 
judging a president's level of academic involvement. 
Goodall said she relied on peer assessment because other 
researchers in the field are the best arbiters of the quality of a 
particular person's research. 
"It is very difficult to find a method of judging that is not 
subjective, " she said. 
Tilghman said she disagreed with the methodology used for 
ranking academic involvement. 
"Counting citations is a very, very poor way to judge excellence 
and academic accomplishment, " she said. 
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